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ABSTRACT
AUTOMATED NEGOTIATION FOR COMPLEX
MULTI-AGENT RESOURCE ALLOCATION
FEBRUARY 2011
BO AN
B.Sc., CHONGQING UNIVERSITY
M.Sc., CHONGQING UNIVERSITY
M.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Victor Lesser
The problem of constructing and analyzing systems of intelligent, autonomous
agents is becoming more and more important. These agents may include people,
physical robots, virtual humans, software programs acting on behalf of human be-
ings, or sensors. In a large class of multi-agent scenarios, agents may have different
capabilities, preferences, objectives, and constraints. Therefore, efficient allocation of
resources among multiple agents is often difficult to achieve. Automated negotiation
(bargaining) is the most widely used approach for multi-agent resource allocation and
it has received increasing attention in the recent years. However, information uncer-
tainty, existence of multiple contracting partners and competitors, agents’ incentive
to maximize individual utilities, and market dynamics make it difficult to calculate
agents’ rational equilibrium negotiation strategies and develop successful negotiation
vi
agents behaving well in practice. To this end, this thesis is concerned with analyzing
agents’ rational behavior and developing negotiation strategies for a range of complex
negotiation contexts.
First, we consider the problem of finding agents’ rational strategies in bargaining
with incomplete information. We focus on the principal alternating-offers finite hori-
zon bargaining protocol with one-sided uncertainty regarding agents’ reserve prices.
We provide an algorithm based on the combination of game theoretic analysis and
search techniques which finds agents’ equilibrium in pure strategies when they exist.
Our approach is sound, complete and, in principle, can be applied to other uncertainty
settings. Simulation results show that there is at least one pure strategy sequential
equilibrium in 99.7% of various scenarios. In addition, agents with equilibrium strate-
gies achieved higher utilities than agents with heuristic strategies.
Next, we extend the alternating-offers protocol to handle concurrent negotiations
in which each agent has multiple trading opportunities and faces market competition.
We provide an algorithm based on backward induction to compute the subgame
perfect equilibrium of concurrent negotiation. We observe that agents’ bargaining
power are affected by the proposing ordering and market competition and for a large
subset of the space of the parameters, agents’ equilibrium strategies depend on the
values of a small number of parameters. We also extend our algorithm to find a pure
strategy sequential equilibrium in concurrent negotiations where there is one-sided
uncertainty regarding the reserve price of one agent.
Third, we present the design and implementation of agents that concurrently
negotiate with other entities for acquiring multiple resources. Negotiation agents
are designed to adjust 1) the number of tentative agreements and 2) the amount of
concession they are willing to make in response to changing market conditions and
negotiation situations. In our approach, agents utilize a time-dependent negotiation
strategy in which the reserve price of each resource is dynamically determined by 1)
vii
the likelihood that negotiation will not be successfully completed, 2) the expected
agreement price of the resource, and 3) the expected number of final agreements.
The negotiation deadline of each resource is determined by its relative scarcity. Since
agents are permitted to decommit from agreements, a buyer may make more than
one tentative agreement for each resource and the maximum number of tentative
agreements is constrained by the market situation. Experimental results show that
our negotiation strategy achieved significantly higher utilities than simpler strategies.
Finally, we consider the problem of allocating networked resources in dynamic
environment, such as cloud computing platforms, where providers strategically price
resources to maximize their utility. While numerous auction-based approaches have
been proposed in the literature, our work explores an alternative approach where
providers and consumers negotiate resource leasing contracts. We propose a dis-
tributed negotiation mechanism where agents negotiate over both a contract price
and a decommitment penalty, which allows agents to decommit from contracts at a
cost. We compare our approach experimentally, using representative scenarios and
workloads, to both combinatorial auctions and the fixed-price model, and show that
the negotiation model achieves a higher social welfare.
viii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
The problem of resource allocation is ubiquitous in many diverse research fields
such as economics, operations research, and computer science, and is relevant to a
wide range of applications, e.g., electronic commerce, supply chain, sensor networks,
web/grid service composition, workflow, and enterprise integration. In systems involv-
ing multiple autonomous agents, it is often necessary to decide how scarce resources
should be allocated. The allocation of resources within a system of autonomous
agents is a challenging and exciting area of research at the interface of computer sci-
ence and economics. There are (at least) two different lines of work, depending on
how decisions about allocations are made. In centralized approaches like combina-
torial auctions [26, 42], agents simply report their preferences and wait for the final
allocation to be made by the auctioneer or some other central entity. However, it
is often impractical to adopt a centralized approach for resource allocation problems
due to various constraints, e.g., computational overhead, communication constraints,
privacy, and real-time requirements. In distributed approaches, allocations evolve in
an asynchronous way, by means of local negotiations among agents.
Negotiation has been treated as a key approach for resource allocation problems
and has been applied to e-commerce, manufacturing planning, sensor networks, cloud
computing, and distributed vehicle routing [10, 75, 119]. Automated negotiation is
an important research area bridging together economics, game theory, and artificial
intelligence. It has received prominent attention in recent years [70] and its impor-
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tance is widely acknowledged since intelligent agents that negotiate with each other
on behalf of human users are expected to lead to more efficient negotiations [120].
A very common class of negotiation is bargaining.1 It refers to a situation in which
individual agents have the possibility of concluding a mutually beneficial agreement
which could not be imposed without all individuals’ approval. In intelligent agent
systems like electronic markets, agents negotiate with each other through some form
of negotiation protocol and negotiation capabilities for software agents are a central
concern. Specifically, agents need to employ certain strategies to make negotiation
decisions on behalf of the parties they represent with the aim of maximizing benefit
for their users. One open question about automated negotiation is determining which
strategy to employ, which is a complex decision making task because of the inherent
uncertainty and dynamics of the situation.
In this thesis, we will be concerned with agents’ negotiation strategies in dynamic
and complex negotiation environments in which 1) agents have conflicting objectives
and preferences; 2) agents need to acquire a set of resources; 3) agents have incom-
plete information about others; and 4) agents have multiple trading partners and
trading competitors. The complex negotiation problem has not been studied deeply
in the field. Our approaches will include both theoretic analysis and heuristic imple-
mentation. From a theoretical perspective, we analyze agents’ rational strategies in
bargaining games that more closely mirror the issues in complex negotiation than have
previously been studied. Game theoretic analysis provides insights and theoretical
foundations for developing negotiation agents. For more realistic complex dynamic
bargaining games involving multiple agents, it is impractical to compute agents’ ra-
tional strategies and we design heuristics based negotiation strategies by considering
1Unless a specific distinction is drawn, we use the terms negotiation and bargaining interchange-
ably.
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agents’ constraints, contracting opportunities and market competition.2 As part of
this work, we will also focus on the use of decommitment penalties to handle the
uncertainty present in dynamic and complex bargaining environments.
1.2 Motivating Examples
The focus of this thesis is developing new techniques for complex agent-mediated
negotiation problems in which agents have different goals, preferences, constraints,
and knowledge about others. To motivate the research from a practical perspective,
this section describes two examples of application domains where the approaches
developed in this thesis are needed.
1.2.1 Collaborating, Autonomous Stream Processing Systems (CLASP)
Collaborating, Autonomous Stream Processing Systems (CLASP) [27] is a mid-
dleware for cooperating data stream processing sites, which has been designed and
prototyped in the context of System S project [69] within IBM Research to enable
sophisticated stream processing. There are multiple sites running the System S soft-
ware, each with their own administration and goals. Each site may only have limited
processing capabilities, so cooperation among these sites can frequently be of mutual
benefit and such cooperation enables such sites to increase the scale, breadth, depth,
and reliability of analysis beyond that available within a single site [5].
In System S, a job is an execution unit that accomplishes certain work through
stream analysis. A job takes the form of a processing graph, consisting of resources,
i.e., data sources and processing elements (PEs), which are interconnected in a cer-
tain manner. These resources might be located at multiple different sites. Due to the
potentially large numbers of data sources and PEs needed in complex jobs, and the
2Informally, a rational agent is an agent which has clear preferences, models uncertainty via
expected values, and always chooses to perform the action that results in the optimal outcome for
itself from among all feasible actions.
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existence of functionally equivalent processing graphs, it is infeasible for human users
to manually construct and identify the best alternative graph. System S has a plan-
ning component that can construct processing graphs automatically from high-level
descriptions of desired results [108].
Figure 1.1 illustrates an example of a distributed job execution [27]. Site 3 is
responsible for executing a job, which can be decomposed to three subjobs, each of
which contains a normal job (for data processing) and multiple tunneling PE jobs
(for data transportation). The Remote Execution Coordinator (REC) of owner site
3 executes the third subjob and dispatches two other subjobs to Sites 1 and 2 for
execution. Site 4 monitors the execution status of Sites 1 and 2. The REC at the
owner site maintains a subjob table about which subjobs are running at which other
site. The table is used for recovery of subjobs on failed sites. The REC executing a
subjob first parses its Job Description Language (JDL) to identify one normal job,
and multiple tunneling PE jobs. One thread is launched to handle each of them. The
thread customizes the JDL, such as assigning a host for each PE. Then it deploys
the job through its local Job Management. For a source PE job, the REC needs to
contact the local Tunneling Manager responsible for assigning the network address
and port on which the source PE will be listening for incoming connections. It deploys
the source PE job and reports the assigned network location to the REC at the owner
site. For a sink PE job, the REC needs to query the REC of the owner site for the
network location of the corresponding source PE. Then it configures and deploys the
sink PE job.
Many resources needed in plans are accessed exclusively. In order for a site to
reserve a limited resource from another site, it must establish an agreement with
the other site, specifying the price of sharing the resource. Consider that a site
receives a job. After planning [108], the site finds that using only its local resources,
it cannot satisfy all resource requirements of the plan. Then, the site negotiates with
4
Figure 1.1. Execution of a distributed job consisting 3 subjobs [27]. Owner Site 3
executes one subjob, and dispatches two subjobs to Site 1 and 2 for execution. Site
4 monitors Sites 1 and 2.
other sites to acquire resources needed using its negotiation management component
[5]. For each resource, there can be multiple providers and the site negotiates with
different resource providers to construct agreements for these resources. The plan can
be executed if and only if all resource requirements are satisfied. Therefore, while
making a proposal to a trading partner for one resource, the site needs to consider the
dynamically changing negotiation environments (e.g., the number of sites requiring
the same resource) and the negotiation situation of other negotiations for the same
resource and for other resources. It also has to consider the total price it will need to
pay for all the resources needed to complete the job. Chapter 5 presents the design
of negotiation strategies for a multi-resource allocation problem abstracted from this
example.
1.2.2 Global Environment for Network Innovations (GENI)
Cloud computing platforms enable consumers to programmatically rent multiple
types of Internet-accessible computing resources. In many cases, these platforms use
recent advances in virtualization to make the resources appear to the consumer as raw
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Figure 1.2. Resource sharing with one consumer and one provider [1]
hardware components, such as machines, storage block devices, sensors, or network
links. For example, Amazon currently operates both the Elastic Compute Cloud
(EC2) and the Elastic Block Store (EBS), where consumers programmatically rent
virtual machines and block devices, respectively. As another example, the Global
Environment for Network Innovations (GENI) project [2] is a recent NSF initiative
that uses a similar paradigm but incorporates a wider range of hardware components,
including not only machines and block devices, but also sensors, mobile devices,
and the network links connecting them, from a wider range of providers, including
universities and industry research labs.
GENI aims to provide a flexible and programmable shared experimental infras-
tructure for the investigation of future internet protocols and software. As explained
in the GENI System Overview [1], one core concept for the suite of GENI infrastruc-
ture is Resource Sharing. That is, multiple researchers can simultaneously share the
infrastructure and each experiment runs within its own, isolated slice created end-to-
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end across the experiment’s GENI resources. Furthermore, GENI experiments will
be an interconnected set of reserved resources on platforms in diverse locations. Re-
searchers will remotely discover, reserve, configure, program, debug, operate, manage,
and teardown distributed systems established across parts of the GENI suite.
To illustrate the GENI’s basic concepts regarding resource sharing, we show an
example with a researcher who wishes to use GENI to perform an experiment [1]. A
GENI Clearinghouse can be treated as a resource provider which can provide a wide
range of resources. Most GENI resource components are not treated as isolated units.
Instead they are parts of aggregates, which are collections of resources managed as
a coherent whole. GENI contain many different kinds of aggregates. For example,
the Clearinghouse in Figure 1.2 controls three aggregates: a computing cluster, a
backbone network, and a metropolitan wireless network.
One core concept of GENI is virtualization in the sense that multiple researchers
can simultaneously share the infrastructure. If the clearinghouse agrees to provide
resources for the researcher, it will create a slice for the researcher. A slice is an empty
container into which experiments can be instantiated and to which researchers and
resources may be bound. The slice in Figure 1.2 extends across three aggregates: a
computer cluster, a backbone network, and a metro wireless network. The resources
within this slice are linked together to form a coherent virtual network in which an ex-
periment can run. By virtualization, this slice will be isolated from other researchers’
slices so that experiments running within the slice will behave consistently no matter
what other researchers are doing within their own GENI slices. Once the slice is cre-
ated, the researcher can download code into her slice, debugs, collects measurements,
and iterates.
Generally there are multiple consumers acquiring resources and multiple clear-
inghouses which can provide resources (see Figure 1.3). Each clearinghouse may be
operated by a private company, other US government agency, or indeed a separate
7
Figure 1.3. Resource sharing with multiple consumers and multiple providers
nation. For a consumer’s resource requirement, there could be multiple clearinghouses
which can satisfy the consumer’s resource requirement separately. In this situation,
the consumer has the opportunity to choose the clearinghouse with the lowest cost.
It is also possible that a consumer’s resource requirement cannot be satisfied by
any single clearinghouse. In this situation, the consumer needs to acquire resources
from multiple clearinghouses which may need to coordinate with each other to sat-
isfy the consumer’s resource requirements. After the consumer makes agreements
with clearinghouses regarding resource sharing, a slice will be created over multiple
clearinghouses.
Each consumer achieves some utility once its resource requirement is satisfied. A
clearinghouse suffers a cost while providing resources. Given the existence of many
resource consumers, the resources provided in the market is “limited”. Therefore,
the problem of allocating resources is an important issue. Since resource consumers
and providers are always trying to maximize their own utilities, it is necessary to
introduce some market mechanism to regulate the behaviors of resource consumers
and providers: clearinghouses charge consumers and in turn consumers pay clear-
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inghouses. Automated negotiation can be used for agents to make agreements on
resource sharing. Chapter 6 discusses a distributed negotiation mechanism for the
dynamic resource allocation problem in GENI.
The negotiation problem in the above two examples has the following features:
• Each agent has a negotiation deadline. A resource consumer’s negotiation dead-
line is the time by which its job has to be executed. The presence of deadline
indicates that an agent may need to make larger concessions when its deadline
is approaching.
• All agents (including all resource consumers and resource providers) are self-
ish. That is, during negotiation, each agent chooses its negotiation strategy
maximizing its (expected) utility. While agents are not cooperative, an agent
often has no optimal strategy and we use the notion of an equilibrium strategy
to define rational behavior of players, which jointly decide the outcome of the
bargaining game. A strategy equilibrium is a profile of players’ strategies so
that no player could benefit by unilaterally deviating from its strategy in the
profile, given that other players follow their strategies in the profile.
• Each agent has incomplete information about others. In a stream processing
system, a site has incomplete information about other sites’ cost of providing
resources. Similarly, a resource provider does not know the exact reserve price
of a site (the highest price the site is willing to pay) which desires its resource.
Furthermore, resource supply and requirement in a stream processing system
change dynamically.
• There could be multiple resource providers for a resource. To acquire a resource,
a resource consumer can negotiate concurrently with all resource providers and
make an agreement with the lowest price provider.
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• A resource consumer also faces market competition from other resource con-
sumers, which indicates that a negotiation agent needs to take the market sit-
uation into account to decide what is a necessary price to pay.
• An agent may need to acquire a set of resources and it gains nothing if it fails to
get all the resources. Therefore, while making a proposal to a trading partner
for one resource, the site needs to consider the dynamically changing negotiation
environments (e.g., the number of sites requiring the same resource) and the
negotiation situation of other negotiations for the same resource and for other
resources, i.e., it is limited in what it can pay for the needed resources.
• In part of this work, we treat decommitment as a feature of negotiation prob-
lems. Since agents can choose to decommit from agreements, an agent may
need to make more than one agreement for each resource. However, the buyer
needs to pay much more by making more agreements. Thus, it is important to
decide how many agreements to make. In some situations, it is also important
to negotiate over both price and decommitment penalty.
The two examples demonstrate many of the issues that will the focus of the the-
sis: negotiation where there is uncertainty about agents’ types, negotiation involving
multiple buyers and sellers, and negotiation where the buyer needs to acquire multiple
resources.
1.3 Automated Negotiation for Complex Resource Alloca-
tion Problems
In designing automated negotiation agents for complex resource allocation prob-
lems we consider in this thesis, and in many others besides, there are a number of open
problems and common issues that need to be dealt with. In addition, it is possible to
identify a range of concepts and approaches that form a solid foundation for tackling
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complex resource allocation problems. This thesis addresses important issues regard-
ing automated negotiation for complex resource allocation problems. Specifically, this
thesis investigates the following three questions:
• What are agents’ equilibrium strategies in bilateral negotiation with uncertain
reserve prices?
• How to compute agents’ equilibrium strategies in concurrent one-to-many and
many-to-many negotiation?
• When an agent needs to acquire multiple resources in a marketplace and it is
allowed to decommit from an existing contract, how to make proposing decisions
and decommiting decisions to achieve a high utility?
• How to develop an efficient negotiation model for resource allocation problems
in dynamic markets such as cloud computing?
1.3.1 Negotiation with Uncertainty
The problem of finding agents’ rational strategies in bargaining with incomplete
information is well known to be challenging and there is no generally applicable algo-
rithm [61]. We focus on finding agents’ rational strategies in incomplete information
bilateral bargaining. We consider the most common bargaining protocol, i.e., the
Rubinstein’s alternating-offers [111], which has been widely used in the bargaining
theory literature, e.g., [61, 112, 117]. We analyze the situation with one-sided un-
certain reserve prices and where agents have deadlines. This problem is customarily
modeled as a Bayesian extensive-form game with infinite number of strategies as the
price is a continuous value. The appropriate solution concept for such a class of game
is sequential equilibrium [79], specifying a pair: a system of beliefs that prescribes how
agents’ beliefs must be updated during the game and strategies that prescribe how
agents should act. In a sequential equilibrium there is a sort of circularity between
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the belief system and strategies: strategies must be sequentially rational given the
belief system and belief system must be consistent with respect to strategies.
The first area of focus is on the development of a novel algorithm to find a pure
strategy sequential equilibrium in bilateral bargaining with multi-type uncertainty
(Chapter 3). Our algorithm combines together game theoretic analysis with state
space search techniques and it is sound and complete. Our approach is based on the
following two observations: 1) with pure strategies, the buyer’s possible choice rules
regarding whether different buyer types behave in the same way or in different ways
at a decision making point are finite, and 2) with pure strategies, the seller’s possible
beliefs regarding whether different buyer types will accept or reject its offer are finite.
We employ a backward approach to find sequential equilibria in the context of a
forward search process: to compute agents’ equilibrium strategy at a continuation
game with certain belief, we search forward to find agents’ equilibria strategies in its
continuation game with different beliefs and consider agents’ all possible choice rules
as well as belief update rules. At the same time, we derive theoretically the agents’
optimal strategies by applying a Bayesian extension of backward induction and check
equilibrium existence conditions.
In addition to developing the algorithm for computing all the sequential equilibria,
we also empirically evaluate the performance of equilibrium strategies against some
representative heuristic based strategies in the literature (e.g., [12, 48, 78, 124, 127]).
Empirical results show that agents with equilibrium strategies achieved higher utilities
than agents with heuristic based strategies. Furthermore, when both agents adopt
the equilibrium strategies, they achieved the highest social welfare than that in all
other strategy combinations.
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1.3.2 One-to-Many and Many-to-Many Negotiation
In the bargaining theory literature, most work focuses on bilateral bargaining. A
variety of negotiation aspects like information and outside options have been studied.
One-to-many and many-to-many negotiations are also very important and widely exist
in many application domains. For one-to-many negotiation, an auction is widely used
and, for many-to-many negotiation, market mechanisms like matching or two-sided
auction seem more intuitively appropriate. Even if an agent interacts with many
agents, a common assumption in the literature is that an agent can pursue only one
negotiation at a time. The result is that an agent may terminate a current negotiation
in disagreement, in spite of possible gains from trade in order to pursue a more
attractive outside alternative. Therefore, the presumption that an agent can pursue
only one negotiation at a time appears to be restrictive. While there has been much
experimental work (e.g., [97, 125]) on one-to-many and many-to-many negotiations in
which an agent concurrently negotiates with multiple agents in discrete time, there is
no game theoretic analysis of agents’ strategic interactions in concurrent one-to-many
and many-to-many negotiations.
The difference between negotiation and market mechanisms (e.g., auctions) is
blurred with the arrival of the Internet and electronic commerce [72]. Negotiation
has been treated as a key component of e-commerce and has been applied to e-
commerce, manufacturing planning, and distributed vehicle routing. While an auction
is the most widely implemented and discussed market mechanism, only recently the
complex, multidimensional, and combinatorial auctions have gained the interest of
researchers and foremost practitioners. Negotiations have been somewhat neglected
as a possible market mechanism. The proliferation and acceptance of web and Internet
technologies made the replacement of some negotiated transactions with auctions not
only possible but also efficient. However, negotiation-based mechanisms still remain
the preferred choice when the good and service attributes are ill-defined and there are
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criteria other than price (e.g., reputation, trust, relation and future contracts) [64]. In
addition, no third party like an auctioneer is needed in bargaining. Strategic agents
may prefer bargaining as they can exploit other agents by using learning, collusion,
and other bargaining techniques. In this work, we compared the efficiency of our
model with some other mechanisms like auctions.
The second focus of this work is on analyzing agents’ strategic behavior in one-to-
many and many-to-many negotiations in which agents are negotiating with multiple
trading partners and, at the same time, are facing competition from trading competi-
tors (Chapter 4). The subgame perfect equilibrium for complete information setting is
presented and equilibrium properties, such us uniqueness, are discussed. We analyze
the reduction of computation in one-to-many settings and many-to-many settings.
We also consider uncertainty about the reserve price of an agent while the reserve
prices of other agents are common knowledge. We extend our approach for bilateral
bargaining to search for sequential equilibrium when each agent is negotiating with
multiple agents.
A central research topic in bargaining theory is understanding bargaining power,
which is related to the relative abilities of agents in a situation to exert influence
over each other. In bilateral bargaining, each agent’s bargaining power is affected by
its reserve price, patience attitude, deadline, etc. When many buyers and sellers are
involved in negotiation, it is important to investigate how the market competition will
affect agents’ equilibrium bargaining strategies. With a large number of buyers and
sellers, a single agent is unlikely to have much influence on the market equilibrium.
Our analysis shows that both bargaining order and market competition affect agents’
bargaining power. We show how an agent’s bargaining power increases with the
number of trading partners (agents of a different type) and decreases with the number
of trading competitors.
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1.3.3 Multi-Resource Negotiation
In electronic commerce markets where selfish agents behave individually, agents
often have to acquire multiple resources in order to accomplish a high level task with
each resource acquisition requiring negotiations with multiple resource providers. For
example, in the CLASP [27], a site may need a set of resources to execute a job.
Therefore, agents may need to engage in multiple negotiations. If the multiple nego-
tiations are not all successful, consumers gain nothing. Such scenarios widely exist in
practical applications. For example, a complex task may need several robots to work
together and the absence of any of these robots results in the failure of the task. This
is a simple form of multi-linked negotiation where the resources are independent but
are interrelated. Resources are independent in the sense that there is no dependence
between different resources, i.e., using one resource doesn’t constrain how the other
resources are used. However, from the perspective of the overall negotiation, resources
are dependent as an agent’s utility from the overall negotiation depends on obtaining
overall agreements on all the resources. The negotiation problem we consider has the
following three features:
1. When acquiring multiple resources, a consumer agent only knows the reserve
price available for the entire set of resources, i.e., the highest price the agent
can pay for all the resources, rather than the reserve price of each separate
resource. In practice, given a plan and its resource requirements, an agent can
easily decide the reserve price for all the resources in that plan based on the
overall worth of the task. However, it is difficult (even impossible) for a resource
consumer to understand how to set the reserve price for each separate resource.
In fact, we show experimentally that it is undesirable to set a fixed reserve price
for an individual resource prior to beginning negotiations.
2. Agents can decommit from tentative agreements at the cost of paying a penalty.
Decommitment allows agents to profitably accommodate new tasks arriving
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or new negotiation events. If these events make some existing contracts less
profitable or infeasible for an agent, that agent can decommit from those con-
tracts [121].
3. Negotiation agents are assumed to have incomplete information about other
agents, for example, a buyer agent knows the distribution of the reserve price
of a seller agent and the number of trading competitors. However, an agent’s
negotiation status (the set of proposals it has received) and negotiation strategy
are its private information. For strategic reasons, a negotiation agent won’t
disclose such information during negotiation. During negotiation, negotiation
agents can quit negotiation at any time, even without notifying their trading
partners. When a buyer acquires multiple resources, it concurrently negotiates
with sellers to reach agreements for all the resources.
Because resource providers and consumers may have different goals, preferences,
interests, and policies, the problem of negotiating an optimal allocation of resources
within a group of agents has been found to be intractable both in computation [45]
and communication [47]. The multi-resource negotiation is even more complex due
to decommitment. The multi-resource negotiation problem is different from multi-
attribute negotiation in which negotiations are bilateral [49, 80, 82]. Sim and Shi
[130] proposed a coordination strategy for multi-resource negotiation where an agent
can negotiate with multiple agents as in this work. Each buyer in [130] knows the
reserve price of each resource in advance and the buyer just needs to decide the
concession strategy for each one-to-many negotiation for one resource. In contrast,
each buyer in this work is assumed to only know the value of its high level task,
i.e., the reserve price of all resources required for the high level task. Furthermore,
a buyer in [130] only makes one tentative agreement but in this work, a buyer may
make more than one tentative agreement. Nguyen and Jennings [97, 98] provide and
evaluate a commitment model for concurrent negotiation. However, the maximum
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number of tentative agreements is determined prior to negotiation. In our work, the
maximum number of tentative agreements is determined by market situation and
will change dynamically during negotiation. In addition, our work studies a multi-
resource negotiation problem, rather than single resource negotiation as in [97, 98].
Furthermore, Nguyen and Jennings [97, 98] make very restrictive assumptions about
agents’ available information.
An agent’s bargaining position in each round is determined by many factors such as
market competition, negotiation deadlines, current agreement set, trading partners’
proposals, and market dynamics. During each round of negotiation, an agent has
to make decisions on how to proceed with each negotiation thread and there are
many possible choices for each decision based on a variety of factors. Thus, it is
difficult to construct an integrated framework in which all these factors are optimized
concurrently. Rather than explicitly model those inter-dependent factors and then
determining each agent’s best decisions by an intractable combined optimization,
the third area of focus (Chapter 5) tries to connect those inter-dependent factors
indirectly and develops a set of heuristics to approximate agents’ decision making
during negotiation. The distinguishing feature of negotiation agents is that they are
designed with the flexibility to adjust 1) the number of tentative agreements for each
resource and 2) the amount of concession by reacting to i) changing market conditions,
and ii) the current negotiation status of all concurrently negotiating threads. In our
approach, agents utilize a time-dependent negotiation strategy in which the reserve
price of each resource is dynamically determined by 1) the likelihood that negotiation
will not be successful (conflict probability), 2) the expected agreement price of the
resource, and 3) the expected number of final agreements given the set of tentative
agreements made so far. The negotiation deadline of each resource is determined
by its scarcity. A buyer agent can make more than one tentative agreement for
each resource and the maximum number of tentative agreements is constrained by
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the market situation in order to avoid the agent’s making agreements more than
necessary.
To evaluate the performance of negotiation agents, a simulation testbed consisting
of a virtual e-Marketplace, a society of trading agents and a controller was imple-
mented. Given that there is no existing negotiation agents dealing with our multi-
resource negotiation problem, for comparison reason, we implemented three other
types of buyers based on existing techniques for single resource negotiation and ne-
gotiation with decommitment. In the experiments, agents were subjected to different
market densities, market types, deadlines, number of resources to acquire or sell, and
supply/demand ratio of each resource. We use a number of performance measures
including expected utility, success rate. Extensive stochastic simulations were car-
ried out for all the combinations of market density, market type and other agents’
characterizations. Experimental results show that the designed negotiation strategy
achieved much better performance than other strategies.
1.3.4 Negotiation with Decommitment for Dynamic Resource Allocation
in Cloud Computing
Cloud computing platforms enable consumers to programmatically rent multiple
types of Internet-accessible computing resources. In many cases, these platforms use
recent advances in virtualization to make the resources appear to the consumer as raw
hardware components, such as machines, storage block devices, sensors, or network
links. There are many reasons why market-oriented mechanisms are attractive for reg-
ulating resource supply and demand for these platforms. Amazon’s goal is to make a
profit by renting their resources to consumers for more than it costs to purchase and
operate them. While GENI is initially operated as a non-profit platform, it allocates
resources from multiple providers that dynamically donate and withdraw them, which
makes centralized allocation difficult as the number of providers scales. Additionally,
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market-oriented allocation mechanisms are attractive since they encourage providers
to contribute resources to GENI in exchange for (real or virtual) currency that in-
creases their access. Recent work has explored a variety of both system [55, 68] and
market [19, 83] structures for resource allocation in market-oriented cloud computing
platforms.
In this work, we focus on a general resource allocation problem that matches the
characteristics of cloud computing platforms and their consumers. Namely, multiple
self-interested agents supply or consume multiple types of resources, where 1) con-
sumers dynamically enter and leave the market, 2) consumers have some bounded
flexibility over when they require resources, and 3) a single provider cannot satisfy
consumers’ resource requirements. The first two characteristics are evident in current
cloud platforms that are available to the general public, which use them to execute
tasks that may or may not have hard deadlines. The motivation for 3) is natural for an
infrastructure like GENI that allocates networked resources from multiple providers,
and is also becoming more prevalent for profit-making enterprises like Amazon as
competitors, such as RackSpace Cloud, become more prominent.
Given these characteristics, we consider the design of a market structure that allo-
cates resources to their most efficient use. A straightforward approach would have all
consumers submit both their resource requirements and bids to a single super agent
that runs an auction, such as the well-known VCG auction [42], to allocate resources.
Since VCG is not necessarily strategy-proof in dynamic settings, this approach does
not necessarily result in the most efficient usage [101]. While efficient online mecha-
nisms have been proposed for dynamic environments, they only work in constrained
settings and often rely on strong assumptions about agents’ knowledge [101]. Fur-
ther, finding an auctioneer that selfish agents will trust and comply with is difficult.
Alternatively, each consumer could run the VCG auction separately, but a provider
may not truthfully report its information due to the existence of other auctions.
19
In this work, we present a negotiation mechanism in which agents make contracts
for resource leases, which bind a set of resources from a provider to a consumer for a
fixed time interval. To accommodate the highly dynamic nature of cloud computing
platforms, we introduce a negotiation mechanism where an agent is able to decommit
from a contract by paying a penalty to the other contract party. Thus, an agent
may find it advantageous to decommit from existing contracts. Rather than setting
decommitment penalties exogenously, we consider the role of negotiation in deciding
decommitment penalties, where agents concurrently negotiate over both the contract
price and the amount of decommitment penalty. We propose negotiating simultane-
ously over contract prices and decommitment penalties since it is difficult for system
designers to decide the optimal contract prices and decommitment penalties that
maximize the social welfare in dynamic environments involving multiple agents. We
show that allowing decommitment improves the efficiency of the resource allocation
mechanism.
Negotiation with uncertainty is both the most challenging problem in the ne-
gotiation literature [61], and is key to successful application of negotiation to real
problems such as cloud computing. The literature provides a limited number of
closed form results with narrow uncertainty settings using bilateral bargaining that
considers only one type of uncertainty, such as a negotiation deadline [61] or reserve
price [6]. In contrast, we consider negotiation between multiple agents in dynamic en-
vironments where there are multiple types of uncertainty that increases the difficulty
of computing agents’ rational equilibrium strategies. As a result, we bound agents’
rationality and design negotiation strategies for them following the negotiation deci-
sion functions paradigm [11, 48]. Our negotiation problem is complex due to market
dynamics, uncertainty, multiple contracting opportunities, resource competition, and
decommitment. As a result, constructing an integrated framework for each agent
that optimizes these factors concurrently is difficult. Rather than explicitly model
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these inter-dependent factors and determine each agent’s best decisions through an in-
tractable combined optimization, we connect these inter-dependent factors indirectly
and develop a set of heuristics to approximate agents’ decision-making during nego-
tiation. The distinguishing characteristic of our negotiation agents is their flexibility
to adjust their decisions, such as making offers, by reacting to changing negotiation
status, while also considering the time constraints, resource competition, and resource
cost.
We evaluate our negotiation mechanism on a simulation testbed against two well-
known mechanisms—combinatorial auctions and Amazon’s fixed-price model. Exper-
imental results show that our negotiation mechanism achieves a higher social welfare
than either mechanism in a wide range of scenarios. Further, we show that setting
penalties through negotiation achieves a higher social welfare than exogenous mech-
anisms for setting penalties.
1.4 Main Contributions
The work described in this thesis makes a number of important contributions to
the state of the art in the area of agent mediated negotiation by looking at more
complex bargaining problems from both theoretical and heuristic perspectives. The
contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
• We present a novel algorithm to find a pure strategy sequential equilibrium in
bilateral bargaining with multi-type uncertainty [6]. Our algorithm goes beyond
existing algorithms dealing with complete information settings. Our approach is
not specific to an application and it can be applied to other uncertainty settings,
e.g., bilateral bargaining with uncertain discount factors, multi-issue negotiation
with uncertain weight functions [51], and sequential auction (potentially over
multiple goods).
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• We extend the alternating-offers protocol to handle multiple trading opportu-
nities and market competition [7]. We provide an algorithm based on backward
induction to compute the subgame perfect equilibrium of concurrent one-to-
many negotiation and many-to-many negotiation. There is no existing work on
analyzing agents’ equilibrium strategies in concurrent negotiation in markets.
• We present the design, implementation, and experimental evaluation of nego-
tiation agents that negotiate for multiple resources where agents don’t know
the reserve price of each resource and are allowed to decommit from existing
agreements [11, 12]. Existing work only considers single resource negotiation
and often make unrealistic assumptions about agents’ knowledge.
• We propose a distributed negotiation mechanism for the problem of allocating
networked resources in dynamic environment, such as cloud computing plat-
forms. In our approach, providers and consumers automatically negotiate re-
source leasing contracts as well as decommitment penalties. Experimental re-
sults show the advantage of the negotiation model over different combinatorial
auction mechanisms and Amazon’s fixed price model. This is the first work that
shows the importance of negotiation over decommitment penalties.
1.5 Thesis Organization
The rest of this thesis is structured in the following manner: In Chapter 2, we
discuss related research on automated negotiation, including both theoretic work and
empirical work. Subsequently, in Chapter 3, we present an algorithm for finding
agents’ equilibrium in pure strategies in bargaining with one-side uncertainty about
agents’ reserve prices. Next, in Chapter 4, we analyze agents’ equilibrium strate-
gies in one-to-many and many-to-many negotiations. After that, in Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6, we consider more practical multi-agent resource allocation problems. In
22
Chapter 5, we present the design and implementation of agents that concurrently ne-
gotiate with other entities for acquiring multiple resources as the negotiation problem
in Section 1.2.1. In Chapter 6, we discuss the distributed negotiation mechanism for
the problem of allocating networked resources in cloud computing platforms such as
the GENI platform in Section 1.2.2. We finally summarize the contributions in this
thesis and outline future directions In Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW ON AUTOMATED
NEGOTIATION
Automated negotiation is an important research area bridging together economics,
game theory, and artificial intelligence. Bargaining (or negotiation) refers to a situa-
tion in which individual agents have the possibility of concluding a mutually beneficial
agreement which could not be imposed without all individuals’ approval. A bargain-
ing theory is an exploration of the relation between the outcome of bargaining and
the characteristics of the situation. Cooperative bargaining theory (axiomatic ap-
proach) initiated by Nash [95] is concerned with the outcome of bargaining given
the list of properties (e.g., stability, fairness) the outcomes are required to satisfy.
In the non-cooperative bargaining theory (strategic approach), the outcome is an
equilibrium of an explicit model of the bargaining process. The strategic bargaining
has received more attention following Rubinstein’s path-breaking work [111]. In this
chapter we provide an extensive literature review on the research of non-cooperative
negotiation in the fields of economics and artificial intelligence.1 The research in the
economics community mainly focuses on computing agents’ equilibrium strategies
and the research in the AI part contributes to the development of software agents
which negotiate on behalf of their users in realistic environments in which it is often
impossible to compute agents’ equilibrium strategies. We also discuss some market
mechanisms for resource allocation problems.
1An interested reader can refer to [70, 77, 107] for further discussions.
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2.1 Negotiation as a Mechanism
Automated negotiation research can be considered to deal with three broad top-
ics: negotiation protocols, negotiation objects and strategies. According to [70], a
negotiation protocol is a set of rules that govern the interaction which cover the per-
missible types of participants (e.g., the negotiators and any relevant third parties),
the negotiation states (e.g., accepting bids, negotiation closed), the events that cause
negotiation states to change (e.g., no more bidders, bid accepted) and the valid actions
of the participants in particular states (e.g., which messages can be sent by whom,
to whom, at what stage). This section discusses a variety of negotiation protocols
and we start with the formal bargaining mechanism design in the mechanism design
literature.
2.1.1 Bargaining Mechanism Design
Bargaining mechanism design generally focuses on bilateral monopoly, in which a
buyer and a seller are bargaining over the price of an object (e.g., a good). Myerson-
Satterthwaite theorem [94] is one of the most remarkable negative results in eco-
nomics. Informally, Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem says that there is no efficient
way for two parties to trade a good when they each have secret and probabilistically
varying valuations for it, without the risk of forcing one party to trade at a loss. My-
erson and Satterthwaite analyze bargaining as a static direct revelation game in which
each player reports its type to a third party, and the third party chooses whether the
object is transferred, and how much the buyer must pay. Chatterjee and Samuel-
son [36] analyze a strategic game in which both players make offers simultaneously,
and the trade occurs at a price between the two offers if the seller’s offer is less than
the buyer’s offer. This game is closely related to the direct revelation game since
it is static. Moreover, it can be shown that for a particular class of examples, the
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simultaneous-offers game implements the direct revelation game in which the outcome
functions are chosen to maximize the players’ ex ante utility.
It is unrealistic to use a bargaining mechanism that forces agents to walk away from
known positive gains from a potential trade since such mechanisms violate a broad
interpretation of sequential rationality [40]. Cramton [40] examined the bargaining
problem as a sequential direct revelation game, focusing on both the role of incomplete
information and sequential aspects of bargaining. The difference between the static
direct revelation game in [94] and the sequential direct revelation game in [40] is that
in the sequential game, the outcome functions not only determine the probability
and terms of trade, but also dictate when trade is to take place. In the static game
trade may occur only at time zero whereas in the sequential game trade may occur
at different times depending on the players’ reports of their private information.
Analyzing sequential bargaining mechanisms enable one to infer what the players’
learning process is over time and to study what bargaining outcomes are possible
when the bargainers are unable to make binding agreements.
Efficient bargaining mechanisms strongly depend on the bargaining settings char-
acterized by agents’ preferences and knowledge. Athey and Segal [16] consider the
problem of allocating a good between two players in each period of an infinite-horizon
game. The players’ valuations in each period are private information, and the valua-
tions change over time following a first-order Markov process. They analyze conditions
under which there exists an efficient, Bayesian incentive-compatible, individually ra-
tional, budget-balanced mechanism, when the mechanism designer has commitment
power.2
2A mechanism is Bayesian incentive-compatible if telling truth is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
of the game induced by the mechanism. A mechanism is individually rational if an agent can
always achieve as much expected utility from participation as without participation. A mechanism
is budget-balanced if there are no net transfers out of the system or into the system.
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Mechanism design is a powerful theory for studying incentive problems in bar-
gaining. We are able to characterize the set of attainable outcomes and determine
optimal or efficient trading mechanisms. However, mechanism design has a number of
weaknesses [18]. First, the mechanisms may depend on the traders’ beliefs and utility
functions, which are assumed to be common knowledge. In addition, it is difficult to
find a “satisfactory” bargaining mechanisms [94]. In practice, bargainers use simple
negotiation protocols (e.g., the most widely used alternating-offers protocol [111]) that
do not depend on agents’ beliefs or utility functions. Given a negotiation protocol, the
focus is then on analyzing agents’ equilibrium strategies in the strategic bargaining
game. An important distinction between direct revelation games and strategic games
is that the direct revelation game does not explicitly model the process of bargaining.
The sequence of offers and replies that eventually leads to an outcome is not studied
in the direct revelation game as it is in strategic games.
2.1.2 Alternating-offers protocol and its extensions
The most widely used bargaining protocol in strategic bargaining games is the
alternating-offers protocol, which was was pioneered by Stahl [132] and Rubinstein [111]
in a setting with complete information. The alternating-offers game represents a very
general bargaining rule: at any time, a bargainer may make a new offer or accept
the most recent offer of its opponent. The alternating-offers protocol captures the
most important features of bargaining: bargaining consists of a sequence of offers and
decisions to accept or reject these offers. The alternating-offers protocol has been
widely used in the bargaining theory literature, e.g., [61, 112, 117], just to name a
few.
The original alternating-offers protocol is designed for the simple discrete time
bilateral single-issue negotiation and the allowed actions include offer and accept .
The alternating-offers protocol has been extended in a variety of ways to handle
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more complex negotiation situations, e.g., deadline, one-to-many negotiation, and
decommitment. In realistic applications, agents often face deadlines and the action
quit allows an agent to quit a negotiation before its deadline approaches. In addition
to bilateral negotiation, one-to-many and many-to-many negotiations are also very
important and widely exist in many application domains like e-commerce as well as in
human society [5, 97, 98]. In automated negotiation systems for self-interested agents,
contracts have traditionally been binding and do not allow agents to efficiently deal
with future events in the environment. Sandholm and Lesser [121] proposed leveled-
commitment contracts which allow an agent to be freed from an existing contract at
the cost of simply paying a penalty to the other contract party. A self-interested agent
will be reluctant to decommit because the other contract party might decommit, in
which case the former agent gets freed from the contract, does not incur a penalty, and
collects a penalty from the other party. Despite such strategic decommiting, leveled-
commitment increases the expected payoffs of all contract parties and can enable deals
that are impossible under full commitment [121]. Negotiation with decommitment
has been applied in a variety of applications [5, 97, 98].
The contract net protocol (CNP) [131] is a simple negotiation protocol for dis-
tributed problem-solving based on the notion of call for bids on markets. The original
CNP protocol is for cooperative problem solving and it has a number of limitations.
For example, in the original CNP model, a contractor can only respond to bids se-
quentially. However, in a multi-agent system, several managers may concurrently call
for bids and it is important to give each contractor the opportunity to concurrently
negotiate with multiple managers and optimize its utility. In addition, there is no
counter-proposing in the CNP model. The original CNP protocol has been extended
in different applications. In the work on TRACONET [115, 118], a formal model
based on marginal cost calculation was proposed for bounded rational self-interested
agents to make announcing, bidding and awarding decisions. In early CNP imple-
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mentations, tasks were negotiated one at a time, which is insufficient. Sandholm [113]
analyzed task reallocation where individually rational agents contract tasks among
themselves based on marginal costs and propose different contract types to facilitate
negotiation. Aknine et al. [4] proposed an extended version of CNP to support con-
current negotiation processed for the task contractor service provider. Later, Dang
and Huhns [43] extended the model to allow counter-proposing.
We consider both bilateral negotiation and concurrent negotiation. We use the
most widely used alternating-offers protocol to study bilateral bargaining. To acco-
madate one-to-many negotiation, we extend the alternating-offers protocol by intro-
ducing another action confirm to avoid agents’ non-reasonable behaviors as in the
ADEPT (Advanced Decision Environment for Process Tasks) multi-agent architec-
ture [71]. If one seller s accepts an offer from a buyer b, buyer b needs to confirm
the acceptance to reach an agreement. Notice that, in absence of the action confirm,
if buyer b makes offers to multiple sellers and all these accept, buyer b must buy
multiple items. In presence of the action confirm, buyer b is in the position to choose
only one contract.
2.2 Equilibrium strategies in Strategic Bargaining Game
Strategic bargaining theory uses the notion of an equilibrium strategy to define
rational behavior of bargaining agents, which jointly decide the outcome of a bar-
gaining game. A strategy equilibrium is a profile of players’ strategies so that no
player could benefit by unilaterally deviating from its strategy in the profile, given
that other players follow their strategies in the profile.
A game is with complete information if the preference information of a player
is known to all other players, otherwise it is a game with incomplete information.
When both agents have complete information about each other, the appropriate
solution concepts are Nash equilibria for one-shot bargaining games and subgame
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perfect equilibria (SPE) for multi-stage bargaining games. The strategies chosen by
all players are said to be in Nash equilibrium if no player has anything to gain by
changing only his or her own strategy unilaterally. A subgame perfect equilibrium
refines the Nash equilibria in dynamic games. A strategy profile is a subgame perfect
equilibrium if it represents a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the original game.
Rubinstein [111] studies the alternating-offers game with infinite horizon. It describes
two-person bargaining as an extensive game with perfect information in which the
players alternate offers. A key assumption is that the players are impatient. The
main result gives conditions under which the game has a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium and characterizes this equilibrium.
For a dynamic bargaining game with incomplete information, the appropriate so-
lution concept for such a class of game is sequential equilibrium [58], specifying a
pair: a system of beliefs that prescribes how agents’ beliefs must be updated during
the game and strategies that prescribe how agents should act. A belief gives, for
each information set of the game belonging to the player, a probability distribution
on the nodes in the information set. In a sequential equilibrium there is a sort of
circularity between the belief system and strategies: strategies must be sequentially
rational given the belief system and belief system must be consistent with respect
to strategies. The study of bargaining with uncertain information is well known to
be a challenging problem due to this circularity and there is no generally applicable
algorithm for such problem in the literature. Operations research inspired algorithms
such as Miltersen-Sorensen [92] work only on games with finite number of strategies,
and therefore cannot be applied to bargaining in which each agent’s strategy space
is generally continuous. Enumeration based methods were used in [104] to compute
Nash equilibria. They enumerate the agents’ strategy supports. This approach can-
not be applied in bargaining problems since the number of strategies of each agent is
infinite. Several attempts to extend the backward induction method [58] have been
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tried, but they work for very restrictive cases. This is because in the computation
of the equilibrium they break down the circularity between strategies and the belief
system. For example, Fatima et al. [51, 52] present an algorithm to produce equilib-
rium strategies in multi-issue bargaining with uncertain reserve prices. By exploiting
backward induction, their algorithm searches agents’ strategy space from the deadline
to the beginning of negotiation with the initial beliefs. Once the optimal strategies
at the beginning of negotiation have been found, the system of beliefs are designed to
be consistent with them. However, the optimization in their approach is myopic since
it did not take into account its information effects. As a result, the strategies found
by their approach are not guaranteed to be sequentially rational given the designed
system of beliefs [61]. We will discuss this further in Chapter 3.
The microeconomic literature provides a number of closed form results with very
narrow uncertainty settings, e.g., uncertainty regarding deadlines, reserve prices, and
discounting factors. Rubinstein [112] considered bilateral infinite horizon bargaining
with uncertainty over two possible discount factors. Sandholm and Vulkan [117] con-
sider a continues time bilateral bargaining with uncertainty deadlines and show that
the only sequential equilibrium outcome is one where the agents wait until the first
deadline, at which point that agent concedes everything to the other. In other words,
bargaining game is a “waiting” game. Gatti et al. [61] provided an algorithm to com-
pute agents’ equilibrium strategies in bilateral bargaining with one-sided uncertain
deadlines. In bargaining models with incomplete information, there could be multi-
ple sequential equilibria (e.g., [112]) and most of these equilibria are supported by
optimistic conjectures by the uninformed player. Bikhchandani [23] discussed how to
eliminate some equilibria by placing restrictions on beliefs off equilibrium paths. The
only known result about bargaining with uncertain reserve prices is due to Chatterjee
and Samuelson [34, 35] where they studied bilateral infinite horizon bargaining with
two-type uncertainty over the reservation values. The absence of agents’ deadlines
31
makes these two results nonapplicable to the situation we study. In this work, we
present a novel algorithm to compute sequential equilibrium strategies for bilateral
finite horizon bargaining with uncertain reserve prices. Our approach can be applied
to many other bargaining settings, like the multi-issue negotiation considered in [51].
Another challenging problem in bargaining theory is multi-issue negotiation, which
is more complex and challenging than a single-issue negotiation (an interested reader
can refer to [81] for a more detailed review). With multiple issues, agents need to
decide the negotiation procedure and agreement implementation. There usually exist
different types of negotiation procedures [51] like package (simultaneous) deal, separate
negotiation, and sequential negotiation. Package deal means two agents negotiate a
complete package on all issues simultaneously. Separate negotiation means agents
negotiate each issue separately (independently & simultaneously). For sequential
negotiation in which two agents negotiate issue by issue sequentially, agents need to
decide a negotiation agenda (order of negotiation issues) [50]. There are generally two
ways to decide the negotiation agenda: endogenous, i.e., allow the bargainers to decide
which issue they will negotiate next during the process of negotiation, and exogenous
agendas, i.e., fix the agenda exogenously as part of the negotiation procedure. For
agreement implementation, there can be two types: sequential and simultaneous.
Sequential implementation means the agreement on each issue is implemented once
it is reached, while simultaneous implementation is that agreements are implemented
together when all issues are settled.
There are two important questions regarding multi-issue negotiation. The first
question is determining the best procedure in terms of efficiency and the optimal
procedures in different settings are different. Busch and Horstmann [30] show that
if agents are heterogeneous, agents might have conflicting favors on the procedures.
Lang and Rosenthal [84] argue that the package deal is better if agents’ payoff func-
tions are concave. When there is a risk of breakdown due to agents’ deadline, it is
32
found that in a noncooperative bargaining model with alternating offers and time
preferences, the timing of issues (the agenda) matters and simultaneous bargaining
over “packages” should be a prevailing phenomenon [67]. Fatima et al. [51] study
different procedures for bilateral multi-issue negotiation and show that the package
deal is the optimal procedure. For incomplete information multi-issue negotiation,
it is necessary to consider the signaling factor. Bac and Raff [20] study a case with
two simultaneous and identical pies where agents can either choose sequential negoti-
ation with sequential implementation or simultaneous negotiation with simultaneous
implementation. They show that as long as there is incomplete information about
bargaining strength, players may engage in issue-by-issue negotiations even if 1) the
issues are perfect substitutes and players are only concerned with maximizing their
gains from settling the complete set of issues, and 2) there are no transaction costs
involved in negotiating a complete package. Busch and Horstmann [31] show that
issue-by-issue bargaining arises endogenously as part of a separating equilibrium in
which agenda choice is used to signal bargaining strength.
The other important question regarding multi-issue negotiation is selecting the
negotiation agenda while using the issue-by-issue approach. Flamini [54] shows that
there is a Pareto superior agenda among the issue-by-issue procedures. Fershtman [53]
defines two different agendas with simultaneous implementation and shows that 1)
when agents have identical preferences, the highest payoff under the big pie first
agenda is higher than that under the small pie first agenda and 2) when agents have
conflicting preferences, they prefer the first issue negotiated to be least important to
themselves but most import to the opponent. In and Serrano [66] show that restricting
agendas yields multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes because it creates strong forms
of non-concave payoff frontiers. Busch and Horstmann [29] explore how bargaining
conflicts and procedures interact to determine players’ bargaining costs in multi-
issue bargaining settings. They show that when bargaining frictions take the form
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of discounting and agreements are implemented as they are reached, issue-by-issue
negotiation can generate bargaining costs different from those that occur if all issues
are bargained simultaneously.
While the bargaining theory literature mainly focuses on bilateral bargaining, it
also considers an agent’s other contracting opportunities in terms of “outside op-
tions”. That is, a negotiating agent can exit the current negotiation and negotiates
with another trading partner. The outside option strategic factor has been explored
in different ways. While Shaked and Sutton [123] look at fixed exogenous outside
options in complete information settings, Fudenberg et al. [59] consider incomplete
information bargaining with outside opportunities. Muthoo [93] studies a model of
the situation in which two players are bargaining face-to-face over the partition of
a unit size cake and, moreover, one of the players can choose to temporarily leave
the negotiating table to search for an outside option. A main conclusion is that the
equilibrium outcome does not depend on whether a bargainer is allowed (within the
game form) to choose to return to the negotiating table to resume bargaining after
having searched for some finite time. There are also some work (e.g., [33, 60]) on
modeling outside option as a sequential search process, where an agent can choose to
search for other offers and return to bargaining at any time. The search policy and
bargaining strategies are related due to the search cost.
2.3 Designing Negotiation Agents
Research on negotiation in the economics field considers relatively simple bargain-
ing scenarios, e.g., there are only two agents, each agent has knowledge about other
agents’ preference and goals. However, in realistic applications, agents often have
high level tasks with complex structures in dynamic uncertain environments and it is
often impossible to compute agents’ equilibrium strategies. In addition, game theo-
retic analysis often makes strong assumptions about agents’ knowledge, which limits
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the practical applicability of game theoretic results. Furthermore, game theoretic so-
lutions in which agents are assumed to be fully rational cannot be applied to realistic
negotiation problems as, in practice, it’s not reasonable to assume agents’ full ratio-
nality. In contrast, agents adopting AI approaches often have bounded rationality
and make “satisfying” decisions based on heuristics. Research in economics and AI
have different methodologies and concerns and their contributions complement each
other. Research in economics provides insights and theoretical foundations for de-
signing good heuristics, and heuristic approaches provide approximate solutions for
realistic negotiations problems.
Negotiation strategy : Heuristic search has been widely used by bounded rational
agents to find approximate solutions. To build more flexible and sophisticated ne-
gotiation agents, Faratin et al. [48, 71] devised a negotiation model that defines a
range of Negotiation Decision Functions (NDFs) for generating (counter-)proposals
based on time, resource, and behaviors of negotiators. In the time-dependent tactics,
an agent submits offers that change monotonically from the minimum (best) to the
maximum (worst) of the deal that she can agree on, and the rate of change depends
on time. There are different time-dependent tactics depending on the changing rate
of offers. The pressure of deadline has been widely studied. For example, Kraus et al.
[78] proposed a strategic model in which the passage of time was taken into account.
It has been shown that if agents use sequential equilibrium strategies, negotiation
will end rapidly. The resource-dependent tactics are similar to the time-dependent
ones in which time is the sole considered resource. The resource-dependent tactics are
modeled in the same way as the time-dependent ones by using the same functions.
The difference is that the resource-dependent tactics either, 1) have dynamic value
of the maximum available resource, or 2) make the changing rate function depend on
an estimation of the amount of a particular resource. The behavior-dependent tactics
compute the next offer based on the previous attitude of the negotiation opponent.
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These tactics are especially important in cooperative problem solving negotiation
settings, or integrative negotiations, by allowing agents to consider the other agents’
behavior. Sim et al. [124, 127] consider other factors, such as competition, trading al-
ternatives, and differences of negotiators, and propose market-driven agents (MDAs)
which can make minimally sufficient concessions. A game theoretical analysis of this
approach [125] shows that the strategies of MDAs are in sequential equilibrium and
market equilibrium for some specific bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Like
MDAs, our negotiation agents for multi-resource negotiation make negotiation deci-
sions taking into account market dynamics and negotiation status of all negotiation
threads for all resources.
Multi-issue negotiation: There are two different definitions of a negotiation issue
in the literature. In papers like [49, 80, 82], an issue is an attribute (e.g., price, qual-
ity, delivery time) of a resource. In this case, multi-issue negotiation is bilateral. An
issue can also be treated as a resource as in [51, 128, 130] and in this case, a buyer
can negotiate with multiple sellers for each resource. If a seller has multiple resources,
such multi-resource negotiation could be bilateral and each resource can be treated
as an attribute. Multi-issue negotiation is more complex and challenging than single-
issue negotiation as the solution space is multi-dimensional and it’s often difficult to
reach a Pareto-efficient solution [81]. Almost all the work on multi-issue negotiation
focuses on bilateral negotiation and a variety of learning and searching methods are
used, e.g., case-based reasoning [133], similarity criteria based search [49], decentral-
ized search [80, 82]. Klein et al. [73] propose a simulated annealing based approach
appropriate for negotiating such complex contracts that achieves near-optimal so-
cial welfare for negotiations with binary issue dependencies. Different from related
work on bilateral multi-issue negotiation, this work studies multi-resource negotiation
where resources are provided by multiple agents and thus an agent is negotiating with
multiple trading partners.
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One-to-many and many-to-many negotiation: In many situations, an agent has
an opportunity to make an agreement with more than one trading partners. An
agent may also face the competition from agents of the same type, e.g., a buyer in
negotiation faces competition from other buyers. Even if an agent interacts with
many agents, an agent can pursue only one negotiation at a time in some models. An
agent has to terminate a current negotiation in disagreement first, and then pursue a
more attractive outside alternative. This kind of model is called bilateral negotiation
with outside options [87, 100]. However, the presumption that an agent can pursue
only one negotiation at a time appears to be restrictive. In one-to-many negotiation
[13, 14, 28, 96, 97, 98, 106, 128, 130], an agent can concurrently negotiate with
multiple trading partners and an agent’s proposal to one trading partner is affected
by the status of its negotiation with other trading partners. In this work, each agent
concurrently negotiates with multiple trading partners for multiple resources and an
agent’s proposals to each trading partner depends on the negotiation with all the
trading partners.
Concurrent negotiations : Sim et al. [128, 130] proposed a coordination strategy
for multi-resource negotiation where an agent can negotiate with multiple agents as
in this work. Each buyer in [128, 130] knows the reserve price of each resource in
advance and the buyer just needs to decide the concession strategy for each one-to-
many negotiation for one resource. However, it is noted since [128, 130] focused on
designing a concurrent mechanism for Grid resource co-allocation, the mechanism
did not assume that consumer agents know the number of competing consumers. In
contrast, each buyer in this work is assumed to only know the value of its high level
task, i.e., the reserve price of all resources required for the high level task. We propose
a set of heuristics for dynamically determining the reserve price of each resource based
on the status of all negotiations. Furthermore, a buyer in [128, 130] only makes one
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tentative agreement but in this work, a buyer may make more than one tentative
agreement.
Organizational negotiation: Zhang et al. have studied a number of sophisticated
negotiation problems in organizational contexts [137, 138]. Automated negotiation
becomes increasingly complex and difficult as 1) agents are large-grained and com-
plex with multiple goals and tasks, 2) agents often have more negotiation tasks and
organizational relationships among heterogeneous agents become more complex, 3)
negotiation process is tightly interleaved with agents’ negotiation, scheduling and
planning processes. Zhang et al. [137, 138] focus more on the coordination (a good
“fit”) of multiple negotiation tasks in organization context and they do not address
agents’ bargaining strategy in complex negotiation environments. In contrast, our
work investigates how agents make concessions in dynamic negotiation environments
where agents have multiple resources to negotiate. Zhang et al. [137] also considered
multi-linked negotiation problems in which an agent needs to negotiate with multiple
other agents about different subjects, and the negotiation over one subject has influ-
ence on negotiations over other subjects. They present a heuristic search algorithm
for finding a near-optimal ordering of negotiation issues and their parameters.
Leveled commitment contracts : Sandholm et al. propose leveled-commitment con-
tracts [121] in which the level of commitment is set by decommiting penalties. How-
ever, they only study the two-player game and they didn’t investigate agents’ bargain-
ing strategies with decommitment from agreements. In addition, the problem setting
in [121] is far from the real-world settings since they make strong assumptions about
agents’ knowledge such as outside options in the future. In the negotiation manage-
ment system for CLASP [5], resource consumers can decommit from agreements made
before at the cost of paying a penalty. However, the focus in their work is only on
the scheduling problem. This work in contrast focuses on agents’ negotiation strate-
gies given that agents can decommit from agreements. Nguyen and Jennings [97, 98]
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provide and evaluate a commitment model for concurrent negotiation. However, the
maximum number of tentative agreements is determined prior to negotiation. In our
work, the maximum number of tentative agreements is determined by the current
market situation and will change dynamically during negotiation. In addition, our
work studies a multi-resource negotiation problem, rather than single resource negoti-
ation as in [97, 98]. Furthermore, Nguyen and Jennings [97, 98] make very restrictive
assumptions about agents’ available information, e.g., each agent is assumed to have
knowledge about 1) other agents’ negotiation strategies, 2) its negotiation success rate
when it adopts certain strategy, and 3) its payoff when it adopts certain strategy. In
this work, we assume that each agent has no knowledge about negotiation outcomes.
Learning in negotiation: A negotiating agent may have limited knowledge about
others. Thus it is important for an agent to have the ability to update its beliefs
based on its interactions with others. A variety of learning techniques have been
used for building negotiation agents. Genetic algorithms (GAs) have been widely
applied to automated negotiation. In general, GAs are used to enhance automated
negotiation in two ways: 1) GAs were used as a decision making component at every
round, e.g., [85], and 2) GAs were used to learn the best strategies, e.g., [13, 91].
Zeng and Sycara [136] present a sequential negotiation model and address multi-agent
learning issues by explicitly modeling beliefs about the negotiation environment and
the participating agents under a probabilistic framework using a Bayesian learning
representation and updating mechanisms. Coehoorn and Jennings [37] showed that
the preferences of a negotiation opponent in bilateral multi-issue negotiations can be
effectively learnt by using kernel density estimation.
Mediation based negotiation: Another approach to resolve negotiation agents’ con-
flicts is mediation. Ehtamo et al. [46] present a mediation-based negotiation frame-
work for making trade-offs between cooperative negotiation agents. Klein et al. [73]
presents a mediator based approach to negotiate complex contracts based on a ran-
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dom searching method. The mediator in this model makes proposals to both agents.
There are two types of negotiators: hill-climber and simulated annealer. Lai et al. [80]
consider self-interested agents and propose a non-biased mediator who applies query
learning to maintain near Pareto-efficiency without heavy computation. The major
limitation of mediation based negotiation is that it ignores agents’ strategic behavior
of selfish negotiation agents. For instance, an agent may not truthfully report its
information to the mediator in order to manipulate the mediation.
2.4 Auction Mechanism
Another class of widely used resource allocation mechanisms is the auction in
which agents bid for the best resources. There are many possible auction designs
depending on issues such as the efficiency of a given auction design, optimal and
equilibrium bidding strategies, and revenue comparison. There are traditionally four
types of auction that are used for single item allocation: 1) First-price sealed-bid
auctions in which bidders simultaneously submit their bids in a sealed envelope. The
individual with the highest bid wins and pays its bidding price. 2) Second-price
sealed-bid auctions (or Vickrey auctions [134]) which is similar to first-price sealed-
bid auctions except that the winner pays a price equal to the exact amount of the
second highest bid. 3) English auctions in which the price is steadily raised by the
auctioneer with bidders dropping out once the price becomes too high. This continues
until there remains only one bidder who wins the auction at the current price. 4)
Dutch auctions in which the auctioneer begins with a high asking price which is
lowered until some participant is willing to accept the price. The winning participant
pays the last announced price.
A combinatorial auction is an auction in which participants can place bids on
combinations of discrete items, or “packages,” rather than just individual items or
continuous quantities (see the recent book [42] for more information about combi-
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natorial auctions). Combinatorial auctions have been widely used in many applica-
tions such as sourcing in Internet commerce [114]. Combinatorial auctions present
challenges compared to traditional auctions. In combinatorial auction schemes, a
centralized controlling agent (the “auctioneer”) assumes responsibility for determin-
ing which agents receive which resources based on the bids submitted by individual
agents. However, the problem of deciding successful bids, i.e., winner determina-
tion problem, is NP-hard [110], meaning that a polynomial-time algorithm to find
the optimal allocation is unlikely ever to be found. In addition, the auctioneer may
face significant computational overload due to a large number of bids with complex
structures.
Our negotiation approach for multi-agent resource allocation is of a distributed
nature. In general, the allocation procedure used to find a suitable allocation of
resources could be either distributed or centralized, e.g., combinatorial auctions. One
of the most important arguments against centralized approaches is that it may be
difficult to find an agent that could assume the role of an “auctioneer”. For instance,
selfish resource providers may not trust the auctioneer and are not willing to comply
with the decisions made by the auctioneer. In distributed approaches like automated
negotiation, on the other hand, allocations emerge as the result of a sequence of
distributed negotiations and each selfish agent acts on behalf of itself. The distributed
model seems more natural in cases where resources belong to different selfish agents
and finding optimal allocations may be (computationally) infeasible.
In dynamic resource allocation problems such as cloud computing, agents need
to reason about future events while making decisions. For such dynamic resource
allocation problem, strategy-proof mechanisms such as the well-known VCG auction
is not necessarily strategy-proof and do not necessarily result in the most efficient
usage [101]. While efficient online mechanisms have been proposed for dynamic envi-
ronments, they only work in constrained settings and often rely on strong assumptions
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about agents’ knowledge (see [21, 101] for a survey). Against this background, we
use distributed negotiation for dynamic resource allocation and compare it with some
representative existing auction mechanisms.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a brief overview of agent mediated negotiation as
well as some market mechanisms. We first introduce the work on bargaining mech-
anism design and strategic bargaining games in economics. Then we discussed the
related work on designing negotiation agents in AI. We also compared our work in this
thesis and the state of the art. Analyzing agents’ rational strategies for incomplete
information bargaining and building agents for complex multi-resource negotiation
are important for negotiation based resource allocation problems, but the literature
does not provide satisfactory solutions. The focus of this thesis is on both challeng-
ing problems in bargaining theory and development of negotiation agents for practical
complex resource allocation problems.
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CHAPTER 3
NEGOTIATION WITH UNCERTAIN RESERVE PRICES
This chapter presents the algorithm for computing sequential equilibrium in pure
strategies for bilateral bargaining with one-sided uncertainty regarding agents’ reserve
prices. There is no existing approach to solve the problem formally in the literature.
Our approach is general in that it can be applied to other dynamic games with
continuous strategy space.
3.1 Background
While there are many negotiation settings in electronic commerce transactions,
the most common one (also the simplest one) is bilateral negotiation with a single
negotiation issue. For instance, consider a scenario in which a buyer and a seller
negotiate on the price of a good. In such a bargaining scenario, the two agents have
different preferences over agreements. Thus agents need to make concessions toward
a mutually acceptable agreement through a series of offers and counter offers. The
negotiation fails if the two agents fail to make an agreement. There are many real-
world negotiation examples such as the negotiation between a service provider and a
customer over the price and the quality for providing a service.
In a bargaining game, an agent’s strategy can be either pure or mixed. A pure
strategy deterministically prescribes one action at any decision node of the game. In
contrast, a mixed strategy is an assignment of a probability to each pure strategy.
The concept of mixed strategies is very useful for games having no pure strategy
equilibrium. However, the concept of mixed strategies has been criticized for being
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“intuitively problematic” since randomization lacks behavioral support [17]. When
mixed strategies are considered, the number of sequential equilibria of the game usu-
ally increases and coordination problems of choosing a equilibrium strategy profile
has not been fully addressed. Due to these reasons, we focus on pure strategies equi-
librium. Fortunately, simulation results show that there is at least one pure strategy
sequential equilibrium in 99.7% of various bilateral bargaining scenarios we will look
at in our experiments. Additionally, experimentally we found that as the number of
uncertain types and deadlines increase, all cases had at least one sequential equilib-
rium.
One major motivation of the study of negotiation theory is designing successful
negotiation agents in practical applications. However, it is often impossible to com-
pute agents’ rational strategies for more realistic complex negotiation games where
there are many agents and a large number of uncertainties. While we study a rela-
tively simple negotiation problem in this chapter, our analysis can give us guidelines
for designing negotiation agents for practical negotiation problems. In addition, as
will be discussed at the end of this chapter, there may be ways to extend the solu-
tion approaches presented in this chapter to compute agents’ equilibrium strategies
in more complex negotiation games.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We start with complete infor-
mation negotiation in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 discusses the difficulty caused by
introducing uncertainty. Section 3.4 introduces our algorithm. Section 3.5 shows
how to compute the buyer’s equilibrium offer and Section 3.6 shows how to compute
the seller’s equilibrium offer. Section 3.7 analyzes equilibrium existence. Section 3.8
compared agents’ utilities while using different strategies. Section 3.9 discusses two
potential applications of our approach. Section 3.10 concludes this chapter and out-
lines future research directions.
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3.2 Bargaining with Complete Information
This section describes the discrete time bargaining between a buyer b and a seller
s. The seller wants to sell a single indivisible good to the buyer with a price. All
the agents enter the market at time 0. An alternating-offers bargaining protocol
is utilized. Formally, the buyer b and the seller s can act at times t ∈ N. The
player function ι : N → {b, s} returns the agent that acts at time t and is such that
ι(t) 6= ι(t+1), i.e., a pair of agents bargain by making offers in alternate fashion. This
chapter focuses on single-issue negotiation but this model can be easily extended to
handle multi-issue negotiation [61].
Possible actions σtι(t) of agent ι(t) at any time point t > 0 are:
1. offer [x], where x ∈ R is the proposed price for the good;
2. exit , which indicates that negotiation fails;
3. accept , which indicates that b and s have reached an agreement.
At time point t = 0 the only allowed actions are 1) and 2). If σtι(t) = accept
the bargaining stops and the outcome is o = (x, t), where x is the value such that
σt−1ι(t−1) = offer [x]. This is to say that the agents agree on the value x at time point
t. If σtι(t) = exit the bargaining stops and the outcome is FAIL. Otherwise the
bargaining continues to the next time point.
Each agent a ∈ {b, s} has a utility function Ua : (R × N) ∪ FAIL → R, which
represents its gain over the possible bargaining outcomes. Each utility function Ua
depends on a’s reserve price RPa ∈ R+, temporal discount factor δa ∈ (0, 1),1 and
deadline Ta ∈ N, Ta > 0. If the bargaining outcome is o = (x, t), then the utility
function Ua is defined as:
1A discount factor is used to model bargaining cost, which is a common assumption in the
bargaining literature [111, 112, 51, 61].
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Ua(x, t) =


(RPa − x) · (δa)t if t ≤ Ta and a is a buyer
(x− RPa) · (δa)t if t ≤ Ta and a is a seller
ǫ < 0 otherwise
If the outcome is FAIL, Ua(FAIL) = 0. Notice that the assignment of a strictly
negative value to Ua after a’s deadline allows one to capture the essence of the dead-
line: an agent, after its deadline, strictly prefers to exit the negotiation rather than to
reach any agreement. Therefore, the bargaining model we consider is a finite horizon
game. Finally, we assume the feasibility of the problem, i.e., RPb ≥ RPs.
With complete information the appropriate solution concept for the game is the
subgame perfect equilibrium in which agents’ strategies are in equilibrium in every
possible subgame [58]. Note that there is no deadline constraint in the negotiation
protocol, which indicates that agents are allowed to offer and counteroffer also after
their deadlines have expired. However, the deadline constraint is in both agents’ util-
ity functions such that no rational agent will continue negotiation after its deadline.
Therefore, the bargaining game is a finite horizon game and the subgame perfect
equilibrium can be found employing the backward induction method.
Initially, it is determined that the game rationally stops at time point T =
min(Tb, Ts). The equilibrium outcome of every subgame starting from t ≥ T is
FAIL, since at least one agent will exit from bargaining. Therefore, at t = T agent
ι(T ) would accept any offer x which gives it a utility not worse than FAIL, namely,
any offer x such that Uι(T )(x, T ) ≥ 0. From t = T − 1 back to t = 0 it is possible
to find the optimal offer agent ι(t) can make at t, if it makes an offer, and the offers
that it would accept. x∗(t) denotes the optimal offer of agent ι(t) at t. x∗(t) is the
offer such that, if t < T − 1, agent ι(t+1) is indifferent at t+1 between accepting it
and rejecting it to make its optimal offer x∗(t + 1) and, if t = T − 1, agent ι(t + 1)
is indifferent at t + 1 between accepting it and exiting. Formally, x∗(t) is such that
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Uι(t+1)(x
∗(t)), t) = Uι(t+1)(x
∗(t + 1), t+1) if t < T − 1 and Uι(t+1)(x
∗(t), t) = 0 if
t = T − 1. The offers agent ι(t) would accept at t are all those offers that give it a
utility no worse than the utility given by offering x∗(t). The equilibrium strategy of
any subgame starting from 0 ≤ t < T prescribes that agent ι(t) offers x∗(t) at t and
agent ι(t + 1) accepts it at t+ 1.
Backward propagation is used to provide a recursive formula for x∗(t): given
value x and agent a, we call backward propagation of value x for agent a the value
y such that Ua(y, t− 1) = Ua(x, t); we employ the arrow notation x←a for backward
propagations. Formally, x←b = RPb− (RPb−x) · δb and x←s = RPs+(x−RPs) · δs.
If a value x is backward propagated n times for agent a, we write x←n[a], e.g., x←2[a] =
(x←a)←a. If a value is backward propagated for more than one agent, we list them
left to right in the subscript, e.g., x←b2[s] = ((x←b)←s)←s. The values of x
∗(t) can be
calculated recursively from t = T − 1 back to t = 0 as follows:
x∗(t) =


RPι(t+1) if t = T − 1
(x∗(t+ 1))←ι(t+1) if t < T − 1
It can be observed that x←b ≥ x as x←b − x = RPb − (RPb − x) · δb − x =
(1 − δb)(RPb − x) ≥ 0, and x←s ≤ x as x←s − x = RPs + (x − RPs) · δs − x =
(δs − 1)(x− RPs) ≤ 0.
Figure 3.1 shows an example of backward induction construction with parameters
RPb = 100, RPs = 0, ι(0) = s, δb = 0.75, δs = 0.8, Tb = 10, and Ts = 11. The
backward induction process starts from time T = min{Tb, Ts} = 10. At time 10, the
seller is willing to accept any offer which is no less than its reserve price and thus the
optimal offer at time t = 9 is x∗(9) = RPs = 0. The optimal offer of the seller at time
t = 8 is x∗(8) = (RPs)←b = RPb − (RPb − RPs) · δb = 25. Analogously, the optimal
offer of the buyer at time t = 7 is x∗(7) = (x∗(8))←s = RPs+ (x
∗(8)−RPs) · δs = 20.
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Figure 3.1. Backward induction construction with RPb = 100, RPs = 0, ι(0) = s,
δb = 0.75, δs = 0.8, Tb = 10, Ts = 11; at each time point t the optimal offer x
∗(t) is
marked; the dashed lines are isoutility curves.
Following this procedure, we can get agents’ optimal offers from time t = 6 to the
initial time point t = 0.
Finally, agents’ equilibrium strategies can be defined on the basis of x∗(t) as
follows:
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σ∗b(t) =


t = 0 offer [x∗(0)]
0 < t < T


if σs(t− 1) = offer [x] with x ≤ (x∗(t))←b accept
otherwise offer [x∗(t)]
T ≤ t ≤ Tb


if σs(t− 1) = offer [x] with x ≤ RPb accept
otherwise exit
Tb < t exit
σ∗s(t) =


t = 0 offer [x∗(0)]
0 < t < T


if σb(t− 1) = offer [x] with x ≥ (x∗(t))←s accept
otherwise offer [x∗(t)]
T ≤ t ≤ Ts


if σb(t− 1) = offer [x] with x ≥ RPs accept
otherwise exit
Ts < t exit
We can see that the above strategies constitute a unique subgame perfect equi-
librium of bargaining with complete information. The equilibrium can be found in
time linear to the maximum deadline of the two agents. At the equilibrium, the two
agents reach an agreement at time t = 1 and the agreement price is x∗(0).
3.3 One-sided Uncertainty about Reserve Prices
In this section, we first loosen the complete information bargaining model in the
previous section by introducing one-sided uncertainty regarding the buyer’s reserve
price. We then review the existing approaches in the literature.
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3.3.1 Introducing Uncertainty
With uncertain information, the appropriate solution concept for an extensive-
form game is sequential equilibrium [58]. A sequential equilibrium is a pair a = 〈µ, σ〉
(also called an assessment) where µ is a belief system that specifies how agents’
beliefs evolve during the game and σ specifies agents’ strategies. At an equilibrium
µ must be consistent with respect to σ and σ must be sequentially rational given
µ. Informally, the rationality requirement says that after every possible sequence of
actions, an agent’s strategy must maximize its expected utility given its beliefs and
its opponent’s equilibrium strategy. An assessment a is consistent (in the sense of
Kreps and Wilson [79]) if there exists a sequence of totally mixed strategy profiles
(with associated sensible beliefs updated according to Bayes’ rule) that converges to
the equilibrium profile.
We assume the one-sided uncertainty regarding the type of the buyer b (the case
of having uncertainty with the type of the seller s can be analyzed analogously). The
buyer b can be of finitely many types {b1, . . . ,bn} in which buyer type bi has an
associated reserve price RPi. The initial belief of s on b is µ(0) = 〈∆0b, P
0
b〉 where
∆0b = {b1, . . . ,bn} and P
0
b = {ω
0
b1
, . . . , ω0bn} such that
∑
i ω
0
bi
= 1. ω0bi is the priori
probability that b is of type bi. The belief of s on the type of b at time t is µ(t). The
probability assigned by s to b = bi at time t is denoted ω
t
bi
. Given an assessment
a = 〈µ, σ〉, there are multiple possible bargaining outcomes: outcome obi if b = bi.
We denote bargaining outcome as o = 〈ob1, . . . , obn〉.
Seller s’s belief of the type of buyer b will evolve based on its observed actions
and the buyer’s equilibrium strategies. On the equilibrium path, s’s belief at any
time t is µ(t) = 〈∆tb, P
t
b〉. As is customary in economic studies [112], we consider
only stationary systems of beliefs, i.e., if s believes a b’s type with zero probability
at time point t, it will continue to believe such a type with zero probability at any
time point t′ > t. We can therefore specify µ(t) by specifying ∆tb. Moreover, given
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that µ(t) = ∆tb and we only consider pure strategies, the probability that b is of type
bi ∈ ∆tb is ωbi(∆
t
b) =
ω0
bi∑
bj∈∆
t
b
ω0
bj
.
We need to also specify the belief system off the equilibrium path, i.e., when an
agent takes an action that is not optimal. We use the optimistic conjectures [112].2
That is, when buyer b acts off the equilibrium strategy, agent s will believe that agent
b is of its “weakest” type, i.e., the type against which the seller would gain the most.
This choice is made to assure the existence of the equilibrium for the largest subset of
the space of the parameters [61]. In our case, the weakest type is the buyer type with
the highest reserve price (see Section 3.4.4 for the proof). That is, if µ(t− 1) = ∆t−1b
and b acts off the equilibrium strategy at time t− 1, it follows that ∆tb = bh(∆
t−1
b )
where bh(∆
t−1
b ) is the buyer type with the highest reserve price in buyer types ∆
t−1
b .
3.3.2 Existing Solutions in Literature
Computation agents’ equilibrium strategies of an extensive-form game with im-
perfect information is well known to be hard and classic game theory does not pro-
vide any general approaches to find sequential equilibria. While there has been long
standing literature in solving bargaining games with uncertainty since Rubinstein’s
path-breaking work [112], there is no existing approach that can be applied to solve
the bargaining problem studied in this chapter. An interested reader can find a more
detailed survey on bargaining with uncertainty in [18].
Computer science researchers have proposed a number of algorithms for computing
Nash equilibria (e.g., [62, 63, 74]) or sequential equilibria (e.g., [92]). However, these
algorithms are not applicable in solving bargaining games since they only consider
finite strategy space rather than continuous strategy space (i.e., price) considered in
2While this chapter assumes optimistic conjectures, our approach can be used for any belief
update rules for agents’ actions off the equilibrium path.
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this chapter. Due to the same reason, enumeration based methods (e.g., [104]) cannot
be applied to our bargaining problem as well.
The microeconomic literature provides a number of results for some specific bar-
gaining problems with uncertainty. For instance, Rubinstein [112] considered bilateral
infinite horizon bargaining with uncertainty over two possible discount factors. With
the unrealistic infinite horizon assumption, Rubinstein found a number of closed form
results such as how the discount factors will affect the equilibrium outcome. Sand-
holm and Vulkan [117] analyze agents’ strategic behavior in a slight variation of
the war-of-attrition game where the surplus can be divided. They consider a fi-
nite horizon alternating-offer bilateral bargaining game where agents have uncertain
deadlines, time is continuous, and there are not discount factors. In contrast, Gatti
et al. [61] relaxed the infinite horizon deadlines and provided an algorithm to com-
pute agents’ equilibrium strategies in bilateral bargaining with one-sided uncertain
deadlines. They proved that agent types would adopt the same strategy at any time
point before their deadlines, which may not be true in our case with uncertain re-
serve prices. Therefore, their approach cannot be applied to our case. Cramton [39]
considered a special infinite horizon bargaining protocol in which only the seller can
make offers and the buyer can only accept or reject the seller’s offer. Chatterjee and
Samuelson [34, 35] studied bilateral infinite horizon bargaining with two-type uncer-
tainty over the reservation values. The absence of agents’ deadlines makes these two
results nonapplicable to the situation we study in the chapter. An et al. [6] only
considered two-type uncertainty about reserve prices and their approach cannot be
directly extended to handle multiple types. The presence of multi-type uncertainty
increases the computational complexity of the procedure to find equilibrium strategies
and requires more stringent equilibrium existence conditions.
The only known general approach that be potentially applied to our bargaining
problem is the backward induction approach by Fatima et al. [51, 52]. They studied
52
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
0(seller) 1(buyer) 2(seller) 3(buyer) 4(seller) 5(buyer)
O
ffe
r p
ric
e
Time (t)
x
*
b1
(1)
x
*
b2
(1)
x
f
(1)
x
*
b1
(0)
x
*
b2
(0)
x
f
(0)
x
*
b1
(2)
x
*
b2
(2)
x
*
b1
(3)
x
f
(2)
x
*
b2
(3)
x
f
(3)
x
f
(4)=x
*
b1
(4)
x
*
b2
(4)
Equilibirum offers using the approach by Fatima et al.
Equilibirum offers when buyer is of type b1Equilibirum offers when buyer is of type b2
Figure 3.2. Failure of the approach in [51, 52] with T = 5, ι(0) = s, RPs = 10,
RP1 = 90, RP2 = 70, ω
0
b1
= 0.8, ω0b2 = 0.2, δs = 0.7, and δb = 0.8; agents’ offers in
complete information settings were also showed.
the alternating-offers protocol with multiple negotiation issues and uncertainty over
the weights of the issues. They proposed an algorithm based on backward induction
to compute sequential equilibria. Note that as in this chapter, Fatima et al. [51, 52]
also focus on pure strategy equilibria. Basically, their algorithm searches in the space
of the strategies exploiting the backward induction from the last possible deadline to
t = 0 with agents’ initial beliefs, and, once the optimal strategies at time point t = 0
have been found, the system of beliefs is designed to be consistent with them. It
has been shown in [61] through a counter example that unfortunately an equilibrium
return by their algorithm is not necessary a sequential equilibrium in pure strategies
for bilateral bargaining with uncertain deadlines.
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We show a simple example where the algorithm in [52, 51] fails in the bargaining
problem studied in this chapter (see Figure 3.2 for agents’ equilibrium offers computed
by their algorithm and agents’ equilibrium offers in complete information settings).
Consider the following scenario: T = 5, ι(0) = s, RPs = 10, RP1 = 90, RP2 = 70,
ω0b1 = 0.8, ω
0
b2
= 0.2, δs = 0.7, and δb = 0.8. Let x
∗
bi
(t) be any agent optimal offer
at time t when buyer b is of type bi in the complete information setting. Let x
f (t)
be any agent optimal offer at time t computed by the algorithm in [52, 51]. Agents’
equilibrium offers are computed with the initial belief. At time t = 4, seller s can
offer either x∗b1(4) = RP1 = 90 which gives the seller a utility of 0.8 · (90 − 10) ·
0.75 = 10.75648 or x∗b2(4) = RP2 = 70 which give the seller a utility of (70 − 10) ·
0.75 = 10.0842. Therefore, the seller’s optimal offer at time t = 4 is xf (4) = 90 and
the equivalent price is 74. Then both buyer types’ optimal offer at time t = 3 is
xf (3) = (74)←s = 54.8. At time t = 2, seller s can offer either (54.8)←b1 = 61.84 or
(54.8)←b2 = 57.84. According to [52, 51], offering price 57.84 will be accepted by both
buyer types and thus the seller can gain a utility of (57.84− 10) · 0.73 = 16.40912. In
contrast, offering price 61.84 will only be accepted by buyer type b1 and t2he seller’s
equilibrium offer at time t = 4 will be accepted. Thus, offering price 61.84 will the
seller a utility of 0.8 · (61.84− 10) · 0.73 + 0.2 · (74− 10) · 0.75 = 16.376192. Thus the
optimal offer of the seller at time t = 2 is xf (2) = 57.84. Then both buyer types’
optimal offer at time t = 1 is xf (1) = (57.84)←s = 43.488. The seller at time t = 0 can
offer either (43.488)←b1 = 52.7904 or (43.488)←b2 = 48.7904 and its optimal offer is
xf (0) = 52.7904 which will only be accepted by buyer type b1. According to [52, 51],
buyer type b1 will accept the offer 52.7904 at time t = 0 since the optimal offer
52.7904 is b1’s backward propagated value of its 43.488 at time t = 1. Accordingly,
the seller will update its belief as follows: if its optimal offer 52.7904 is rejected, it
will update its belief to {b2}.
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However, the above strategy profile is not in sequential equilibrium since buyer
b1 has an incentive to reject the seller’s equilibrium offer at time t = 1 (also see Fig-
ure 3.2). If buyer type b1 rejects the offer 52.7904 at time t = 1 and makes a counter
offer 41.92, the seller will accept it since 41.92 is buyer’s equilibrium offer when the
buyer is of type b2. By doing so, buyer b1 gains a utility of (90−41.92)·0.8
2 = 30.7712
which is higher than its utility (90 − 52.7904) · 0.8 = 29.76768 when it accepts the
seller’s equilibrium offer 52.7904. As pointed out in [61], the reason behind the failure
of [52, 51] in producing equilibrium strategies for some settings of parameters is that
in each step of backward induction they limit the search to the space of the strategies,
but they do not verify the existence of a consistent system of beliefs such that the
found strategy is sequentially rational. In other words, they break the circularity
of strategies and belief systems. In the above example, they decide the acceptance
price of buyer type b1 with the initial belief and ignore the effect of the seller’s belief
update rule. As a result, once their algorithm has produced the agents’ strategies at
t = 0 and has designed the system of beliefs consistent with them, the strategies may
not be sequentially rational given the designed system of beliefs.
3.4 The Algorithm for Finding All Sequential Equilibria
This section first introduces the high level idea of our approach. Following that we
analyze some observations that can be used to drastically reduce the required com-
putation based on our basic approach. Finally we introduce the algorithm for finding
all sequential equilibria of a bilateral bargaining game with one-sided uncertainty.
3.4.1 High Level Idea of the Approach
Our approach follows the spirit of backward induction: To compute agent a’s
equilibrium offer with belief ∆b at time t < T − 1, agent a takes into account all the
sequential equilibria in the continuation game with different beliefs starting from time
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Figure 3.3. A high level illustration of our approach (ι(t) = s and |∆0| > 1)
t + 1. A continuation game is composed of an information set for one agent (buyer
or seller) and all of its successor nodes from the original bilateral bargaining game.
Note that there is no subgame for the bargaining game with uncertainty. There are
continuation games starting from time points 0, 1, . . . . Let Γ(t) be the continuation
game starting from time t. In the continuation game Γ(t), agent ι(t) makes its offer
at time t first. Let Γ(t,∆b) be the continuation game Γ(t) with seller s’s initial belief
∆b. The problem of finding sequential equilibria for a bargaining problem is finding
all sequential equilibria for the continuation game Γ(0,∆0b).
The definition of a sequential equilibrium requires that after observing buyer b’s
counter offer at time t, seller s must update its belief about b’s type using a belief
update rule. The counter offer of buyer b at time t indicates buyer b’s following
actions: 1) seller s’s last offer is rejected by the buyer b if t > 0, and 2) buyer b
makes a new offer at time t. Seller s will update its belief given all the actions of
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buyer b. Therefore, there are two types of belief update rules: 1) reject update rules
applied when buyer b rejects seller s’s offer and offer update rules applied when buyer
b makes a new offer. Assume seller s’s belief before proposing its offer x is ∆b, the
reject update rule is of the following form: If x is rejected, s’s belief about the type
of buyer b is ∆′b ⊆ ∆b. Similarly, the offer update rule has the following form: If
buyer b offers x, seller s’s belief about the type of b is ∆′b ⊆ ∆b where ∆b is s’s
belief before applying the offer update rule. After receiving buyer b’s offer at time
t = 0, s will only apply the offer update rule. In any other situation (i.e., buyer b
first rejects s’s offer and then makes a new offer), seller s will apply the reject update
rule first and then apply the offer update rule.3
While the seller is making an offer at time t given the sequential equilibria for
the continuation game Γ(t + 1) with different beliefs, the seller will consider differ-
ent reject update rules and compute its equilibrium offer for each rule. With pure
strategies, the seller’s reject update rules are finite. The other situation is deciding
the buyer’s equilibrium offer at time t given the sequential equilibria for the continua-
tion game Γ(t+1) with different beliefs, the buyer will consider different choice rules
regarding whether different buyer types behave in the same way or behave in differ-
ent ways. With pure strategies, buyer types’ choice rules are finite. For each choice
rule, we compute each buyer type’s optimal offer and its corresponding offer update
rule. While computing agents’ equilibrium strategies, we also construct equilibrium
existence conditions and check whether those conditions are satisfied.
Roughly, the idea of our approach is the following (see Figure 3.3). To com-
pute agents’ equilibrium offers at a continuation game, we first compute sequential
equilibria in its continuation game with different beliefs. Then we compute agents’
3This belief update process is obvious when an agent is required to send a rejection message
before making a counter offer [51]. For the sake of simplicity, a rejecting agent does not need to send
a rejection message in our protocol.
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equilibrium offers together with agents’ belief update rules. There are two cases.
While computing the seller’s equilibrium strategy, we enumerate all possible reject
update rules (e.g., reject update rules 1 and 2 in Figure 3.3) and for each reject update
rule, we first compute the seller’s optimal strategy in the corresponding continuation
game. For example, for the reject update rule 1 in Figure 3.3, we first solve the
continuation game Γ(t + 1,∆1) where ∆1 ⊆ ∆0 is the seller’s updated belief if the
seller’s offer is rejected. While computing the buyer’s equilibrium strategy, we con-
sider all choice rules and compute different buyer types’ optimal offer for each choice
rule. For instance, for the choice rule 3, we need to first solve the continuation game
Γ(t+ 2,∆3). There are two processes involved in computing all sequential equilibria:
a forward search process to determine the set of continuation games to solve and a
backward induction process to compute agents’ equilibrium strategies based on all
sequential equilibria of continuation games. Furthermore, we introduce some equilib-
rium existence conditions: if they are satisfied, there is a sequential equilibrium in
the continuation game.
Take the bargaining problem in Figure 3.2 as an example. Our objective is to
compute all sequential equilibria for the continuation game Γ(0, {b1,b2}). Since
ι(0) = s, we need to consider different reject update rules. Consider the reject update
rule that the seller is making an offer x that will only be accepted by buyer type b1,
i.e., if the buyer rejects offer x, the seller will update its belief to {b2}. To compute
the optimal offer x at time t = 0, we first compute all sequential equilibria for the
continuation game Γ(1, {b2}) starting from time t = 1. For another reject update
rule that the seller is making an offer x that will be rejected by both buyer types, we
need to first compute sequential equilibria for the continuation game Γ(1, {b1,b2})
with the original belief. To compute sequential equilibria for the continuation game
Γ(1, {b1,b2}), we need to consider buyer types’ different choice rules. Consider the
choice rule that buyer type b1 makes an acceptable offer but buyer type b2 makes an
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offer that will be rejected. For this choice rule, we need to first compute sequential
equilibria for continuation games Γ(2, {b1}) and Γ(2, {b2}) starting from time t = 2.
In the same way, we can recursively try different choice rules and reject update rules
to compute all sequential equilibria of the bargaining game.
3.4.2 Computation Reduction
This section provides some theoretical results which drastically reduce the com-
putation complexity. In an equilibrium, it is possible that the seller will make an offer
that will be rejected by all the buyer types. Without loss of generality, we assume
̟ be seller’s offer that will be rejected by all buyer types. Assume that the seller’s
belief is ∆b. A reject update rule specifies the seller’s updated belief ∆
′
b ⊆ ∆b if
the seller’s offer is rejected. Therefore, the number of reject update rules are finite
since the number of belief set ∆′b ⊆ ∆b is no more than 2
|∆b|. However, there is no
sequential equilibrium for most of the reject update rules.
Theorem 1. If there is a reject update rule with updated belief ∆′b ⊆ ∆b such that
RPi < RPj for buyer type bi ∈ ∆b \∆
′
b and buyer type bj ∈ ∆
′
b, agents’ strategies
are not sequentially rational.
Proof. This result can be proved by contradiction. If there is a sequential equilibrium
with this reject update rule in which s’s equilibrium offer at time t is x, the following
two conditions are satisfied: 1) bi has no incentive to behave as bj , i.e., Ubi(x, t+1) ≥
Ubi(e
t+1
bj
|∆′b, t+2) where e
t+1
bj
|∆′b is bj ’s equivalent offer (will be defined later) in the
continuation game starting from t + 1 with belief ∆′b; 2) bj has no incentive to
behave as bi, i.e., Ubj (e
t+1
bj
|∆′b, t + 2) ≥ Ubj (x, t + 1). Condition 1) suggests that
x ≤ (et+1bj |∆
′
b)←bi and condition 2) indicates that x ≥ (e
t+1
bj
|∆′b)←bj . Therefore,
equilibrium existence conditions requires that (et+1bj |∆
′
b)←bj ≤ (e
t+1
bj
|∆′b)←bi , which
cannot be true since RPi < RPj .
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Due to Theorem 1, we only need to consider reject update rules in which buyer
types with higher reserve prices accept the seller’s equilibrium offer while buyer types
with lower reserve prices reject the seller’s equilibrium offer. Assume that the seller’s
belief at a time point is ∆b. The total number of reject update rules we need to
consider is at most |∆b| rather than 2
|∆b|. For each reject update rule at time t, we
need to first compute the sequential equilibrium for the continuation game Γ(t + 1)
with the corresponding reasonable updated belief if the seller’s offer is rejected, i.e.,
∆′b. Accordingly, we need to compute sequential equilibria for the continuation game
with at most |∆b| different reasonable beliefs.
In addition to the above rejected update rules in which according to the equilib-
rium strategy at least one buyer type will reject the seller’s offer, we also need to
consider the case that according to the equilibrium strategy, the seller’s offer will be
accepted by all buyer types. If the offer is rejected (i.e., the buyer is acting off the
equilibrium path), the seller will update its belief to the buyer type with the highest
reserve price according to the optimistic conjectures. We call this reject update rule
as null reject update rule.
The other situation is deciding the buyer’s equilibrium offer at time t. We use
the term “choice rule” to characterize buyer types’ strategies regarding whether they
behave in the same way at a specific decision making point. With pure strategies,
buyer types’ choice rules are finite. Consider that the belief of s on the type of b
at time t is µ(t) = ∆b where |∆b| > 1 (note that if |∆b| = 1, the bargaining from
time t becomes the trivial complete information bargaining) and ι(t) = b. Let the
equilibrium offer of buyer type bi ∈ ∆b be xbi(t). After receiving b’s offer, s will
update its belief and decide whether to accept the offer from b. Without loss of
generality, we assume that xbi(t) = −1 if bi’s equilibrium offer will be rejected by
seller s at time t + 1. There are two situations: 1) All buyer types make the same
offer. In this case, a pooling choice rule is chosen by different buyer types. 2) Buyer
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types make different offers. That is, a separating choice rule is used by different buyer
types.
It is easy to see that there are two pooling choice rules depending on whether the
seller will accept the offer at time t + 1 in equilibrium: 1) accepting pooling choice
rule in which all buyer types make the same acceptable offer to seller s; 2) rejecting
pooling choice rule in which all buyer types make the same rejectable offer (i.e., −1)
to seller s. While the buyer adopts the separating choice rule, some buyer types’
equilibrium offers are acceptable to the seller and the number of separating choice
rules is drastically reduced due to the following theorem.
Theorem 2. There is no equilibrium assessment in pure strategies if buyer types
make different acceptable offers at t.
Proof. We can easily prove this by contradiction. Assume that there is a sequential
equilibrium for a belief system in which at time t such that ι(t) = b, buyer bi makes
an acceptable offer x to s and buyer types bj makes an acceptable offer y to s such
that x 6= y. If x > y, buyer bi has an incentive to behave like buyer bj by offering
price y. The other direction is analogous.
Therefore, we only need to consider the following separating choice rules: buyer
types ∆ab make an acceptable offer to s at time t but buyer types ∆
r
b = ∆b \∆
a
b make
an offer (i.e., −1) that will be rejected by s at time t. Due to Theorem 6 (will be
detailed later), we only need to consider partitions ∆ab ∪∆
r
b = ∆b such that for any
buyer type bi ∈ ∆ab and any bj ∈ ∆
r
b, RPi > RPj . Thus, the number of separating
choice rules is |∆b| − 1. For each choice rule at time t, we need to first compute the
sequential equilibria for the continuation game Γ(t+1) with corresponding reasonable
beliefs, i.e., ∆ab and ∆
s
b. Accordingly, we need to compute sequential equilibria for
the continuation game with at most 2(|∆b| − 1) different reasonable beliefs.
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Algorithm 1: Compute equilibrium strategies for a continuation game Γ(t,∆b)
such that ι(t) = b, |∆b| > 1, and t < T − 1
Let SE(∆b, t) = ∅ be the set of sequential equilibria for the continuation game with
belief ∆b at t;
for each choice rule do
for each equilibrium strategy combination of the continuation game with
reasonable beliefs starting from time t+ 1 do
Compute buyer types’ equilibrium offers and construct offer update rules
(Section 3.5);
if equilibrium existence conditions are satisfied then
add agents’ equilibrium strategies from time t to SE(∆b, t);
end
end
end
return SE(∆b, t);
3.4.3 The Algorithm
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 outline the main steps for computing agents’ equi-
librium strategies in a continuation game based on the sequential equilibria in its
continuation game with different beliefs. To compute a buyer agent’s equilibrium
offer, the buyer considers different choice rules and for each choice rule, we need to
consider all the sequential equilibria of the continuation game with reasonable beliefs
since there may be multiple sequential equilibria for the continuation game with a spe-
cific belief. Different buyer types’ equilibrium strategies are derived using a Bayesian
extension of backward induction (see Section 3.5). To compute the seller’s equilib-
rium offer at a time point, we consider all the reject update rules and for each reject
update rule, we compute the sequential equilibria of the continuation game with the
belief corresponding to the reject update rule. We compute the seller’s equilibrium
offer for each sequential equilibrium corresponding to a reject update rule and check
equilibrium existence conditions (see Section 3.6).
3.4.4 Off the Equilibrium Path Optimal Strategies
Before analyzing equilibrium strategies, we provide the optimal strategies in the
situations seller s believes the buyer of one single type. There are two cases: 1) Seller
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Algorithm 2: Compute equilibrium strategies for a continuation game Γ(t,∆b)
such that ι(t) = s, |∆b| > 1, and t < T − 1
Let SE(∆b, t) = ∅ be the set of sequential equilibria for the continuation game with
belief ∆b at t;
for each reject update rule do
for each sequential equilibrium of the continuation game with the belief
corresponding to the reject update rule do
Compute the seller s’s optimal offer and buyer types ∆b’s acceptance
decision at time t+ 1 (Section 3.6);
if equilibrium existence conditions are satisfied then
add agents’ equilibrium strategies from time t to SE(∆b, t);
end
end
end
return SE(∆b, t);
s has the right belief about the type of the buyer b. In this case, agents’ equilibrium
strategies are the equilibrium strategies of the corresponding complete information
bargaining discussed in Section 3.2. Let x∗bi(t) be any agent optimal offer at time t
when b is of type bi in this case. 2) Seller s has the wrong belief about the type of
the buyer b, i.e., bi is believed to be bj .
Lemma 3. x∗bi(t) ≥ x
∗
bj
(t) if RPi > RPj.
Proof. Case 1 (ι(T ) = s). It follows that x∗bi(T − 1) = x
∗
bj
(T − 1) = RPs. Then
x∗bi(T − 2) = RPi(1− δb) + δbx
∗
bi
(T − 1) > x∗bj (T − 2) = RPj(1− δb) + δbx
∗
bi
(T − 1).
Similarly, we have x∗bi(T −3) = RPs(1− δs)+ δsx
∗
bi
(T −2) and x∗bj (T −3) = RPs(1−
δs) + δsx
∗
bj
(T − 2). Thus we have x∗bi(T − 3) > x
∗
bj
(T − 3). Recursively, we have
x∗bi(t) > x
∗
bj
(t) for t < T − 3.
Case 2 (ι(T ) = b). It follows that x∗bi(T − 1) = RPi > x
∗
bj
(T − 1) = RPj .
Then at time time T − 2, we have x∗bi(T − 2) = RPs(1 − δs) + δsx
∗
bi
(T − 1) and
x∗bj (T −2) = RPs(1− δs)+ δsx
∗
bj
(T −1). Thus, x∗bi(T −2) > x
∗
bj
(T −2). Recursively,
we have x∗bi(t) > x
∗
bj
(t) for t < T − 2.
We can see that bi is weaker than bj in terms of its offering price at each time
point in complete information bargaining. Similarly, we can get RPi − x∗bi(t) ≥
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RPj−x
∗
bj
(t). RPi−x
∗
bi
(0) is the gain (utility) of bi in complete information bargaining
and RPj − x∗bj (0) is the gain (utility) of bj in complete information bargaining.
Lemma 4. x∗bi(t) ≤ (x
∗
bi
(t+ 1))←bi and x
∗
bj
(t) ≤ (x∗bj (t+ 1))←bj .
Proof. We can get this result by following the same procedure in the proof of Lemma 3.
This result indicates that the buyer will accept sellers’ lowest equilibrium price in
complete information bargaining, i.e., agents will reach a final agreement at time
t− 2 in the complete information bargaining case.
Agents’ equilibrium strategies when seller s has the wrong belief about the type
of the buyer b are specified in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. If seller s has the wrong belief about the type of b, its optimal strategies
are those in complete information bargaining. Assume that RPi > RPj. The optimal
strategies σ∗bi(t)|{bj} of buyer bi when it is believed to be bj are:
σ∗bi(t)|{bj} =


accept y if y ≤ (x∗bj (t))←bi
offer x∗bj (t) otherwise
The optimal strategies σ∗bj (t)|{bi} of the buyer bj when it is believed to be bi are:
• If ι(T ) = b, accept y if y ≤ min{(x∗bi(t))←bj ,RPj}. Otherwise, offer min{x
∗
bi
(t),RPj}.
• If ι(T ) = s, accept y if y ≤ min{(x∗bi(t))←bj , (RPj)←(T−t)[bj ]. Otherwise, offer
min{x∗bi(t), (RPs)←(T−1−t)[bj ]}.
Proof. Case 1 (bi is believed to be bj). If the seller offers x
∗
bj
(t − 1), buyer bi’s
optimal strategy is to accept it as the minimum price that the seller would accept
at time t + 1, i.e., x∗bj (t), gives bi a utility lesser than x
∗
bj
(t− 1) since (x∗bj (t))←bi >
(x∗bj (t))←bj = x
∗
bj
(t− 1). If the seller acts off the equilibrium path and offers a price
y lower than x∗bj (t − 1), the optimal strategy of bi is obviously to accept y. If the
seller offers a price y greater than x∗bj (t− 1), the optimal strategy of bi is to accept
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y only if y ≤ (x∗bj (t)←bi, otherwise bi’s optimal strategy is to reject y and to offer
x∗bj (t). Note that x
∗
bi
(t) ≤ RPi and x∗bj (t) ≤ RPi.
Case 2 (bj is believed to be bi). This case is more complicated as seller’s optimal
offer x∗bi(t−1) on its equilibrium path is not acceptable to bj as when bj offers x
∗
bi
(t)
at time t, (x∗bi(t))←bj < (x
∗
bi
(t))←bi = x
∗
bi
(t− 1). In addition, bj may not offer x
∗
bi
(t)
if it is advantageous to wait for the agreement at time T . There are two situations:
1) ι(T ) = b. In this case, s will propose RPi at time T −1, which is not acceptable to
buyer bj as RPi is higher than bj ’s reserve price. Therefore, bj ’s optimal offer at time
t is min{x∗bi(t),RPj}. Note that x
∗
bj
(t) is always not acceptable to s. 2) ι(T ) = s.
In this case, bj will propose RPs at time T − 1, which will be accepted by seller s at
time T . Therefore, bj ’s optimal offer at time t is min{x∗bi(t), (RPs)←(T−1−t)[bj ]}.
3.5 The Buyer’s Equilibrium Offer
This section focuses on computing the buyer’s equilibrium offer at a continuation
game Γ(t,∆b) such that ι(t) = b. If t = T , it is the buyer agent’s dominant strategy to
accept any offer which is not worse than its reserve price. At time t = T −1, different
buyer types’ optimal offer is RPs since seller s will accept the offer at time T . If |∆b| =
1, agents’ equilibrium strategies are the equilibrium strategies of the corresponding
complete information bargaining discussed in Section 3.2. When |∆b| > 1 at time t <
T −1, buyer types have multiple choice rules and we need to consider the equilibrium
strategies for each choice rule. There could be multiple equilibrium strategies for a
choice rule since there could be multiple sequential equilibria for the continuation
game with a reasonable belief starting from time t + 1. In the rest of this section,
we show how to compute different buyer types’ equilibrium strategies given agents’
equilibrium strategies of the continuation game with different beliefs and construct
agents’ belief systems.
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Before we proceed, we introduce the concept of equivalent offer. In complete
information bargaining, seller s’s optimal offer x∗(t) at time t is the value to be
propagated backward at time point t− 1. That is, if b offers (x∗(t))←s at time t− 1,
s will accept it at time t. With incomplete information, this property no longer
holds since s will accept an offer if and only if the utility of accepting the offer is
not less than the expected utility of making its optimal offer at time t. Given the
equilibrium assessment 〈µ, σ∗〉, the equilibrium expected utility of seller s’s offer x
at time t, denoted as EUs(x, t), is the expected utility of the seller’s offering x if 1)
the seller’s belief at time t is µ(t) and 2) agents act according to the equilibrium
strategies σ∗ from time t on. The equivalent offer of s’s offering x, denoted as ets|µ(t),
is a value satisfying Us(e
t
s|µ(t), t+1) = EUs(x, t). e
t
s|µ(t) is the value to be propagated
backward at time point t− 1.
Similarly, the equivalent offer of buyer bi’s offering x at time t, denoted as e
t
bi
|µ(t),
is a value satisfying Ubi(e
t
bi
|µ(t), t + 1) = Ubi(EBO(bi, x, t)) where EBO(bi, x, t) is
the equilibrium bargaining outcome of bi if it offers x at time t. In addition, let
EBO(bi, ℘) denote the equilibrium bargaining outcome of bi if agents follow the
strategies specified by a sequential equilibrium ℘. Given a bargaining outcome oc,
buyer bi’s equivalent offer at time t is given by function ρ(bi, t, oc) which satisfies
Ubi(ρ(bi, t, oc), t+ 1) = Ubi(oc).
3.5.1 Pooling Choice Rule
Here we consider agents’ equilibrium strategies when b employs a pooling choice
rule at a continuation game Γ(t,∆b). Since all buyer types will behave in the same
way, seller s will not change its belief after observing the buyer’s equilibrium offer.
Thus, we need to consider all sequential equilibria SE(∆b, t+ 1) of the continuation
game with belief ∆b at time t+1. If SE(∆b, t+1) = ∅, there is no sequential equilib-
rium for this choice rule. Otherwise, for each sequential equilibrium ℘ ∈ SE(∆b, t+1),
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we compute buyer types’ optimal offer and check the satisfaction of equilibrium exis-
tence conditions.
First we consider the accepting pooling choice rule. Let et+1s |∆b be s’s equivalent
offer at time t+1 given the belief ∆b in the sequential equilibrium ℘. At time t+1, the
equilibrium strategy of s is that s will accept any offer y if y ≥ (et+1s |∆b)←s. Therefore,
the equilibrium offer of buyer bi ∈ ∆b at time t is (et+1s |∆b)←s.
4 The corresponding
offer update rule is the following: µ(t+1) = ∆b if σb(t) = offer (e
t+1
s |∆b)←s; µ(t+1) =
{bh(∆b)}, otherwise.
If buyer bi ∈ ∆b deviates from offering (e
t+1
s |∆b)←s, it will be believed to be
of type bh(∆b). Following Theorem 5, when a buyer bi is believed to be of type
bh(∆b) which has a reserve price no less than RPi, bi’s optimal offer at time t is
x∗bi(t)|{bh(∆b)}. Thus, the condition of equilibrium existence needed to be checked is
etbi |∆b ≤ x
∗
bi
(t)|{bh(∆b)} for all bi ∈ ∆b. If the equilibrium existence conditions are
satisfied, there is a sequential equilibrium with buyer types’ offer (et+1s |∆b)←s and ℘ as
the sequential equilibrium for the continuation game from time t+ 1. The sequential
equilibrium will be added to SE(∆b, t). Buyer bi’s equilibrium bargaining outcome in
this equilibrium is EBO(bi, (e
t+1
s |∆b)←s, t) = ((e
t+1
s |∆b)←s, t + 1) since (e
t+1
s |∆b)←s
is acceptable to the seller. Thus buyer bi’s equivalent offer is e
t
bi
|∆b = (et+1s |∆b)←s.
Then we consider the rejecting pooling choice rule. By definition, all buyer types
∆b will make an offer (i.e., −1) that will be rejected by the seller. Buyer bi’s
equilibrium bargaining outcome is the bargaining outcome in the sequential equi-
librium ℘, i.e., EBO(bi,−1, t) = EBO(bi, ℘). Thus buyer bi’s equivalent offer is
etbi |∆b = ρ(bi, t, EBO(bi, ℘)). We can also derive e
t
bi
|∆b in the following way. If
according to the sequential equilibrium ℘, seller s’s equilibrium offer xt+1|∆b at time
t+1 is ̟, buyer bi’s equivalent offer at time t is then e
t
bi
|∆b = (e
t+2
bi
|∆b)←2[bi] where
4We assume that buyer types are “cooperatively selfish” in the sense that when they are making
the same acceptable offer, the will choose the lowest acceptable price.
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et+2bi |∆b is bi’s equivalent offer at time t + 2. If x
t+1|∆b 6= ̟, buyer bi’s equivalent
offer at time t is 1) etbi |∆b = (x
t+1|∆b)←bi if according to the sequential equilibrium
℘, s’s equilibrium offering price xt+1|∆b at time t+ 1 will be accepted by buyer type
bi; or 2) e
t
bi
|∆b = (e
t+2
bi
|∆
′
b)←2[bi] if according to the sequential equilibrium ℘, buyer
type bi will reject s’s equilibrium offering price x
t+1|∆b at time t + 1 where ∆
′
b is
the set of buyer types that will reject s’s offer at time t+ 1. The corresponding offer
update rule is the following: µ(t+1) = ∆b if σb(t) = offer −1; µ(t+1) = {bh(∆b)},
otherwise. If buyer b deviates from offering −1 at time t, it will be treated as buyer
type bh(∆b) and the equilibrium existence condition is e
t
bi
|∆b ≤ x
∗
bi
(t)|{bh(∆b)} for
all bi ∈ ∆b.
3.5.2 Separating Choice Rule
Then we consider agents’ equilibrium strategies at a continuation game Γ(t,∆b)
when buyer b employs the separating choice rule where buyer types ∆ab make an
acceptable offer while buyer types ∆rb make a rejectable offer −1. For this choice
rule, the reasonable beliefs of its continuation game are ∆ab and ∆
r
b. If one of the
continuation games has no sequential equilibrium, there is no sequential equilibrium
for this choice rule. We show how to compute agents’ equilibrium strategies at time
t given a sequential equilibrium ℘a ∈ SE(∆ab, t + 1) and a sequential equilibrium
℘r ∈ SE(∆rb, t+ 1).
Let et+1s |∆
a
b be s’s equivalent offer at time t+1 in the equilibrium ℘
a. Let et+1s |∆
r
b
(xt+1|∆rb, respectively) be s’s equivalent offer (equilibrium offer, respectively) at time
t+1 in the equilibrium ℘r. Similar to the pooling acceptance choice rule, the optimal
offer of buyer types ∆ab at time t is (e
t+1
s |∆
a
b)←s. Accordingly, buyer bi ∈ ∆
a
b’s
equivalent offer is etbi |∆b = (e
t+1
s |∆
a
b)←s since its equilibrium bargaining outcome is
((et+1s |∆
a
b)←s, t + 1). By convention, the equilibrium offer of buyer type bj ∈ ∆
r
b at
time t is −1. Buyer bj ’s equilibrium bargaining outcome is the bargaining outcome
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EBO(bj, ℘
r) in the sequential equilibrium ℘r. Thus buyer bj ∈ ∆
r
b’s equivalent offer
is etbj |∆b = ρ(bj , t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)). We can also compute etbj |∆b by considering the
following two situations:
• If xt+1|∆rb 6= ̟, buyer bj ∈ ∆
r
b’s equivalent offer at time t is 1) e
t
bj
|∆b =
(xt+1|∆rb)←bj if according to the sequential equilibrium ℘
r, s’s equilibrium of-
fering price xt+1|∆rb at time t + 1 will be accepted by buyer type bj ; or 2)
etbj |∆b = (e
t+2
bj
|∆r
′
b )←2[bj ] if according to the sequential equilibrium ℘
r, buyer
type bj will reject s’s equilibrium offering price x
t+1|∆rb at time t + 1 where
∆r
′
b ⊆ ∆
r
b is the set of buyer types that will reject s’s offer at time t+ 1.
• If xt+1|∆rb = ̟, buyer bj ∈ ∆
r
b’s equivalent offer at time t is then e
t
bj
|∆b =
(et+2bj |∆
r
b)←2[bj ] where e
t+2
bj
|∆rb is bj ’s equivalent offer at time t + 2.
Seller s will update its belief to ∆ab when it receives an offer (e
t+1
s |∆
a
b)←s. If it
receives an offer −1, it will update its belief to ∆rb. Otherwise, it will update its belief
to bh(∆b). The existence of such an equilibrium depends on the following conditions:
• Any buyer type bi ∈ ∆ab has no incentive to behave as any buyer type bj ∈
∆rb. If bi pretends to be bj , it will offer −1 at time t and its equilibrium
bargaining outcome will be EBO(bj,−1, t) = EBO(bj, ℘r). Therefore, this
condition requires that Ubi(EBO(bi, (e
t+1
s |∆
a
b)←s, t)) ≥ Ubi(EBO(bj, ℘
r)) or
equivalently, (et+1s |∆
a
b)←s ≤ ρ(bi, t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)).
• Any buyer type bj ∈ ∆
r
b must have no incentive to behave as bi ∈ ∆
a
b. If bj
behaves as bi, it will offer (e
t+1
s |∆
a
b)←s at time t and the offer will be accepted. bj
will not choose to behave as bi if Ubj (EBO(bj, ℘
r) ≥ Ubj (EBO(bj, (e
t+1
s |∆
a
b)←s, t)))
or equivalently, ρ(bj , t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)) ≤ (et+1s |∆
a
b)←s.
• No buyer type has an incentive to offer a price different from the above two equi-
librium offers. If a buyer type bi ∈ ∆b offers a price different from (et+1s |∆
a
b)←s
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and −1, it will be treated as buyer type bh(∆b) and its optimal offer at time t is
then x∗bi(t)|{bh(∆b)}. Buyer type bi will not choose to act off the equilibrium
path if etbi |∆b ≤ x
∗
bi
(t)|{bh(∆b)}.
If all the three conditions are satisfied, buyer types’ optimal offers, the belief
update rule, and the sequential equilibria ℘a and ℘r for the continuation game starting
from time t+1 consists of a sequential equilibrium for the continuation game Γ(t,∆b).
The following theorem suggests that we only need to consider at most |∆b| different
choice rules.
Theorem 6. Assume that b behaves in different ways at a continuation game with
belief set ∆b where ∆b = ∆
a
b ∪∆
r
b at time t. If there is a buyer type bi ∈ ∆
a
b and a
buyer bj ∈ ∆rb such that RPi < RPj, there is no sequential equilibrium for this choice
rule.
Proof. This result can be proved by contradiction. If there is a sequential equilibrium,
the following two conditions are satisfied: 1) Buyer type bi has no incentive to behave
as bj, i.e., (e
t+1
s |∆
a
b)←s ≤ ρ(bi, t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)); and 2) Buyer type bj has no incentive
to behave as bi, i.e., ρ(bj , t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)) ≤ (et+1s |∆
a
b)←s. Therefore, equilibrium
existence requires that ρ(bj , t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)) ≤ ρ(bi, t, EBO(bj, ℘r)).
Assume that EBO(bj, ℘
r) = (x, t′) where T ≥ t′ > t. From the definition of
equivalent offers, we have
(
RPj − ρ(bj , t, EBO(bj, ℘r))
)
· δt+1b = (RPj − x) · δ
t′
b ,
which can be rewritten as ρ(bj , t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)) = RPj − (RPj − x) · δ
t′−t−1
b . Simi-
larly, we have ρ(bi, t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)) = RPi − (RPi − x) · δ
t′−t−1
b . Since RPi < RPj ,
it follows that ρ(bi, t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)) < ρ(bj , t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)) which contradicts with
equilibrium existence conditions.
This result drastically reduces the number of separating choice rules we need to
consider. Consider an belief set ∆b at time t < T−1 such that |∆b| > 1 and ι(t) = b.
The total number of partitions satisfying the condition ∆ab ∪ ∆
r
b = ∆b is 2
|∆b| − 2.
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Given Theorem 6, we just need to consider partitions ∆ab ∪ ∆
r
b = ∆b such that for
any buyer type bi ∈ ∆ab and any bj ∈ ∆
r
b, RPi > RPj . Then for each belief set ∆b,
the total number of separating choice rules is |∆b| − 1.
3.6 The Seller’s Equilibrium Offer
This section discusses how to compute the seller’s equilibrium offer at a continu-
ation game Γ(t,∆b) such that ι(t) = s. If t = T , it is the seller’s dominant strategy
to accept any offer which is not worse than its reserve price. At time t = T − 1,
seller s has multiple choices, each for one buyer type in ∆b. The optimal offer
of seller s for buyer type bi ∈ ∆b is RPi, which gives seller s an expected utility
EUs(RPi, T − 1) =
∑
bj∈∆b,RPj≥RPi
ωbj (∆b)Us(RPi, T ) since RPi is only acceptable
to a buyer type with a reserve price no less than RPi. The optimal offer of s at time
T − 1 is y = argmaxy∈{RPi|bi∈∆b}EUs(y, T − 1) and its equivalent offer is e
T−1
s |∆b
such that Us(e
T−1
s |∆b, T ) = EUs(y, T −1). If |∆b| = 1, agents’ equilibrium strategies
are the equilibrium strategies of the corresponding complete information bargaining
discussed in Section 3.2.
Our idea of computing the seller’s equilibrium offer given a belief ∆b (|∆b| > 1)
at time t < T − 1 is the following. We consider all possible reject update rules
and for each reject update rule, we compute all the sequential equilibria for the
continuation game with beliefs corresponding to the reject update rule. Then for
each sequential equilibrium for a reject update rule, we compute the seller’s optimal
offer and check the equilibrium existence conditions. Theorem 1 suggests that we
only need to consider reject update rules in which buyer types with higher reserve
prices accept the seller’s equilibrium offer while buyer types with lower reserve prices
reject the seller’s equilibrium offer. Thus we only need to consider a restricted set of
beliefs for the continuation game.
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We consider a reject update rule in which buyer types ∆′b will reject the seller’s
offer and buyer types ∆b − ∆′b will accept the seller’s offer such that such that
RPi > RPj for any bi ∈ ∆b −∆′b and bj ∈ ∆
′
b. We first compute all the sequential
equilibria SE(∆′b, t+ 1) for the continuation game with belief ∆
′
b starting from time
t+1. If there is no sequential equilibrium for the continuation game Γ(t+1,∆′b), there
is no sequential equilibrium for this reject update rule. Otherwise, for each sequential
equilibrium ℘ ∈ SE(∆′b, t+ 1), we check whether there exists a price x such that the
price, the reject update rule, and the sequential equilibrium ℘ constitute a sequential
equilibrium for the continuation game Γ(t,∆b).
A price x, a reject update rule, and a sequential equilibrium ℘ constitute a se-
quential equilibrium if and only if the following three conditions are satisfied (assume
that bi ∈ ∆b−∆′b and bj ∈ ∆
′
b where buyer types ∆
′
b will reject the seller’s offer x):
1. bi is willing to accept the offer x and does not want to behave as bj. That is,
for any bi ∈ ∆b − ∆′b and bj ∈ ∆
′
b, Ubi(x, t + 1) ≥ Ubi(EBO(bj, ℘)) where
EBO(bj, ℘) is the bi’s equilibrium bargaining outcome when it behaves as bj .
This condition can be reformulated as x ≤ minbi∈∆b−∆′b,bj∈∆′b ρ(bi, t, EBO(bj, ℘)),
which provides an upper bound for seller’s offering price x. Intuitively, if the
offering price x is too high (e.g., higher than RPi), bi can not accept the offering
price.
2. bj will reject the offer x. That is, each buyer type bj ∈ ∆′b has no incentive
to behave as bi, i.e., Ubj (x, t + 1) < Ubj (EBO(bj, ℘)). This condition can be
rewritten as x > maxbj∈∆′b ρ(bj , t, EBO(bj, ℘)), which provides a lower bound
for the offering price x. Intuitively, if the offering price x is very low (e.g., close
to 0), bj will choose to accept the favorite offer.
3. Seller s has no incentive to choose a price other than x given the reject update
rule and the sequential equilibrium ℘ of the continuation game Γ(t+ 1,∆′b);
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The third condition requires that the price x is seller’s optimal offer given the
reject update rule and the sequential equilibrium ℘ for the continuation game. Any
buyer type can either accept the seller’s offer x or reject it and receive a bargaining
outcome in the sequential equilibrium ℘ for the continuation game. Formally, buyer
type bj ∈ ∆
′
b will accept a price x if and only if x ≤ ρ(bj , t, EBO(bj, ℘)). Buyer type
bi ∈ ∆b −∆′b will accept a price x if and only if x ≤ minbj∈∆′b ρ(bi, t, EBO(bj, ℘)).
We can define the acceptance price φ(bi,∆
′
b, ℘) of each buyer type bi ∈ ∆b given the
sequential equilibrium ℘ as follows:
φ(bi,∆
′
b, ℘) =


ρ(bi, t, EBO(bi, ℘) if bi ∈ ∆′b
minbj∈∆′b ρ(bi, t, EBO(bj, ℘)) otherwise
Seller s’s expected utility of making an offer x given the sequential equilibrium ℘
is defined as
EUs(x, t) =
∑
bi∈∆b
ωbi(∆b)EUs(x, t,bi)
where EUs(x, t,bi) is seller s’s utility if the buyer is of type bi, which is defined as


Us(x, t+ 1) if x ≤ φ(bi,∆′b, ℘)
Us(EBO(bi, ℘)) if x > φ(bi,∆
′
b, ℘) and bi ∈ ∆
′
b
Us(minbj∈∆′b ρ(bi, t, EBO(bj, ℘)), t+ 1) otherwise
It is easy to see that the optimal offer the seller should be either one buyer type’s
acceptance price or a price that will be rejected by all buyer types (i.e., ̟). If the
seller’s optimal offer x satisfies the first two equilibrium existence conditions, there
is a sequential equilibrium in which the seller offers price x and buyer types ∆′b will
reject the offer with the sequential equilibrium ℘. If such a x value does not exist,
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there is no sequential equilibrium given this reject update rule and the continuation
game equilibrium ℘.
In addition to the above reject update rules under which at least one buyer type
will choose to reject the offer, the seller can also make an offer such that it is all buyer
types’ equilibrium strategies to accept the offer. It is easy to see that the highest
offer that will be accepted by all buyer types in equilibrium is x = minbi∈∆b(x
∗
bi
(t +
1)|bh(∆b))←bi since if a seller offers a price larger than x, at least one buyer type
has an incentive to deviate from accepting the offer. If the buyer rejects x, the
seller will update its belief to bh(∆b). The acceptance price of buyer type bi for
this reject update rule is thus (x∗bi(t + 1)|bh(∆b))←bi. If the optimal offer of the
seller in this case is not acceptable to all the buyer types (i.e., the optimal offer is
not minbi∈∆b(x
∗
bi
(t + 1)|bh(∆b))←bi), there is no sequential equilibrium for this null
reject update rule. Otherwise, there is a sequential equilibrium in which the seller
will make an offer which will be accepted by all buyer types.
3.7 Equilibrium Existence
The algorithm for producing equilibrium strategies is a backward induction pro-
cess, which starts from the continuation game with the initial belief at time t = 0.
Here we show an example of equilibrium calculation for the bargaining game with the
following parameters: T = 3, ι(0) = s, RPs = 10, RP1 = 100, RP2 = 60, RP3 = 50,
ω0b1 = 0.25, ω
0
b2
= 0.5, ω0b3 = 0.25, δs = 0.8, and δb = 0.6. Before we start the
backward induction process, we compute agents’ equilibrium offers in complete infor-
mation setting using the approach in Section 3.2 since we may use these equilibrium
offers to construct agents’ equilibrium strategies for the bargaining game. If buyer is
of type b1, we have x
∗
b1
(2) = 100, x∗b1(1) = 82, and x
∗
b1
(0) = 89.2. If buyer is of type
b2, we have x
∗
b2
(2) = 60, x∗b2(1) = 50.0, and x
∗
b2
(0) = 54.0. If buyer is of type b3, we
have x∗b3(2) = 50, x
∗
b3
(1) = 42.0, and x∗b3(0) = 45.2.
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Now we try our algorithm to compute all the sequential equilibria. Since ι(0) = s,
seller s will consider different reject update rules at time t = 0. Therefore, we
need to first compute all the sequential equilibria for the continuation game with
reasonable beliefs {b1,b2,b3}, {b2,b3}, and {b3} at time t = 1. We show how
to compute sequential equilibria for the continuation game with belief {b1,b2,b3}
at time t = 1. At time t = 1, b can apply different choice rules and we need
to first compute all the sequential equilibria for the continuation game with beliefs
{b1,b2,b3}, {b1}, {b2,b3}, {b1,b2}, and {b3} at time t = 2. For the continuation
game with belief {b1,b2,b3} at time t = 2, s can offer RP3 = 50, RP2 = 60, or
RP1 = 100: If it offers 50, its expected utility is (50− 10)0.83 = 20.48; If it offers 60,
its expected utility is 0.75(60− 10)0.83 = 19.20; If it offers 100, its expected utility is
0.25(100− 10)0.83 = 11.52. Thus, the optimal offer of s at time t = 3 is 50 and the
equivalent price is e2s|{b1,b2,b3} = 50.0. When the belief is {b2,b3}, the optimal
offer of s at time t = 3 is 50 and the equivalent price is e2s|{b2,b3} = 50.0. When
the belief is {b1,b2}, the optimal offer of s at time t = 3 is 60 and the equivalent
price is e2s|{b1,b2} = 60.0. For the pooling accepting choice rule at time t = 1, the
optimal offer of all buyer types is (e2s|{b1,b2,b3})←s = (50)←s = 42 and no buyer has
an incentive to deviate from it: if any buyer type chooses a different offer, it will be
treated as buyer type b1 and its utility in the later negotiation is 0. For the pooling
rejecting choice rule at time t = 1, all buyer types will offer −1 and no buyer has an
incentive to deviate from it. For example, buyer b2’s equivalent offer of offering −1
is e1b2 |{b1,b2,b3} = (e
2
s|{b1,b2,b3})←b2 = (50)←b2 = 54. If buyer b2 deviates from
offering −1, it will be believed to be b1 and its optimal offer at time t = 1 is then
x∗b2(1)|{b1} = 60, which is higher than e
1
b2
|{b1,b2,b3}. For the separating choice
rule in which b1 makes an acceptable offer while the other two buyer types offer −1,
there is only one sequential equilibrium for the continuation game with beliefs {b1}
and {b2,b3}. Thus, the optimal offer of b1 is x1b1 |{b1} = x
∗
b1
(1) = 82. However,
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b1 has an incentive to behave as b2 or b3 since in the sequential equilibrium for
the continuation game with beliefs {b2,b3}, s will make an offer 50 at time t = 2
which can bring b1 a higher utility because (50)←b1 = 70 < 82. Therefore, there
is no sequential equilibrium for this choice rule. However we can show that there is
a sequential equilibrium for the separating choice rule in which b1 and b2 make an
acceptable offer and their optimal offer is (e2s|{b1,b2})←s = (60)←s = 50. There are
totally 3 sequential equilibria for the continuation game with belief {b1,b2,b3} at
time t = 1.
In the same way, we can compute the two sequential equilibria for the continuation
game with belief {b2,b3} at time t = 1. One equilibrium is for the pooling accepting
choice rule in which both buyer types offer 42. In this case, both buyer types will
accept the offer in equilibrium. The other is for the separating choice rule in which
buyer b2 offers 50 but buyer b3 offers −1. In this case, b2’s offer will be accepted at
time t = 2. b3’s offer will be rejected and the seller will offer 50 after updating its
belief to {b3}.
Now we consider the seller’s equilibrium offers with the initial belief at time t = 0.
Seller s can apply the following different reject update rules:
1. If the buyer rejects the seller s’s offer, seller s will not change its belief, i.e., seller
s is offering ̟ by convention. Under this reject update rule, any buyer type’s
acceptance price depends on the negotiation outcome in the continuation game
Γ(1, {b1,b2,b3}), which has three sequential equilibria. In the first sequential
equilibrium where all buyer types adopt the pooling accepting choice rule at time
t = 1, all buyer types will offer 42 and the seller will accept it at time t = 2. If
seller s offers ̟, its utility is (42 − 10)0.82 = 20.48. Buyer types’ acceptance
prices are (42)←b1 = 65.2 for b1, (42)←b2 = 49.2 for b2, (42)←b3 = 45.2 for b3.
If seller s offers 65.2, buyer type b1 will accept it but buyer types b2 and b32
will reject it and follow the first sequential equilibrium. Thus, seller s’s expected
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utility while offering 65.2 is 0.25∗ (65.2−10)∗0.8+0.75∗ (42−10)0.82 = 26.40.
In the same way, we can find that the seller achieves an expected utility of 28.64
while offering 49.2 and achieves an expected utility of 28.16 while offering 45.2.
Thus, the seller’s optimal offer is 49.2. However, buyer types b1 and b2 will
accept the offer, which is in conflict with the reject update rule in which all
buyer types will reject the offer. Therefore, there is no sequential equilibrium
for the first sequential equilibrium for the continuation game Γ(1, {b1,b2,b3}).
In the same way, we can see that there is no sequential equilibrium for the other
two sequential equilibria for the continuation game Γ(1, {b1,b2,b3}).
2. If the buyer rejects the seller s’s offer, seller s updates its belief to {b3}), i.e.,
seller s is making an offer acceptable to b1,b2. There is only one sequential
equilibrium for the continuation game Γ(1, {b3}) in which buyer type b3 offers
x∗b3(1) = 42.0. It is easy to see that seller s gets a utility of (42−10)0.8
2 = 20.48
if it offers ̟ at time 0. Buyer types’ acceptance prices are (42)←b1 = 65.2 for
b1, (42)←b2 = 49.2 for b2, (42)←b3 = 45.2 for b3. Seller s’s optimal offer for this
reject update rule is 49.2. We can easily see that no buyer type has an incentive
to deviate: 1) By rejecting the offer 49.2, buyer type b1 can gain a utility of
(100− 42)0.62 = 20.88, which is lower than the utility (100 − 49.2)0.6 = 30.48
when it accepts the offer. 2) Buyer type b2 gains a utility of (60−49.2)0.6 = 6.48
by accepting the offer 49.2, which is not lower than its utility (60−42)0.62 = 6.48
when it rejects the offer. 3) Buyer type b3 gains a utility of (50−49.2)0.6 = 0.48
by accepting the offer 49.2, which is lower than its utility (50− 42)0.62 = 2.88
when it rejects the offer.
3. If the buyer rejects the seller s’s offer, seller s updates its belief to {b2,b3}),
i.e., seller s is making an offer only acceptable to b1. There are two sequential
equilibria for the continuation game Γ(1, {b2,b3}). For the sequential equilib-
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rium in which both buyer types offer an acceptable price 42, the seller’s optimal
offer is 49.2 such that b1 will accept it and b2 and b3 will reject it. However, we
could not find an offer which satisfies all equilibrium existence conditions given
the other sequential equilibrium for the continuation game Γ(1, {b2,b3}).
4. Finally, the seller can make an offer that will be accepted by all buyer types,
i.e., seller s updates its belief to {b1}) if buyer rejects the seller s’s offer. The
acceptance prices for buyer types b1, b2, and b3 are 89.2, 60.0, and 50.0, respec-
tively. Seller s’s optimal offer for this reject update rule is 89.2. Buyer types
b2 and b3 will reject the seller’s optimal offer, which is in conflicting with the
reject update rule. Therefore, there is no sequential equilibrium for this reject
update rule.
Therefore, there are two sequential equilibria for the bargaining game. In the first
equilibrium, seller s will offer 49.2 at time t = 0. If the buyer is of type b1 or b2, it
will accept the offer and they make an agreement at time t = 1. If the buyer is of
type b3, it will reject the offer and make a counter offer 42.0 at time t = 1. When
seller s receives offer 42.0, it will update its belief to {b3}) and it will accept the offer
at time t = 2. In the second equilibrium, seller s will also offer 49.2 at time t = 0. If
the buyer is of type b1, it will accept the offer and they make an agreement at time
t = 1. If the buyer is of type b2 or b3, it will reject the offer and make a counter
offer 42.0 at time t = 1. When seller s receives offer 42.0, it will update its belief to
{b2,b3}) and it will accept the offer at time t = 2.
The following theorem states that the proposed approach is sound and is complete.
Theorem 7. Our algorithm can generate all pure strategy sequential equilibria.
Proof. Our algorithm is complete since at any decision making point, we consider 1)
all sequential equilibria of the continuation game with different beliefs, 2) all choice
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rules when it’s the buyer’s turn to make an offer, and 3) all possible reject update
rules if it’s the seller’s turn to make an offer.
If all equilibrium existence conditions are satisfied, agents’ strategies and belief
systems generated by our algorithm constitutes of a sequential equilibrium. The
sequential rationality is easily seen from the backward construction: agents’ strategies
at time t is optimal in the continuation game starting from time t. Consistency can
be proved by the assessment sequence an = (µn, σn) where σn is the fully mixed
strategy profile such that for the seller and buyer type bh(∆
0
b) there is probability
1−1/n of performing the action prescribed by the equilibrium strategy profile and the
remaining probability 1/n is uniformly distributed among the other allowed actions,
while for any other buyer type bi ∈ ∆0b − bh(∆
0
b), there is probability 1 − 1/n
T of
performing the action prescribed by the equilibrium strategy profile and the remaining
probability 1/nT is uniformly distributed among the other allowed actions, and µn
is the system of beliefs obtained applying Bayes rule starting from the same priori
probability distribution P 0b. As n → ∞, the above mixed strategy profile converges
to the equilibrium strategy profile. In addition, the beliefs generated by the mixed
strategy profile converges to the priori probability distribution. Thus, the assessment
is consistent.
Since we focus on pure strategy equilibrium, there may be no sequential equi-
librium for some bargaining games. The non-existence problem of the equilibrium
in pure strategies is critical since it may affect the applicability of alternating-offers
protocol in realistic settings. Here we show one example which has no sequential
equilibrium. The bargaining game with the following parameters: T = 2, ι(0) = b,
RPs = 10, RP1 = 100, RP2 = 40, ω
0
b1
= 0.6, ω0b2 = 0.4, δs = 0.9, and δb = 0.8. First
consider that the buyer is applying the pooling accepting choice rule at time 0. With
the initial belief, the seller will get a utility of 0.6(100−10)0.92 = 43.74 if it offer RP1
at time t = 1 and will get a utility of (40−10)0.92 = 24.3 if it offer RP2 at time t = 1.
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Table 3.1. Simulation parameters
Parameters Value range
Deadline (T ) [2, 14]
Number of buyer types (|∆0b|) [2, 9]
Reserve price of buyer (RPi) [40, 100]
Reserve price of seller (RPs) [5, 20]
Discounting factors (δs, δb) [0.5, 1]
Therefore, the optimal offer of the seller with the initial belief at t = 1 is offering 100.
Accordingly, the optimal offer of all buyer types is (100)←s = 58.6. Obviously, buyer
b2 will deviate from it since the offering price 58.6 is higher than its reserve price
40. Consider the pooling rejecting choice rule in which all buyer types offer −1 and
buyer b1’s equivalent offer is (100)←b1 = 100. In this case, buyer b1 has an incentive
to offer x∗b1(0) = 91 which will be accepted by the seller since it will update its belief
to {b1} after receiving the offer other than 100. The final choice rule for the buyer
is the separating choice rule in which buyer b1 offers x
∗
b1
(0) = 91 and buyer b2 offers
−1. However, buyer b1 has an incentive to offer −1 since at time t = 1 the seller will
offer RP2 = 40, which is better since (40)←b1 = 52 < x
∗
b1
(0) = 91. Therefore, there
is no sequential equilibrium for this bargaining game.
To evaluate the percentage of games with at least one pure strategy sequential
equilibrium, we performed a series of experiments in a variety of test environments and
the parameters are given in Table 6.2. In the experiments, the negotiation deadline is
randomly selected from [2, 14], the number of buyer types is randomly selected from
[2, 9] and the initial probability of each buyer type is set randomly. The reserve price
of each buyer type is randomly selected from [40, 100] and the reserve price of the seller
is randomly selected from [5, 20]. Therefore, the reserve price of each buyer is always
higher than the reserve price of the seller and the two agents have a negotiation
space. Agents’ discounting factors model how agents’ utilities decrease with time.
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Table 3.2. Average number of sequential equilibria and percentage of games with
sequential equilibria
T |∆0
b
| = 2 |∆0
b
| = 3 |∆0
b
| = 4 |∆0
b
| = 5 |∆0
b
| = 6 |∆0
b
| = 7 |∆0
b
| = 8 |∆0
b
| = 9
2 1.64 (95.1%) 1.72 (95.4%) 1.78 (96.5%) 1.81 (96.4%) 1.84 (964%) 1.87 (97.3%) 1.89 (97.9%) 1.90 (97.8%)
3 1.99 (100%) 2.07 (100%) 2.17 (100%) 2.24 (100%) 2.30 (100%) 2.37 (100%) 2.39 (100%) 2.48 (99.9%)
4 2.37 (99.9%) 2.83 (100%) 3.23 (100%) 3.58 (100%) 3.87 (100%) 4.24 (100%) 4.38 (100%) 4.58 (100%)
5 2.49 (100%) 3.11 (100%) 3.67 (100%) 4.18 (100%) 4.70 (100%) 5.15 (100%) 5.53 (100%) 5.93 (100%)
6 2.87 (99.8%) 3.79 (100%) 4.69 (100%) 5.52 (100%) 6.34 (100%) 6.97 (100%) 7.66 (100%) 8.46 (100%)
7 3.06 (100%) 4.24 (100%) 5.25 (100%) 6.21 (100%) 7.16 (100%) 8.12 (100%) 9.16 (100%) 9.99 (100%)
8 3.54 (99.9%) 5.18 (100%) 6.59 (100%) 8.04 (100%) 9.67 (100%) 10.99 (100%) 12.55 (100%) 13.66 (100%)
9 3.82 (100%) 5.85 (100%) 7.38 (100%) 8.89 (100%) 10.62 (100%) 11.91 (100%) 13.95 (100%) 16.61 (100%)
10 4.55 (100%) 7.21 (100%) 9.92 (100%) 12.60 (100%) 15.48 (100%) 18.49 (100%) 20.71 (100%) 22.58 (100%)
11 5.04 (100%) 8.17 (100%) 11.11 (100%) 13.48 (100%) 17.22 (100%) 19.83 (100%) 25.15 (100%) 28.86 (100%)
12 6.36 (99.9%) 10.22 (100%) 16.54 (100%) 21.28 (100%) 27.57 (100%) 36.55 (100%) 38.05 (100%) 54.30 (100%)
13 6.89 (100%) 12.42 (100%) 16.79 (100%) 21.34 (100%) 28.57 (100%) 43.98 (100%) 48.35 (100%) 70.04 (100%)
14 8.90 (100%) 16.88 (100%) 26.10 (100%) 44.12 (100%) 70.63 (100%) 103.28 (100%) 125.86 (100%) 155.49 (100%)
When discounting factors are smaller than 0.5, agents’ utilities drastically decrease
with time. In order to make our setting more realistic, agents’ discounting factors
are randomly selected from [0.5, 1). The agent making the first offer is randomly
determined. The above setting represents a wide range of scenarios.
Experimental results show that there is at least one sequential equilibrium in
∼ 99.7% of the bargaining games. Table 3.2 shows the average number of sequential
equilibria (including both games with sequential equilibria and without sequential
equilibria) and percentage of games with sequential equilibria in negotiation games
with different deadlines and number of buyer types. For each combination of dead-
lines and number of buyer types, we randomly generated over 10000 scenarios and
computed the average values. We can see that the average number of sequential
equilibria or the percentage of games with sequential equilibria increases with the
increase of deadlines. Similarly, the average number of sequential equilibria slightly
increase with the number of buyer types, which corresponds to our intuitions. It can
be observed from Table 3.2 that when the deadline is longer than 2 and the number
of buyer types is more than 3, all scenarios have at least one sequential equilibrium.
With more buyer types, there are more choice rules and reject update rules and poten-
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tially, there will be more sequential equilibria. However, more buyer types introduce
more stringent equilibrium existence conditions since an equilibrium requires that
each buyer type has an incentive to choose a different strategy.
Our approach can find all sequential equilibria for each bargaining game. Based
on the computation reduction techniques, we just need to find sequential equilibria
for at most |∆0b| continuation games Γ(t,∆b) at time t where ∆b ⊆ ∆
0
b. Let Ψ(t,∆b)
be the maximum number of sequential equilibria for the continuation game Γ(t,∆b).
If t = T − 1, it follows that Ψ(t,∆b) = 1. Otherwise, we have the following: 1) If
ι(t) = b, Ψ(t,∆b) = O(|∆b|Ψ(t + 1,∆b)
2) since buyer types can try different choice
rules and for each choice rule, we need to consider all the equilibrium combinations of
at most two continuation games. 2) If ι(t) = s, Ψ(t,∆b) < O(|∆b|(Ψ(t + 1,∆b)|∆b|)
since we need to consider |∆b|+1 reject update rules and for each reject update rule,
we need to consider all the sequential equilibria for the corresponding continuation
game. We can see that the number of sequential equilibria may exponentially increase
with the number |∆0b| of buyer types and the deadline T and our algorithm has a
high computational complexity. In our backward induction approach, the equilibrium
calculation for a continuation game with certain belief may be conducted multiple
times. To avoid the repetition of equilibrium calculation in our approach, one can
store known equilibrium strategies for each continuation game with certain belief. If
there is no calculation repetition, the computational complexity of our approach is
not higher than any other complete algorithm.
We experimentally evaluated the running time to our algorithm using the setting
specified in Table 6.2. All experiments run on a PC with a 2.16 Ghz Intel Pentium
Dual processor and 2 GB of memory. Experimental results show that the algorithm’s
running time increases with the deadlines and the number of buyer types. Table 3.3
shows the average time of computing all the sequential equilibria in a bargaining game.
The average running time is only about 12 seconds when the minimum deadline of the
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Table 3.3. Average computation time (in seconds)
T |∆0
b
| = 2 |∆0
b
| = 3 |∆0
b
| = 4 |∆0
b
| = 5 |∆0
b
| = 6 |∆0
b
| = 7 |∆0
b
| = 8 |∆0
b
| = 9
2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.14
3 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.21 0.37 0.60 0.95 1.38
4 0.03 0.10 0.26 0.53 1.02 1.77 2.93 4.64
5 0.05 0.17 0.45 0.97 1.90 3.39 5.78 9.35
6 0.07 0.24 0.66 1.47 2.99 5.42 9.43 15.50
7 0.08 0.33 0.90 2.07 4.22 7.85 13.82 23.09
8 0.10 0.41 1.18 2.71 5.66 10.73 19.00 31.89
9 0.12 0.51 1.46 3.45 7.27 13.78 24.90 42.61
10 0.15 0.60 1.80 4.32 9.14 17.82 32.56 54.40
11 0.17 0.73 2.16 5.24 11.39 22.33 41.32 70.60
12 0.20 0.86 2.63 6.46 14.39 28.12 51.27 92.55
13 0.23 1.02 3.09 7.75 17.28 36.79 69.48 119.52
14 0.26 1.19 3.73 10.14 23.70 50.38 95.47 176.75
two agents is 14 and the number of buyer types is 9. We can find that the computation
time increases drastically with the increase of both the negotiation deadline and the
number of buyer types.
3.8 The Value of Equilibrium Strategies
This chapter provides a solution to compute pure strategy equilibria in bilateral
bargaining games with one-sided uncertainty. Given that the chapter deals with a
known negotiation setting, it would be very interesting to see how the pure strategy
sequential equilibrium solution would fare against heuristic based strategies. An
agent’s equilibrium strategy is optimal given the other agent’s equilibrium strategy.
Therefore, if one agent adopts the equilibrium strategy, the other agent cannot gain
a higher utility by switching to any other strategy (e.g., heuristic based strategies).
Even though, it is still interesting to investigate how close the performance is when an
agent uses different strategies, e.g., equilibrium strategy and a variety of heuristics.
Furthermore, it would also be interesting to compare the social welfare (the total
utility of all agents) when agents adopt different strategies.
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3.8.1 Heuristic Based Strategies
While there have been a variety of heuristic based strategies in the literature, the
most widely used strategy is the time dependent strategy (e.g., [12, 48, 78, 124, 127]).
In a time dependent strategy, an agent makes concessions in response to the remaining
negotiation time. Formally, an agent’s offer at time t is given by:
IPa + (RPa − IPa)(
t
T − 1
)ε
where RPa is agent a’s reserve price, T is the minimum of two agents’ deadline, and
IPa is agent a’s optimal (or initial) price. An agent’s optimal price is the agent’s
favorable price. In our bilateral bargaining game, an agent’s optimal price is the
reserve price of the other negotiation agent.
With infinitely many values of ε, there are infinitely many possible strategies in
making concessions with respect to the remaining time. However, they can be classi-
fied into: 1) Linear : ε = 1, 2) Conciliatory : 0 < ε < 1, and 3) Conservative: ε > 1.
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ε reflects an agent’s mental state about its eagerness for finishing the negotiation
earlier [48, 78]. Figure 3.4 shows the buyer’s different rates of concession.
3.8.2 Different Strategy Combination
In this section, we measure the value of equilibrium strategies against different
time dependent strategies. For the experiment, we choose three representative de-
pendent strategies (see Figure 3.4): 1) ε = 1: a liner concession making strategy; 2)
ε = 0.25: a conciliatory concession making strategy; and 3) ε = 4: a conservative
concession making strategy. When the seller is adopting a time dependent strategy,
it will use the buyer’s expected reserve price
∑
1≤i≤n ω
0
bi
RPi as its optimal price.
Specifically, we consider the following 16 strategy combinations:
1. Both agents adopt the equilibrium strategies computed by using our algorithm.
This strategy combination is called EQ∼EQ.
2. The seller adopts the equilibrium strategy together with its belief system, but
the buyer takes a time dependent strategy. There are totally 3 strategy com-
binations 0.25∼EQ, 1∼EQ, and 4∼EQ, where 0.25∼EQ indicates that the
buyer is using a conciliatory time dependent strategy (i.e., ε = 0.25) but the
seller is adopting the equilibrium strategy.
3. The buyer adopts the equilibrium strategy but the seller takes a time dependent
strategy. In this case, the seller will not update its belief since it uses the time
dependent strategy. However, the buyer will assume that the seller will update
its belief using the belief system of its equilibrium strategy. EQ∼0.25, EQ∼1,
and EQ∼4, where EQ∼0.25 indicates that the buyer is adopting the equilib-
rium strategy but the seller is using a conciliatory time dependent strategy.
4. Both agents adopt the time dependent strategy. Therefore, there are 9 combi-
nations: 0.25∼0.25, 0.25∼1, 0.25∼4, 1∼0.25, 1∼1, 1∼4, 4∼0.25, 4∼1, and
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Figure 3.5. Buyer’s average utility while using different strategies
4∼4 where 1∼4 indicates that the buyer is adopting a time dependent strategy
ε = 1 and the seller is adopting a time dependent strategy ε = 4.
3.8.3 Performance Measures and Results
We performed a series of experiments in a variety of test environments using the
parameters from Table 6.2. Over 106 bargaining games were randomly generated
that each had at least one sequential equilibrium. For each sequential equilibrium
of a bargaining game, we tried different strategy combinations and for each strategy
combination, we computed the equilibrium bargaining outcome for each buyer type.
Based on the equilibrium bargaining outcome for each buyer type, we also computed
the average utility of all buyer types and the seller. Given the average utilities of both
the buyer and the seller in each sequential equilibrium for a bargaining game, we can
compute the average utilities of both the buyer and the seller in the bargaining game.
The main performance measure is the average utility of the buyer or the seller in each
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Figure 3.6. Buyer’s average utility and the negotiation deadline
strategy combination. Another important performance measure is the social welfare
(i.e, the total utility of the buyer and the seller) in each strategy combination.
Extensive stochastic simulations were carried out for all the combinations of vari-
ables in Table 6.2. For each combination, we randomly generated over 10000 exper-
iments and tried all the strategy combinations and generated average performance
measures. Even though extensive stochastic simulations were carried out for all the
situations to compare the performance of different heuristic strategies and equilibrium
strategies, due to space limitations, we only present the representative results in the
rest of this section. For most results, we did not report the confidence intervals in
our discussions since we found that the confidence interval for each average value was
very tight around the value (e.g., the confidence intervals in Figure 3.5, Figure 3.8,
and Figure 3.10).
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Figure 3.7. Buyer’s average utility and agents’ discount factors
3.8.4 The Value of Choosing Equilibrium strategies
The first question we investigated is what is an agent’s advantage of choosing an
equilibrium strategy over heuristic strategies given that the other agent is adopting
the equilibrium strategy. Figure 3.5 shows the buyer’s average utility (as well as
the 99% confidence interval) while using different strategies given that the seller is
always using the equilibrium strategy. We can see that the equilibrium strategy (i.e.,
the EQ∼EQ strategy combination) achieved a much higher utility than the other
three heuristic strategies, i.e., strategy combinations 0.25∼EQ, 1∼EQ, and 4∼EQ.
Furthermore, the utility of using a conciliatory strategy (e.g., ε = 0.25) is higher than
that of using a conservative strategy (e.g., ε = 4). This result is mainly due to the
existence of discount factor since an earlier agreement (even with the same price) can
bring the buyer a higher utility.
Figure 3.6 shows how the negotiation deadline affects the buyer’s utility when the
seller is using the equilibrium strategy. It can be observed that when both agents
adopt the equilibrium strategy, the negotiation deadline almost has no influence on
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Figure 3.8. Seller’s average utility while using different strategies
the buyer’s utility, which is similar to the strategy combination 0.25∼EQ where
the buyer adopts a conciliatory concession making approach. However, when the
buyer is adopting the linear or conservative strategy, its utility decreases with the
increase of deadline. This result corresponds to the intuition that, when an agent
uses a conservative (or linear) strategy, it will make an agreement later than using a
conciliatory strategy. Correspondingly, it will gain a lower utility due the existence
of the discount factor.
In addition to negotiation deadlines, agents’ discount factors also affect the buyer’s
utility. Figure 3.7 shows how the buyer’s utility changes with the sum δ = δb + δs
of both agents’ discount factors. Since δa is in the range of [0.5, 1), it follows that
δ ∈ [1, 2). It can be seen from Figure 3.7 that for different strategy combinations,
the buyer’s utility increases with the increase of δ. Intuitively, with a higher discount
factor, the buyer gains a higher utility even for the same negotiation negotiation
result.
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Figure 3.9. Seller’s average utility and agents’ discount factors
The other situation is that the buyer is adopting the equilibrium strategy but
the seller is using the equilibrium strategy or different heuristic strategies. Figure 3.8
shows the seller’s average utility while using different strategies given that the buyer is
always using the equilibrium strategy. It is easy to see that the equilibrium strategy
(i.e., the EQ∼EQ strategy combination) achieved a much higher utility than the
other three heuristic strategies, i.e., strategy combinations EQ∼0.25, EQ∼1, and
EQ∼4. Similar to the results in Figure 3.5, the utility of using a conciliatory strategy
is higher than that of using a conservative strategy. Figure 3.7 shows how the seller’s
utility changes with the sum δ = δb+ δs of both agents’ discount factors. We can see
that for different strategy combinations, the seller’s utility increases with the increase
of δ, which is again similar to the results in Figure 3.9.
3.8.5 Comparison of Social Welfare
We also compared the social welfare of different strategy combinations. From Fig-
ure 3.10 we can see that the social welfare of the strategy combination EQ∼EQ is
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Figure 3.10. Social welfare for different strategy combinations
much higher than that of all other strategy combinations, which corresponds to the
results that agents achieved higher utilities while adopting equilibrium strategies. We
can also see that the social welfare increases when agents’ strategies are more concil-
iatory. When agents adopt conciliatory strategies, they will make large concessions
at the beginning and it is more likely that they can make an agreement earlier, which
results in higher social welfare.
Figure 3.11 shows that the social welfare of each strategy combination increases
with the increase of the sum of both agents’ discount factors, which corresponds to
the results in Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.9. The main reason is that an agent’s utility of
a negotiation outcome may increase with its discount factor. Note that even when the
sum of discount factor is close to 2, the strategy combination EQ∼EQ still achieved
a higher social welfare than other strategy combinations.
From Figure 3.12, we can see that the negotiation deadline has almost no effect
on the social welfare when both agents adopt the equilibrium strategies. However, if
one agent is using a heuristic strategy, the social welfare decreases with the deadline,
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Figure 3.11. Social welfare and agents’ discount factors
which is mainly due to the delay of agreement making time. Especially, when agents’
strategies are more conservative, the advantage of the strategy combination EQ∼EQ
increases with the increase of negotiation deadline.
3.9 Applications of the Approach
Our approach can be used to compute pure strategy sequential equilibria in other
games with continuous strategy space. This section briefly discusses two potential
application of our proposed approach.
3.9.1 Bilateral Negotiation with Uncertain Discount Factor
This chapter considers one-sided uncertainty regarding reserve prices and we as-
sume complete knowledge about agents’ discount factors. In other cases, one agent
may have incomplete information about the other agent’s discount factors. For ex-
ample, we can assume that the buyer b can be of finitely many types {b1, . . . ,bn} in
which buyer bi has a discount factor δ
i
b. The initial belief of s on b is µ(0) = 〈∆
0
b, P
0
b〉
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Figure 3.12. Social welfare and the negotiation deadline
where ∆0b = {b1, . . . ,bn} and P
0
b = {ω
0
b1
, . . . , ω0bn} such that
∑
i ω
0
bi
= 1. ω0bi is the
priori probability that b is of type bi. Let x
∗
bi
(t) be any agent optimal offer at time
t when b is of type bi in this case. It follows that x
∗
bi
(t) ≤ x∗bj (t) if δ
i
b > δ
j
b.
Lemma 8. x∗bi(t) ≤ x
∗
bj
(t) if δib > δ
j
b.
Proof. Case 1 (ι(T ) = s). It follows that x∗bi(T − 1) = x
∗
bj
(T − 1) = RPs. Then
x∗bi(T −2) = RPb−δ
i
b(RPb−x
∗
bi
(T −1)) < x∗bj (T −2) = RPb−δ
j
b(RPb−x
∗
bi
(T −1)).
Similarly, we have x∗bi(T −3) = RPs(1− δs)+ δsx
∗
bi
(T −2) and x∗bj (T −3) = RPs(1−
δs) + δsx
∗
bj
(T − 2). Thus we have x∗bi(T − 3) < x
∗
bj
(T − 3). Recursively, we have
x∗bi(t) < x
∗
bj
(t) for t < T − 3.
Case 2 (ι(T ) = b). It follows that x∗bi(T − 1) = x
∗
bj
(T − 1) = RPb. Then at time
time T − 2, we have x∗bi(T − 2) = RPs(1 − δs) + δsx
∗
bi
(T − 1) = x∗bj (T − 2). Thus,
x∗bi(T − 2) > x
∗
bj
(T − 2). As in case 1, we have x∗bi(t) < x
∗
bj
(t) for t < T − 2.
In this setting, it is easy to see that the weakest type is the buyer type with the
lowest discount factor. Accordingly, it the buyer acts off the equilibrium path, the
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seller will update its belief to the buyer type with the lowest discount factor following
the optimistic conjecture.
One can directly apply our approach to solve the bargaining game with uncertain
discount factors. For the bargaining game with uncertain reserve prices, we use two
techniques to reduce the number of choice rules and reject update rules that need to
be considered. Fortunately, we can still only need to a small number of choice rules
and reject update rules for the bargaining game with uncertain discount factors.
First we consider the reject update rule such that the seller will update its belief
to ∆′b ⊆ ∆b if the seller’s offer is rejected by the buyer where ∆b is the seller’s belief
while making the offer.
Theorem 9. If there is a reject update rule with updated belief ∆′b ⊆ ∆b such that
δib > δ
j
b for bi ∈ ∆b\∆
′
b and bj ∈ ∆
′
b, agents’ strategies are not sequentially rational.
Proof. The result can be proved by contradiction. Assume that there is a sequential
equilibrium with this reject update rule. Similar to Theorem 1, equilibrium existence
conditions requires that (et+1bj |∆
′
b)←bj ≤ (e
t+1
bj
|∆′b)←bi where e
t+1
bj
|∆′b is bj ’s equivalent
offer in the continuation game starting from t + 1 with belief ∆′b. Since δ
i
b > δ
j
b, it
follows that (et+1bj |∆
′
b)←bj > (e
t+1
bj
|∆′b)←bi. There is a contradiction.
Accordingly, we just need to consider no more than |∆b| reject update rules with-
out sacrificing completeness of our approach. Similarly, we just need to consider a
small number of choice rules due to the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Assume that b behaves in different ways at a continuation game with
belief set ∆b where ∆b = ∆
a
b ∪ ∆
r
b at time t. If there is a buyer type bi ∈ ∆
a
b and
a buyer bj ∈ ∆rb such that δ
i
b > δ
j
b, there is no sequential equilibrium for this choice
rule.
Proof. Similar to Theorem 6, this result can be proved by contradiction. If there is
a sequential equilibrium, the following two conditions are satisfied: 1) Buyer type
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bi has no incentive to behave as bj , i.e., (e
t+1
s |∆
a
b)←s ≤ ρ(bi, t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)); and
2) Buyer type bj has no incentive to behave as bi, i.e., ρ(bj , t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)) ≤
(et+1s |∆
a
b)←s. Therefore, equilibrium existence requires that ρ(bj , t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)) ≤
ρ(bi, t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)).
Assume that EBO(bj, ℘
r) = (x, t′) where T ≥ t′ > t. From the definition of
equivalent offers, we have
(
RPb − ρ(bj , t, EBO(bj, ℘r))
)
· (δjb)
t+1 = (RPb − x) · δt
′
b ,
which can be rewritten as ρ(bj , t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)) = RPb − (RPb − x) · (δ
j
b)
t′−t−1.
Similarly, we have ρ(bi, t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)) = RPb−(RPb−x) ·(δib)
t′−t−1. Since δib > δ
j
b,
it follows that ρ(bi, t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)) < ρ(bj , t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)) which contradicts with
equilibrium existence conditions.
In summary, our approach can be directly applied to solve the bargaining game
with one-sided uncertain discount factor and we can use the similar techniques to
reduce computational cost.
3.9.2 Bilateral Multi-issue Negotiation with Uncertain Weights
Another potential application of our approach is bilateral multi-issue negotiation,
which is more complex and challenging than a single-issue negotiation since agents
need to make tradeoffs between multiple issues. The problem of bargaining efficiently
over multiple issues with complete information has been addressed in [50, 51, 52].
Agents’ equilibrium strategies can be easily computed by extending the backward
induction method in Section 3.2. Specifically, the acting agent ι(t) at time t chooses
its best offer (consisting of values for each negotiation issue) that is acceptable to
the other agent. In presence of incomplete information, it is common to compute
agents’ sequential equilibrium strategies. There are different sources of uncertainty.
For uncertainty about agents’ reserve prices, discount factors or negotiation deadlines,
the calculation of sequential equilibria in a multi-issue negotiation game is the same as
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that in a single issue negotiation game. The only new source of uncertainty introduced
by having multiple issues is the uncertainty regarding the weights of different issues.
In multi-issue negotiation, two agents are negotiating over multiple issues 1, . . . , l.
For each issue i, let RPia be agent a’s reserve price for the issue. A negotiation
outcome can be represented as o = 〈o1, . . . , ol〉. An agent a’s utility of a negotiation
outcome o is defined as Ua(o) =
∑
1≤i≤l w
i
aUa(oi) where Ua(oi) is a’s utility given the
negotiation outcome oi for issue i, which is the same as the utility function in single
issue negotiation (see Section 3.2). In the cumulative utility function, wia is agent a’s
weight for issue i. Let wa = 〈w
1
a, . . . , w
l
a〉 be agent a’s weight vector. We consider the
one-sided uncertainty about the buyer’s weights of the issues and all other parameters
are complete information. There are n possible weight vectors {wb1 , . . . , wbn} for the
buyer and the probability of the buyer being the type wbi is ωbi. The probability
distribution is common knowledge.
Fatima et al. [51, 52] present an algorithm to produce equilibrium strategies in
multi-issue bargaining with uncertain weights but the strategies found by their al-
gorithm are not necessarily sequentially rational given the designed system of be-
liefs as we discussed previously.5 Here we show a simple example (see Figure 3.13)
where buyer b and seller s are negotiating over two issues 1 and 2 with the follow-
ing parameters: T = 5, ι(0) = s, RP1s = RP
2
s = 0, RP
1
b = RP
2
b = 90, δs = 0.5,
δb = 0.8, ws = 〈0.9, 0.1〉. There are 2 possible weight vectors {wb1 = 〈0.4, 0.6〉, wb2 =
〈0.9, 0.1〉} for the buyer and the probability of the buyer being the type wb1 and
wb2 are ωb1 = 0.9 and ωb2 = 0.1, respectively. At time t = 4, seller s will of-
fer buyer’s reserve prices for both issues 〈90, 90〉, which gives the seller a utility of
0.9 · (90 − 0) · 0.55 + 0.1 · (90 − 0) · 0.55 = 2.8125. At time t = 3, both buyer types’
5The multi-issue negotiation model here is slightly different from the multi-issue negotiation
model in [51, 52] where two negotiation agents are splitting pies and the size of each pie shrinks
over time due to the discount factors. In contrast, the utility of each agent shrinks over time. Our
formulation of multi-issue negotiation has been widely used, e.g., [65, 50], just to name a few.
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Figure 3.13. Failure of the approach in [52, 51] with T = 5, ι(0) = s, RP1s =
RP2s = 0, RP
1
b = RP
2
b = 90, δs = 0.5, δb = 0.8, ws = 〈0.9, 0.1〉, {wb1 = 〈0.4, 0.6〉,
wb2 = 〈0.9, 0.1〉}, ωb1 = 0.9, and ωb2 = 0.1; agents’ offers in complete information
settings were also showed.
optimal offer that is acceptable to the seller is 〈50, 0〉. At time t = 2, seller’s optimal
offer that is acceptable to buyer type b1 is 〈85, 0〉 which can give seller an expected
utility of 8.8875. Seller’s optimal offer that is acceptable to buyer type b2 is 〈50, 90〉
which can give seller an expected utility of 3.20625. Therefore, seller’s optimal offer
at time t = 2 is 〈85, 0〉. In the same way, we can compute that both both buyer
types’ optimal offer at time t = 1 is 〈39.5, 0〉. Similarly, we can compute that seller’s
optimal offer at time t = 0 is 〈76.6, 0〉, which is only acceptable to the buyer type b1.
That is, if the buyer rejects the offer, the seller will update is belief to {b2}. However,
buyer type b1 has an incentive to reject the offer and to make buyer type b2 complete
information offer 〈30, 0〉 which can give b1 a higher utility than accepting seller’s offer
〈76.6, 0〉.
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We can apply our approach to solve the multi-issue bargaining game with uncer-
tain issue weights in Figure 3.13. At time t = 0, we need to try different reject update
rules and for each reject update rule, we first compute the sequential equilibria for
its continuation game starting from time t = 1. To compute all the sequential equi-
libria for a continuation game starting from time t = 1, we need to consider different
choice rules. While computing agents’ equilibrium offers, one important optimization
problem is computing one buyer type’s (or a seller’s) optimal offer which can give
the seller (or a buyer type) certain utility. For instance, seller’s expected utility is
y > 0 and buyer type bj with weights wbj = 〈w
1
bj
, . . . , wlbj〉 is finding a package offer
x = 〈x1, . . . , xl〉 at time t to maximize its utility. The optimization problem can be
formulated as
maximise
∑
1≤i≤l
wibj · (RP
i
b − x
i) · (δb)
t+1
such that
∑
1≤i≤l
wis · (x
i − RPis) · (δs)
t+1 ≥ y
RPib ≤ x
i ≤ RPib for 1 ≤ i ≤ l
As implied in [51, 52], the optimal solution can be generated using a greedy approach
by considering wis/w
i
bj
for 1 ≤ i ≤ l where wibj/w
i
s is the utility that bj needs to
give up in order increase s’s utility by (δb)
t+1/(δs)
t+1. Thus, bj begins by making
concessions to seller s on the issue with the lowest wibj/w
i
s value. Accordingly, the
complexity of solving the optimization problem is polynomial.
The weakness of different buyer types at any continuation game can be computed
by solving the bargaining game with complete information about weights of negoti-
ation issues. Recall that that the weakest type gives the seller the highest utility in
the complete information bargaining setting. Rather than only considering a small
set of reject update rules and choice rules, here we may need to consider all reject
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update rules and choice rules since the two computation reduction techniques are not
necessarily valid here. However, this only increases the number of computations and
does not affect the applicability of our approach. One sequential equilibrium for the
multi-issue bargaining game in Figure 3.13 is that at time t = 0, seller s makes an
offer 〈69, 0〉 that is only acceptable to buyer type b1. It follows that 1) offer 〈69, 0〉 is
the seller’s optimal offer for this reject update rule; 2) buyer type b1 gains a utility of
49.92 and it has no incentive to reject the offer; and 3) by rejecting the offer, buyer
type b2 will gain a utility of 40.32, which is higher than the utility 22.32 by accepting
the offer 〈69, 0〉.
3.10 Summary
Studying rational agents’ strategic behavior is currently one of the most interesting
issue in the field of automated negotiation. However, the bargaining theory literature
lacks of general solutions for bargaining game with the presence of deadlines and in-
complete information. In this chapter we go beyond state of the art by providing an
algorithm that can find all sequential equilibria in incomplete information bargaining
games with deadline constraints. Specifically, this chapter analyzes agents’ rational
strategic behavior in alternating-offers bilateral bargaining with deadline constraints
and one-sided uncertainty on reserve prices. Our approach computes sequential equi-
librium employing a Bayesian extension of backward induction. To guarantee the
completeness of our approach, we enumerate all choice rules and belief reject update
rules. To guarantee the soundness of our approach, we construct equilibrium existence
conditions along the backward induction process. Our approach can also be applied
to other uncertainty settings, e.g., bilateral multi-issue negotiation with uncertain
weight functions [51, 52], and bilateral bargaining with uncertain discount factors.
We also compared the performance of the equilibrium strategies and representative
heuristic based strategies. Empirical results show that agents with equilibrium strate-
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gies achieved higher utilities than agents with heuristic based strategies. Furthermore,
when both agents adopt the equilibrium strategies, the agents achieved much higher
social welfare than that in all other strategy combinations.
Our study shows that there exists at least one sequential equilibrium in more
than 99.7% of scenarios we have tried in which there are deadline constraints and
incomplete information. There are two future research directions for this equilibrium
nonexistence problem. On one hand, we can develop algorithm for finding mixed
equilibrium strategies for bargaining scenarios in which there is no pure strategy
equilibrium. On the other hand, we can slightly modify the alternating-offers pro-
tocol that would allow the existence of the equilibrium in pure strategies, e.g., the
introduction of agents’ strategic delay option [41].
While this chapter only considers one-sided uncertainty, we think our approach
can be extended to handle two-sided uncertainty. Assume that the buyer is also
uncertain about the seller’s reserve price. When it is the buyer’s turn to make an
offer, rather than considering whether a buyer type’s offer will be accepted be the
seller, we need to consider the set of seller types that will accept the buyer’s offer.
That is, we need to combine choice rules and reject update rules. Similar to the buyer
types, all seller types need to not only consider different reject update rules but also
different choice rules. In addition to two-sided uncertainty regarding reserve prices,
our algorithm can also handle two-sided uncertainty about discount factors.
One major motivation of the study of bargaining theory is designing successful
bargaining agents in practical markets where there are more uncertainty and more
agents. Although constraints, complexity, and uncertainty make it impractical to
develop optimal negotiation strategies, our analysis can still give us some insights into
the bargaining problems. Consider that a buyer is acquiring multiple resources in a
dynamic market with multiple sellers. We can first use our approach to generate the
strategy for each single seller and then use heuristics to combine the set of strategies
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for all sellers to generate the overall negotiation strategy. The next chapter will look
at concurrent negotiation between multiple buyers and sellers.
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CHAPTER 4
EXTENDING ALTERNATING-OFFERS BARGAINING
IN ONE-TO-MANY AND MANY-TO-MANY SETTINGS
The focus of this chapter is on analyzing agents’ strategic behavior in one-to-
many and many-to-many negotiations in which agents are negotiating with multiple
trading partners and, at the same time, are facing competition from trading competi-
tors. The subgame perfect equilibrium for complete information setting is presented
and equilibrium properties, such us uniqueness, are discussed. We also analyze the
reduction of computation to find sequential equilibria in one-to-many settings and
many-to-many settings. Furthermore, we provide an algorithm to compute the se-
quential equilibrium in the incomplete information setting where there is uncertainty
regarding the reserve price of an agent. This latter work will build on techniques
developed in the previous chapter. The main goal of this chapter is to begin to
understand which factors are affecting agents’ bargaining position relative to others
when each agent is negotiating with multiple trading partners simultaneously. This
chapter is the first work to provide a game theoretical analysis of agents’ strategic
interactions in concurrent negotiations.
4.1 One-to-Many Alternating-Offers Negotiation
4.1.1 Negotiation Mechanism
In this section, we extend the alternating-offers protocol to capture the situation
wherein there is one buyer agent b and a set S = {s1, . . . , sn} of n seller agents such
that: 1) the items sold by the sellers are the same, 2) all the sellers have exactly one
item to sell, and 3) the buyer is interested in buying exactly one item.
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Our mechanism extends the alternating-offers protocol allowing the buyer to carry
on more simultaneous negotiations, each one with a different seller. As in [97, 125],
a buyer synchronously negotiates with multiple sellers in discrete time. We use the
term “negotiation thread” for the single bargaining between b and a seller si and we
denote it by ℑb,si. Furthermore, we denote by ι(ℑb,si , t) the agent that acts at t in
the negotiation thread ℑb,si. We assume that if ι(ℑb,si , t) = b then ι(ℑb,sj , t) = b for
all j. That is, b simultaneously acts in all the negotiation threads. Therefore, if b is
proposing at time t, ι(t) = b. Otherwise, ι(t) = S.
We modify the alternating-offers mechanism by introducing an action confirm
to avoid agents’ non-reasonable behaviors. In the following we show an example
of non-reasonable behavior in absence of such action. The sellers’ action space is
A = {offer[x], accept, exit, confirm}, whereas the buyer’s action space is the Carte-
sian product ×ni=1A. Legal actions for the buyer are all the pure strategies σb =
〈σb,s1 , . . . , σb,sn〉 such that: if σsi(t−1) 6= accept, then σb,si(t) ∈ {offer[x], accept, exit}
except when t = 0, accept is not available, otherwise σb,si(t) ∈ {confirm, exit}. Le-
gal actions for the sellers are defined analogously: if σb,si(t − 1) 6= accept, then
σsi(t) ∈ {offer[x], accept, exit} except when t = 0, accept is not available, otherwise
σsi(t) ∈ {confirm, exit}. The action confirm is allowed only after making the action
accept .
The outcome of a single negotiation thread ℑb,si is NoAgreement if either b or
si made exit , whereas it is an agreement (x, t) if σι(ℑb,si ,t)(t) = confirm, where x is
such that σι(ℑb,si ,t−2)(t− 2) = offer [x]. Notice that, in absence of the action confirm,
if b makes offers to multiple sellers and all these accept, b must buy multiple items.
In presence of the action confirm, b is in the position to choose only one contract.
Summarily, in our mechanism the following process is needed for implementing an
agreement: one agent proposes a price, the other agent accepts the offer, then the first
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agent confirms the contract made by the second agent. Without loss of generality, we
assume that each seller’s deadline is no less than 2, i.e., Tsi ≥ 2.
The utility functions of the seller agents are exactly those defined in the previous
section. However, we need to refine the utility function of b. This is because b
can potentially buy more items, but is interested in only one item. We redefine b’s
utility as follows. If b has reached more than one agreement, let (xfirst, tfirst) be the
agreement such that, for any other agreement (xj , tj), (1) tfirst ≤ tj and (2) xfirst ≤ xj
if tfirst = tj . Let ifirst be the seller involved in the agreement (xfirst, tfirst). Agent
b’s utility is defined over the set of agreements it reached:
Ub({(xi, ti)}) =
{
(RPb − xfirst) · δ
tfirst
b −
∑
j 6=ifirst
xj if tfirst ≤ Tb
−ǫ otherwise
That is, b receives a positive utility from the first agreement, whereas all the other
agreements reduce b’s utility. This will induce a rational buyer to reach at most one
agreement.
4.1.2 Agents’ Equilibrium Strategies
Let S=t be the set of sellers whose deadline is t, i.e., S=t = {si|Tsi = t}. Let
St be the set of sellers which have no shorter deadline than t, i.e., St = {si|Tsi ≥
t} = ∪t′≥tS=t′ . Without loss of generality, we assume that the sellers St are ranked
according to their reserve prices. We denote by Sit (S
i
=t) the seller with the i
th lowest
reserve price in St (S=t). Let x∗b,si(t) be b’s optimal offer to si at time t if ι(ℑb,si , t) = b
and x∗si,b(t) be si’s optimal offer to agent b at time t if ι(ℑb,si , t) = si.
The negotiation deadline for the negotiation thread between b and si is Tb,si =
min(Tb, Tsi). After Tb,si , at least one agent will have no interest in reaching agree-
ments. Obviously, the negotiation deadline for b is T = maxsi∈S{Tb,si}. We state the
following lemma that allows us to reduce the complexity of the problem.
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Lemma 11. It is b’s weakly dominant strategy to make the same offer to all the
sellers in St+2 at each time t.
Proof. At t we consider only St+2 since all the other sellers will not be interested in
reaching agreements at t + 2 and later. Consider the time point t wherein ι(t) = b.
On the equilibrium path, at t agent b will expect to reach exactly one agreement,
say (x∗b(t+2), t+2), with a specific seller, say s
∗. Obviously, s∗ is the seller that will
accept the lowest offer. If b makes offers higher than x∗b(t) to the other sellers, then
these sellers will not accept such offers and therefore b cannot improve its utility.
Analogously, if b makes offers lower than x∗b(t) to the other sellers, it cannot improve
its utility.
According to Lemma 11 we can assume, without loss of generality, that x∗b,si(t) =
x∗b,sj (t) for all si, sj. For simplicity, we denote such offer by x
∗
b(t). We state the
following theorem.
Theorem 12. In the one-to-many negotiation, the sequences of equilibrium offers x∗b
and x∗si are:
x∗b(t) =


RPS1t+2 t = T − 2 or t = TS1t+2 − 2
min{(x∗
S1t+2
(t+ 1))←S1t+2 ,RPS2t+2} t < T − 2 and t 6= TS1t+2 − 2
,
x∗si(t) =
{
max{RPsi ,RPS2
T
} t = T − 2
max{RPsi ,min{RPS2t+2 , (x
∗
b(t+ 1))←b}} t < T − 2
.
Agent’s equilibrium strategies are similar to those discussed in bilateral negotiation in
Chapter 3, but σb,si prescribes that:
• b accepts the offer x made by si at t if: x ≤ (x∗b(t))←b and x is the lowest
received offer. If more than one seller has offered x, than b accepts the offer
made by the seller with the lowest reserve price;
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• b confirms an accept of si at t if: σb(t − 2) = offer [x] with x ≤ (x
∗
b(t))←2[b]
and, among all the sellers that have accepted σb(t − 2), si is the one with the
lowest reserve price;
and σb,si prescribes that:
• si confirms the accept of b at t if: σsi(t−2) = offer [x] with x ≥ max{(x
∗
si
(t))←2[si],
RPsi}.
Proof. First compute agents’ optimal offers using backward induction. Let x∗S(t) =
minsi∈St+2 x
∗
si
(t) be S’s highest optimal offer at t. It follows that x∗si(t) = max{RPsi ,
x∗S(t)}. At time point T , the game for the buyer b rationally stops. The equilibrium
outcome of every subgame starting from t ≥ T is NoAgreement. Therefore, at t = T
agent ιℑb,si (T ) would only confirm the best agreement proposed by agent ιℑb,si (T−1).
At time t = T − 1, ιℑb,si (T − 1) will accept the best offer by agent ιℑb,si (T − 2), if
ιℑb,si (T − 1) can get a utility not worse than NoAgreement by accepting the best
offer. Note that at time T −1 and T , no agent will propose a price as it takes at least
three time points to implement a final contract.
Assume that ιℑb,si (t) = b. If t = T − 2 or t = TS1t+2 − 2, b’s optimal price is
RPS1t+2 and seller S
1
t+2 will accept it as its deadline is approaching. At t < T − 2,
minsi∈St+3
(
(x∗si(t+ 1))←si
)
is surely acceptable to some sellers in St+3. We also need
to consider sellers St+2−St+3 with deadline t+2, who are willing to accept any offer
which is no less than their reserve prices. Therefore, b’s optimal offer at time t is
x∗b(t)=min{ min
si∈St+3
(
(x∗si(t+ 1))←si
)
, min
si∈St+2−St+3
RPsi} (4.1)
It is easy to see that x∗
S1t+3
(t+ 1) ≤ x∗
S2t+3
(t+ 1) = RP∗S2t+3
(t+ 1). It follows that
minsi∈St+3
(
(x∗si(t+ 1))←si) = (x
∗
S1t+3
(t+ 1))←S1t+3. As t 6= TS1t+2−2, equation (4.1) can
be rewritten as min{(x∗
S1t+2
(t + 1))←S1t+2,RPS2t+2}. Therefore, x
∗
b(t) = min{(x
∗
S1t+2
(t +
1))←S1t+2,RPS2t+2} if t < T − 2 and t 6= TS1t+2 − 2.
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Assume that ιℑb,si (t) = si. At time t = T − 2, the acceptable offer to buyer b
is RPS2
T
as all sellers in S2T compete with each other to get a contract. Thus, si’s
optimal offer is max{RPsi,RPS2T }. At time t < T − 2, the acceptable offer to buyer
b is (x∗b(t + 1))←b. However, si needs to consider the competition among sellers
then si’s winning price should be no higher than RPS2t+2. Then si’s optimal offer is
max{RPsi,min{RPS2t+2, (x
∗
b(t+ 1))←b}}.
Finally, agents’ optimal actions can be easily defined on the basis of x∗b(t) and
x∗si(t). When an agent decides to make an offer, it always proposes it optimal offer
(x∗b(t) or x
∗
si
(t)). Buyer b will accept an offer σsi(t − 1) if σsi(t − 1) ≤ (x
∗
b(t))←b
and σsi(t− 1) is no higher than other sellers’ offers at time t − 1. It is possible that
several sellers propose a same acceptable offer. The tie can be broken by choosing
the lowest offer from the seller with the lowest reserve price (note that we assume
that sellers have different reserve prices). If at time t − 1, seller si agrees with b’s
offer σb,si(t − 2), b will confirm the agreement if σb,si(t− 2) ≤ σb,sj (t − 2) if sj also
agrees with b’s offer at time t − 1. Again, there could be more than one agreement
with the same lowest price. To make sure that b only makes one final agreement,
b confirms the agreement from the seller with the lowest reserve price. The optimal
actions of all the sellers can be defined analogously. For simplicity, we consider just
agents’ strategies on the equilibrium path.
The computational complexity of the backward induction is O(nT ) as the back-
ward induction will go through all the time points and at each time point, each agent
has at most three possible optimal actions. The equilibrium agreement is reached at
t = 2 between b and S12 and it is (x
∗
b(0), 2) if ι(0) = b and (x
∗
S12
(0), 2) otherwise. It
can be easily observed that RPS12 ≤ x
∗
b(0), x
∗
S12
(0) ≤ RPS22 . The result about agree-
ment price is intuitive in the following sense: obviously, the agreement price cannot
be lower than each seller’s reserve price. But it also cannot be higher than the second
lowest price as, if so, there is at least another seller who is willing to sell for less and
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make an agreement with the buyer. Therefore, market competition guarantees that
the buyer can make an agreement by paying no more than RPS22 . The lower bound
of agreement is due to the proposing ordering and agents’ deadlines. For example, if
T = 2 and the buyer proposes at time t = 0, the buyer will propose RPS12 and the
agent S12 will accept the offer at time t = 1. We can see that the market competi-
tion plays an important role in affecting negotiation results. The buyer can make an
agreement with price at most RPS22 . With more sellers, the buyer can get better (at
least not worse) negotiation result.
Let us remark an observation. Consider the situation wherein ι(0) = S and
x∗
S12
= RPS22 . Although both S
1
2 and S
2
2 have the same equilibrium offer, i.e., RPS22 ,
the equilibrium strategy of b prescribes that b must accept only the offer made by
S12 . In the case b accepts the offer by S
2
2 or randomizes over accepting those offers,
S12 ’s optimal action at t = 0 does not exist, being limε→0(S
2
2 − ε) with ε 6= 0. We can
state the following theorem which is a direct consequence of the above observation
and of the equilibrium uniqueness in bilateral alternating-offers.
Theorem 13. Agents’ strategies on the equilibrium path are unique except when
RPS12 = RPsi for more than one i.
Notice that, when the reserve price of more sellers is equal to RPS12 , all these
sellers will offer their reserve price and b can accept any single offer among these.
However, it can be easily observed that all the equilibria are equivalent in terms of
agents’ payoffs, b receiving the same utility in all the equilibria. As we assume that
agents have different reserve prices, the equilibrium is unique.
Figure 4.1 shows an example of backward induction construction with RPb = 1,
RPs1 = 0, RPs2 = 0.2, δb = 0.8, δs1 = 0.7, δs2 = 0.8, Tb = 10, Ts1 = 11, Ts2 = 7.
We report in the figure for any time point t the optimal offer x∗a(t) that ι(t) can
make; the dashed lines are sellers’ optimal offers if there is only one seller. The
time point from which we can apply the backward induction method is T = 10
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Figure 4.1. Backward induction construction with RPb = 1, RPs1 = 0, RPs2 = 0.2,
δb = 0.8, δs1 = 0.7, δs2 = 0.8, Tb = 10, Ts1 = 11, Ts2 = 7; at each time point t the
optimal offer x∗a(t) that ι(t) can make is marked; the dashed lines are sellers’ optimal
offer if there is only one seller.
at which b will confirm the agreement made at t = 9. At t = 9 agent s1 will
accept any offer equal to or higher than its reserve price RPs1 = 0. The optimal
offer x∗b(8) of b at t = 8 is thus RPs1 = 0. s1’s optimal offer x
∗
s1
(7) at t = 7 is
(x∗b(8))←b = RPb − (RPb − x
∗
b(8))δb = 0.2. b’s optimal offer at time t = 6 is then
x∗b(6) = (x
∗
s1
(7))←s1 = 0.14. At time t = 5, another seller s2 can make an offer (note
that t = 5 is the last time s2 can make an offer as it needs another two rounds to
accept and confirm an agreement). s1 and s2 will compete with each other and their
optimal offers aren’t (x∗b(6))←b = 0.312 as one seller has an incentive to choose a
lower price if the other seller choose (x∗b(6))←b = 0.312. The equilibrium optimal
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price for the two sellers is x∗s1(5) = x
∗
s2
(5) = RPS2t=5+2 = RPs2 = 0.2. The process
continues to the initial time point t = 0 where b’s optimal offer is x∗b(0) = 0.14.
There are some other mechanisms which can be used to implement contracts
between buyer b and sellers S. Here we compare our model with the following
mechanisms:
• Bilateral bargaining without outside option: Rubinstein’s bilateral bargaining
does not offer any mechanism to capture competition between sellers. In order to
compare outcomes from bilateral bargaining with respect to outcomes from our
mechanism, suppose that b is able to choose the seller with which to negotiate.
In our mechanism the buyer b gains as in bilateral bargaining without outside
option when the sequence of optimal offers x∗(t) in the bilateral negotiation
between b and S12 is such that x
∗
i (t) ≤ RPS22 , otherwise the buyer b gains more
in our mechanism.
• Bilateral bargaining with outside option: In our mechanism the buyer gains
no less than in bilateral bargaining with outside option in which an agent can
leave the bilateral negotiation it is currently carrying on and negotiate with a
different opponent [24]. We report an example. Consider the situation where
there are two sellers with the same reservation price RPs and any deadline no
smaller than 2. In bilateral bargaining with outside option the agreement price
is strictly larger than RPs, instead in our protocol the agreement price is exactly
RPs.
• VCG auction: Since VCG auction does not take into account any temporal is-
sues (no deadline and no discount factor), we limit our comparison to the agree-
ment price. In VCG mechanism the agreement price is exactly RPS22 , whereas
in our bargaining model the buyer’s agreement price falls between [RPS12 ,RPS22 ].
110
That is, the buyer achieved higher utility within our model which is also effi-
cient.
4.1.3 Equilibrium Outcome Computation and Uncertain Information
We initially focus on the computation of the equilibrium outcome with complete
information. Although agents’ equilibrium strategies depend on the values of the
parameters of all the agents, for a large subset of the space of the parameters the
equilibrium outcome depends on the values of a narrow number of parameters. We
have the following theorem.
Theorem 14. When 1) TS22 > 2 if ι(0) = b and 2) (RPs)←S12b ≥ RPs for any
seller s ∈ S, the equilibrium outcome depends only on the parameters of b (i.e., RPb,
δb, Tb), S
1
2 (i.e., RPS12 , δS12 , TS12 ), and on the reserve price RPS22 of S
2
2 . In these
situations the equilibrium outcome can be produced as follows:
1. finding the sequence of the optimal offers (say y(t)) under the assumption that
S12 is the unique seller, and
2. assigning x∗b(0) = min{y(0), (RPS22 )←S12} if ι(0) = b and assigning x
∗
S12
(0) =
min{y(0),RPS22} if ι(0) = S.
Proof. Case 1 (ι(min{TS12 , Tb}) = b). Let t
′ + 2 = min{TS12 , Tb}. It’s easy to see
that x∗b(t
′) = RPS12 = y(t
′). Then we have x∗S(t
′ − 1) = min{(RPS12 )←b,RPS2t′+1
} =
min{y(t′ − 1),RPS2
t′+1
}.1 At time t′ − 2, we have x∗b(t
′ − 2) = min{(RPS12 )←bS12 ,
(RPS2
t′+1
)←S12 ,RPS1=t′
} = min{y(t′−2), (RPS2
t′+1
)←S12 ,RPS1=t′
}. At time t′−3, we have
x∗S(t
′−3) = min{(y(t′−2))←b, (RPS2
t′+1
)←S12b, (RPS1=t′
)←b,RPS2
t′−1
}. It’s obvious that
(RPS1
=t′
)←b ≥ (RPS1
=t′
) ≥ RPS2
t′−1
. In addition, as we assume that (RPs)←S12b ≥ RPs,
it follows that (RPS2
t′+1
)←S12b ≥ RPS2t′+1 ≥ RPS
2
t′−1
. Then we have x∗S(t
′ − 3) =
1For convenience, RPS2
t′+1
=∞ if |St′+1| < 2.
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min{y(t′ − 3),RPS2
t′−1
}. Following this procedure, we have 1) if ι(0) = S, x∗
S12
(0) =
min{y(0),RPS22}; 2) if ι(0) = b, x
∗
b(0) = min{y(0), (RPS22 )←S12} as (RPS23 )←S12 =
(RPS22 )←S12 ≤ (RPS22 ) ≤ RPS32 ≤ RPS1=2 given that TS22 > 2.
Case 2 (ι(min{TS12 , Tb}) = S). Let t
′ + 2 = min{TS12 , Tb}. At time t
′, there are two
situations: 1) |St′+2| < 2, which implies that x
∗
S(t
′) = RPb = y(t
′); 2) Otherwise,
x∗S(t
′) = RPS2
t′+2
. Therefore, x∗S(t
′) = min{y(t′),RPS2
t′+2
}. At time t′ − 1, it follows
that x∗b(t
′ − 1) = min{y(t′ − 1), (RPS2
t′+2
)←S12 ,RPS1=t′+1
}. Then at time t′ − 2, we
have x∗S(t
′ − 2) = min{y(t′ − 2), (RPS2
t′+2
)←S12b, (RPS1=t′+1
)←b,RPS1
=t′
,RPS2
t′
}. It easy
to see that RPS1
=t′
≥ RPS2
t′
. It’s obvious that (RPS1
=t′+1
)←b ≥ (RPS1
=t′+1
) ≥ RPS2
t′
. As
we assume that (RPs)←S12b ≥ RPs, it follows that (RPS2t′+2
)←S12b ≥ RPS2t′+2
≥ RPS2
t′
.
Then we have x∗S(t
′−2) = min{y(t′−2),RPS2
t′
}. Following this procedure, we have 1)
if ι(0) = S, x∗
S12
(0) = min{y(0),RPS22}; 2) if ι(0) = b, x
∗
b(0) = min{y(0), (RPS22 )←S12}
given that TS22 > 2.
This is to say that the equilibrium outcome does not depend on the values of δS22 ,
TS22 , and on the parameters of all the other sellers. This is of paramount importance
since complex settings with a high degree of uncertainty can be easily solved when 1)
TS22 > 2 if ι(0) = b and 2) (RPs)←S12b ≥ RPs for any seller s ∈ S. Indeed, the above
algorithm produces the equilibrium outcome even when δSi2 with i > 1, TSi2 with i > 1,
and RPSi2 with i > 2 are uncertain. We can write the condition (RPS22 )←S12b ≥ RPS22
as
(RPb − RPS12 ) ≥ (RPS22 − RPS12 )
1− δbδS12
1− δb
.
It can be easily observed that, in common real-world settings where RPb≫RPS22 and
δS12 is close to 1, the above condition is satisfied.
Now, we focus on the uncertainty over b’s and S12 ’s parameters. The values of these
parameters affect the equilibrium outcome and therefore in presence of uncertainty
over them we need to compute agents’ equilibrium strategies to derive the equilibrium
outcome. Currently, the literature provides algorithms to compute agents’ equilibrium
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strategies only in bilateral settings without outside option with one-sided uncertainty
over deadlines [61]. We recall that, since the number of available actions is infinite,
no algorithms such as Lemke-Howson [135] can be employed to compute a sequential
equilibrium.
When RPS22 ≤ (RPS22 )←S12b, the algorithm presented in [61] can be easily extended
to capture uncertainty in one-to-many bargaining. More precisely, we have that:
• when Tb is uncertain, whereas TS12 is certain, then agents’ equilibrium strategies
can be produced by employing the algorithm presented in [61] where the buyer
is b and the seller is S12 and upper bounding the optimal offers to RPS22 if
ι(0) = b and to (RPS22 )←S12 if ι(t) = S;
• when TS12 is uncertain, whereas Tb is certain, then agents’ equilibrium strategies
can be computed.
Settings with a higher degree of uncertainty, such as when both Tb and TS12 are
uncertain, need further exploration.
The results discussed above show that the analytical complexity of one-to-many
bargaining is drastically less complicated than that of bilateral bargaining with out-
side option. This allows one to drastically reduce the search space and makes the
computation easy. Therefore, one-to-many bargaining seems more appropriate for
real-world settings when computational issues should be considered.
4.2 Many-to-Many Alternating-Offers Negotiation
4.2.1 Negotiation Mechanism
In this section, we propose a bargaining model for many-to-many negotiation
where m buyer agents B = {b1, . . . ,bm} negotiate n seller agents S = {s1, . . . , sn}.
In this case, both buyers and sellers face competition and multiple contracting op-
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portunities. Again, we assume that the items sold by the sellers or bought by buyers
are equal, and each agent has only one item to buy or sell.
In the many-to-many negotiation case, each agent concurrently negotiates with
many trading partners. Agent bj ’s concurrent negotiation includes at most n threads
ℑbj ,S = {ℑbj ,si |si ∈ S}, where ℑbj ,si represents the negotiation thread between bj
and seller si. We still assume that, at each time, either the buyers propose to all the
sellers (ι(t) = B) or the sellers propose to all the buyers (ι(t) = S). Similarly, let
B=t be the set of buyers than t, i.e., B=t = {bj |Tbj = t}. Let Bt be the set of buyers
whose deadlines are not shorter deadline than t and Bit (B
i
=t) is the buyer with the
ith highest reserve price in Bt (B=t).
We still use action confirm to avoid one agent’s making more than one final agree-
ment. Buyers and sellers’ action space and agents’ legal actions at each time are the
same as that in one-to-many negotiation. The utility functions of the buyer agents are
exactly those defined in the previous section. However, we need to refine the utility
function of si as it can potentially sell more items, but it has only one item to sell. We
redefine si’s utility as follows. If si has reached more than one final agreement, it gets
a utility of −∞. Otherwise, it’s utility is the same as that in bilateral negotiation.
Therefore, si will make at most one final agreement.
4.2.2 Agents’ Equilibrium Strategies
The negotiation deadline for the negotiation between agent bj and seller si is
Tbj ,si = min(Tbj , Tsi). The negotiation deadline for the agent bj is Tbj ,S = maxsi∈S Tbj ,si.
Let x∗bj ,si(t) be bj ’s optimal offer to agent si at t if ι(t) = B and x
∗
si,bj
(t) be si’s optimal
offer to agent bj at time t if ι(t) = S.
Lemma 15. It is each agent’s dominant strategy to propose the same price to all the
trading partners at each time t.
Proof. The proof is the same as the proof of Lemma 11.
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Then we use x∗bj (t) for short to represent bj ’s optimal offer at t if ι(t) = B and
use x∗si(t) to represent si’s optimal offer at time t if ι(t) = S.
Lemma 16. In equilibrium, agents of the same type should have the same equilibrium
winning price (a price acceptable to agents of the different type).
Proof. Let’s prove this by contradiction. Assume two buyers have different winning
prices at some time t, i.e., the lowest price acceptable to any seller. Then the seller
who is willing to accept the lower winning price should change to accept the higher
winning price. Therefore, the two winning prices are not in equilibrium.
We state the following theorem.
Theorem 17. In the many-to-many negotiation, the sequences of optimal offers in
equilibrium are: Buyer bj’s optimal offer at time t ≤ Tbj−2 is x
∗
bj
(t) = min(RPbj , x
∗
B(t)).
Seller si’s optimal offer at t ≤ Tsi − 2 is x
∗
si
(t) = max(RPsi, x
∗
S(t)).
x∗B(t) is given by: 1) At t = T − 2, x
∗
B(t) = RPS|Bt+2|t+2
if |Bt+2| ≤ |St+2|; otherwise,
x∗B(t) = RPB|St+2|+1t+2
. 2) At t < T − 2, x∗B(t) = max
{
RP
B
|St+2|+1
t+2
,
{
{(x∗si(t+ 1))←si|si ∈
St+3} ∪ {RPsi|si ∈ St+2 − St+3}
}
|St+2|
}
if |St+2| < |Bt+2|. Otherwise, x∗B(t) ={
{(x∗si(t+ 1))←si|si ∈ St+3} ∪ {RPsi |si ∈ St+2 − St+3}
}
|Bt+2|
. In the above equations,
Yi (Y i) denotes the ith smallest (largest) value in the value set Y.
x∗S(t) is given by: 1) At t = T − 2, x
∗
S(t) = RPB|St+2|
T
if |ST | ≤ |BT |, x∗S(t) =
RP
S
|Bt+2|+1
t+2
if |St+2| > |Bt+2|. 2) At t < T − 2, x∗S(t) =
{
{(x∗bj (t + 1))←bj |bj ∈ Bt+3}
∪ {RPbj |bj ∈ B=t+2}
}|St+2| if |St+2| ≤ |Bt+2|. Otherwise, x∗S(t) = min{RPS|Bt+2|+1t+2 ,{
{(x∗bj (t+ 1))←bj |bj ∈ Bt+3} ∪ {RPbj |bj ∈ B=t+2}
}|Bt+2|}
.
Based on x∗bj (t) and x
∗
si
(t), we can get agents’ optimal actions in the same way
as that in Theorem 12 except that an agent needs to use the following rule while
accepting offers or confirming accepts: a buyer bj accepts the offer x made by si at
t if: x ≤ (x∗bj (t))←bj and x is the lowest received offer. If more than one seller has
offered x and buyer bj has the q
th highest reserve price in Bt+2, bj accepts the offer
115
made by the seller with the qth lowest reserve price in sellers St+2.
2 Similarly, if buyer
bj intends to confirm an agreement with price x and multiple sellers have made the
same agreement, bj will confirm the agreement made by the seller with the q
th lowest
reserve price in sellers St+2. To save space, the details of sellers’ optimal actions are
omitted here.
Proof. Given Lemma 15 and Lemma 16, we just need to find out the agents’ equilib-
rium winning price at each time point. Let x∗B(t) (x
∗
S(t)) be B’s lowest (S’s highest)
offer which is acceptable to S (B) at time t if ι(t) = B (ι(t) = S). It follows that
x∗B(t) = maxbj∈Bt+2 x
∗
bj
(t), x∗S(t) = minsi∈St+2 x
∗
si
(t).
Following the idea of backward induction, at T = maxbj∈B Tbj ,S , the game for
all agents rationally stops. The equilibrium outcome of every subgame starting from
t ≥ T is NoAgreement. Therefore, at t = T , agents ι(T ) would only confirm the best
agreement proposed by agents ι(T −1). At time t = T −1, agents ι(T −1) will accept
the best offer by agents ι(T − 2) if the best offer is no worse than NoAgreement by
accepting the best offer. At time T − 1 and T , no agent will propose a price as it
takes at least three time points to implement a final contract.
At time t = T − 2, agents ι(t) will strive to make the best offer. There are two
situations: ι(t) = B or ι(t) = S. First consider the case ι(t) = B and there are two
cases: Case 1 (|BT | ≤ |ST |): In this case, the supply is no less than demand and
buyers have more bargaining power as compared with sellers. It is easy to see that
each buyer’s optimal price is RP
S
|BT |
T
as, by doing so, |BT | sellers will agree to sell their
good and each buyer can get a good. If one buyer pays less than RP
S
|BT |
T
, the sellers
will choose another buyers paying RP
S
|BT |
T
. It doesn’t make sense that a rational
agent will pay more than RP
S
|BT |
T
. If each buyer pays a price less than RP
S
|BT |
T
, each
2Note that in equilibrium, when a buyer bj with q
th highest reserve price is accepting an offer
with price x, the number of sellers proposing x at t−1 should be no less than q. The proof is omitted
as it can be easily derived from the process of calculating agents’ optimal prices.
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buyer will face a risk of losing an agreement as the number of sellers who are willing to
accept the price is less than the number of buyers. Case 2 (|BT | > |ST |): In this case,
the supply is less than demand and buyers need to compete with each other to get
agreements. It is easy to say that each buyer’s optimal price is RP
B
|ST |+1
T
. In the same
way, we can get the optimal offer of buyers ST at time T − 2: x
∗
S(T − 2) = RPB|ST |
T
if
|ST | ≤ |BT |, x∗S(T − 2) = RPS|BT |+1
T
if |ST | > |BT |.
Then we move to the calculation for computing x∗B(t) and x
∗
S(t) given x
∗
B(t + 1)
and x∗S(t + 1). First consider the situation that ι(t) = B. There are two situa-
tions depending on whether there are agents with deadline t + 2. If there is no
agent with deadline t + 2, (x∗si(t + 1))←si is surely acceptable to seller si at time
t. Here we consider two cases: 1) |St+3| ≥ |Bt+3|. It is easy to see that, the
price minsi∈St+3
(
(x∗si(t+ 1))←si
)
is surely acceptable to sellers in St+3 whose opti-
mal price is x∗S(t + 1) at time t + 1. However, we also need to consider the com-
petition among buyers. Therefore, x∗B(t) = {(x
∗
si
(t+ 1))←si|si ∈ St+3}|Bt+3| where Yi
(Y i) is the ith smallest (largest) value in the value set Y . 2) |St+3| < |Bt+3|. As
(x∗si(t+ 1))←si ≤ x
∗
si
(t+ 1), x∗B(t) should be no less than RPB|St+3|+1t+3
. Therefore, it
follows that x∗B(t) = max
{
RP
B
|St+3|+1
t+3
, {(x∗si(t + 1))←si|si ∈ St+3}|St+3|
}
.
Now we move to the general case that there are some buyers or sellers with deadline
t + 2. For a buyer with deadline t + 2, it is willing to propose its reserve price.
For a seller with deadline t + 2, it is willing to accept an offer of its reserve price.
Assume that there are only some sellers with deadline t + 2. We consider three
cases: 1) |St+3| ≥ |Bt+3|, which implies that |St+2| > |Bt+2|. It is easy to see that,
x∗B(t) =
{
{(x∗si(t+ 1))←si|si ∈ St+3}∪{RPsi |si ∈ St+2−St+3}
}
|Bt+2|
. 2) |St+3| < |Bt+3|
and |St+2| < |Bt+2|. In this case, x∗B(t) = max
{
RP
B
|St+2|+1
t+2
,
{
{(x∗si(t+ 1))←si|si ∈
St+3}∪ {RPsi |si ∈ St+2−St+3}
}
|St+2|
}
. 3) |St+3| < |Bt+3| and |St+2| ≥ |Bt+2|. In this
case, x∗B(t) =
{
{(x∗si(t + 1))←si|si ∈ St+3} ∪ {RPsi|si ∈ St+2 − St+3}
}
|Bt+2|
.
117
We can easily extend the above analysis to more general cases where there are both
buyers and sellers with deadline t+2. We can get B’s optimal price at time t < T −2
as follows: 1) if |St+2| < |Bt+2|, x∗B(t) = max
{
RP
B
|St+2|+1
t+2
,
{
{(x∗si(t+ 1))←si|si ∈ St+3}
∪{RPsi|si ∈ St+2−St+3}
}
|St+2|
}
; 2) otherwise, x∗B(t) =
{
{(x∗si(t + 1))←si|si ∈ St+3}∪
{RPsi |si ∈ St+2 − St+3}
}
|Bt+2|
.
In the same way, we can get S’s optimal price at time t < T − 2 as follows: 1)
if |St+2| ≤ |Bt+2|, x∗S(t) =
{
{x∗bj (t+ 1)←bj |bj ∈ Bt+3} ∪ {RPbj |bj ∈ B=t+2}
}|St+2|;
2) otherwise, x∗S(t) = min
{
RP
S
|Bt+2|+1
t+2
,
{
{(x∗bj (t+ 1))←bj |bj ∈ Bt+3} ∪ {RPbj |bj ∈
B=t+2}
}|Bt+2|}
.
The computational complexity of the backward induction is O((n +m)T ) as the
backward induction will go through all the time points and at each time point, each
agent has at most n+m possible optimal actions. It is easy to see that the bargaining
agreement in the many-to-many negotiation is
(
x∗B(0), 2
)
if ι(0) = B and is
(
x∗S(0), 2
)
if ι(0) = S. In addition, when the number of buyers is not equal to the number
of sellers, the market competition affects the equilibrium price in the following way:
if the number of buyers is less than the number of sellers, the buyers have larger
bargaining power which increases with the number of sellers and decreases with the
number of buyers. In contrast, if the number of buyers is larger than the number of
sellers, the buyers have less bargaining power. The proposing order also affects the
equilibrium price.
Figure 4.2 shows an example of backward induction construction in many-to-many
negotiation. The setting in Figure 4.2 is the same as that in Figure 4.1 except that
there is another buyer b′ with parameters RPb′ = 0.9, δb′ = 0.7, and Tb′ = 6.
We report in the figure for any time t the optimal offer x∗B(t) or x
∗
S(t). At time
t = 4, b′ can make an offer to compete with buyer b. Thus we have x∗B(4) =
{(x∗s1(5))←s1, (x
∗
s2
(5))←s2}2 = {0.14, 0.2}2 = 0.2. The process continues to the initial
time point t = 0 where x∗B(0) = 0.40992.
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Figure 4.2. Backward induction construction. At each time t the optimal offer x∗B(t)
or x∗S(t) is marked.
While there is two-sided competition in the market, market mechanisms like dou-
ble auction can be used for resource allocation. The double auction is one of the most
common exchange institutions where both sellers and buyers submit bids which are
then ranked highest to lowest to generate demand and supply profiles. Double auc-
tions permit multiple buyers and sellers to bid to exchange a designated commodity.
Some double auction mechanisms (e.g., BBDA [56]) have been applied to trading in
markets. A market mechanism is efficient if the goods are transferred to agents that
value them most.
Theorem 18. The many-to-many negotiation is efficient.
Proof. This result is straightforward. Assume there are sellers si and sj such that
RPsi > RPsj . It is impossible that seller si makes an agreement but seller sj fails as
seller sj can make an offer lower than RPsi and thus gains a contract with positive
revenue.
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In a market consisting of two sets of agents, matching algorithms can also be used
to solve agents’ conflicts of resource requirements. Then we require a matching to
be stable, i.e., it left no pair of agents on opposite sides of the market who were not
matched to each other but would both prefer to be. Many-to-many negotiation allows
one to avoid studying matching mechanisms since each agent is implicitly matched
with all its trading partners.
4.2.3 Considerations on Settings with Uncertain Information
In this section we provide some considerations on the preliminary analysis of many-
to-many bargaining with uncertainty over agents’ parameters. The result discussed
in Section 4.1.3 can be treated as a special case for many-to-many bargaining. With
more buyers, the agreement price will increase due to the increasing competition be-
tween buyers. For the bargaining between buyers B and sellers S, it can be found
from Theorem 17 that the agreement price depends on the reserve price of at least
min{|B|, |S|} buyers and min{|B|, |S|} sellers. Although the many-to-many bargain-
ing setting is intrinsically very complicated, the problem of finding the equilibrium
outcome can be drastically simplified in some special cases.
Theorem 19. In the following many-to-many bargaining scenarios in which |B| <
|S|, the negotiation outcome only depends on the parameters of B and at most |B|+1
sellers:
1. The sellers having a reserve price no higher than the RP
S
|B|+1
2
have the same
deadline T ′ such that ι(T ′) = S.
2. At each time t, the seller set St+2 includes all the sellers with a reserve price
no higher than RP
S
|Bt+2|+1
2
.
Proof. Case 1 : At time T ′ − 2, the value of x∗S(T
′ − 2) should be no higher than
RP
S
|B|+1
2
and is independent of the reserve prices of sellers having a reserve price
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higher than RP
S
|B|+1
2
. At time t = T ′ − 3, the value of x∗B(t) will also be no higher
than RP
S
|B|+1
2
. Recursively, we can find that the value of x∗B(t) at time t < T
′− 3 will
be no higher than RP
S
|B|+1
2
and is independent of the reserve prices of sellers having
a reserve price higher than RP
S
|B|+1
2
.
Case 2 : We can prove the result in the same way as in the proof of Case 1.
Thus, the negotiation outcome only depends on a small number of parameters in
some special cases. The complexity of solving complete information bargaining and
incomplete information bargaining can be reduced.
4.3 Uncertainty about Reserve Prices
In this section we analyze agents’ rational strategies in concurrent negotiation
with incomplete information. More specifically, we focus on the situation that one
buyer b is negotiating with a number of sellers S and there is uncertainty about the
buyer’s reserve price. We extend our algorithm for bilateral bargaining to handle
concurrent negotiation.
4.3.1 Introducing Uncertainty
We assume the one-sided uncertainty regarding the type of the buyer b (the case
of having uncertainty with the type of a seller s ∈ S can be analyzed analogously).
The buyer b can be of finitely many types {b1, . . . ,bn} in which buyer bi has a reserve
price RPi. The initial belief of s on b is µ(0) = 〈∆
0
b, P
0
b〉 where ∆
0
b = {b1, . . . ,bn}
and P 0b = {ω
0
b1
, . . . , ω0bn} such that
∑
i ω
0
bi
= 1. ω0bi is the priori probability that
b is of type bi. During bargaining, seller s’s belief will evolve using the Bayes rule.
The belief of s on the type of b at time t is µ(t). It’s easy to see that in incomplete
information bargaining, it’s still a weekly dominant strategy for the buyer b to make
the same offer to all the sellers. Therefore, different sellers’ beliefs about the type of
buyer b will always be the same at any time t. The belief of s on the type of b at
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time t is µ(t). The probability assigned by s to b = bi at time t is denoted ω
t
bi
. Given
an assessment a = 〈µ, σ〉, there are multiple possible bargaining outcomes: outcome
obi if b = bi. We denote bargaining outcome as o = 〈ob1, . . . , obn〉.
With pure strategies, buyer types’ possible behaviors regarding whether they be-
have in the same way on the equilibrium path at each decision making node are
finite. We use the term “choice rule” to characterize buyer types’ strategies regarding
whether they behave in the same way at a specific decision making point. Easily,
at a decision making node bi and bj can make the same offer (in this case, choice
rules are said pooling) or can make different offers (in this case, choice rules are said
separating). On the basis of this consideration, we can make some assumptions over
the belief system without loosing generality. On the equilibrium path µ(t) = 〈∆tb, P
t
b〉
of s on b at any time t is one the following. After a time point t where buyer types’
choice rule is pooling, µ(t+ 1) = µ(t), i.e., ∆t+1b = ∆
t
b and P
t+1
b = P
t
b. As is custom-
ary in economic studies [112], we consider only stationary systems of beliefs, i.e., if a
seller s believes a b’s type with zero probability at time point t , then it will continue
to believe such a type with zero probability at any time point t′ > t. We need also
specify the belief system off the equilibrium path, i.e., when an agent makes an action
that is not optimal. We use the optimistic conjectures [112]. That is, when b acts off
the equilibrium strategy, agent s will believe that agent b is of its “weakest” type,
i.e., the type against which each seller would gain the most. In our case, the weakest
type is the buyer type with the highest reserve price (we prove it in the following
section). We can therefore specify µ(t) by specifying ∆tb. That is, if µ(t− 1) = ∆
t−1
b
and b acts off the equilibrium strategy at time t− 1, it follows that ∆tb = bh(∆
t−1
b )
where bh(∆
t−1
b ) is the buyer type with the highest reserve price in buyer types ∆
t−1
b .
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4.3.2 Off the Equilibrium Path Optimal Strategies
Before analyzing equilibrium strategies when the buyer can be of many types,
we provide the optimal strategies in the situations s believes the buyer of one single
type. There are two cases: 1) Seller s has the right belief about the type of the buyer
b. In this case, agents’ equilibrium strategies are the equilibrium strategies of the
corresponding complete information bargaining discussed in Section 4.1. Let xcbi(t)
be agents’ optimal offer at time t when b is of type bi in this case. That is, if ι(t) = b,
xcbi(t) is b’s optimal offer x
∗
b(t) at time t in complete information bargaining when it
is of type bi. 2) Seller s has the wrong belief about the type of the buyer b, i.e., bi
is believed to be bj and bj is believed to be bi.
Lemma 20. xcbi(t) ≥ x
c
bj
(t) if RPi > RPj.
Proof. We can proof the results from the proof of Theorem 12:
Case 1 (ι(T ) = s). It follows that xcbi(T −2) = x
c
bj
(T −2) = RPS2
T
. Then we have
xcbi(T − 3) = min{(x
c
bi
(T − 2))←S1
T−1
,RPS2
T−1
} = min{(xcbj (T − 2))←S1T−1,RPS2T−1} =
xcbj (T − 3). At time t = T − 4, we have x
c
bi
(t) = min{RPS2t+2, (x
c
bi
(t + 1))←b} =
min{RPS2t+2,RPi(1− δb)+ δbx
c
bi
(t+1)} ≥ min{RPS2t+2,RPi(1− δb)+ δbx
c
bj
(t+1)} =
xcbj (t). Recursively, we have x
c
bi
(t) ≥ xcbj (t) for t < T − 4.
Case 2 (ι(T ) = b). It follows that xcbi(T −2) = RPS1T = x
c
bj
(T −2). Then at time
T − 3, we have xcbi(T − 3) = min{RPS2T−1 , (x
c
bi
(T − 2))←b} = min{RPS2
T−1
,RPi(1 −
δb) + δbx
c
bi
(T − 2)} ≥ min{RPS2
T−1
,RPi(1 − δb) + δbx
c
bj
(T − 2)} = xcbj (T − 3).
Recursively, we have xcbi(t) ≥ x
c
bj
(t) for t < T − 3.
We can see that bi is weaker than bj in terms of its offering price at each time
point in complete information bargaining. Furthermore, we can get RPi − xcbi(t) ≥
RPj − xcbj (t) following the same procedure in the proof of Lemma 20. RPi − x
c
bi
(0)
is the gain (utility) of bi in complete information bargaining and RPj − x
c
bj
(0) is the
gain (utility) of bj in complete information bargaining.
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Lemma 21. If RPi > RPj, it follows that x
c
bi
(t) ≤ (xcbi(t + 1))←bi and x
c
bj
(t) ≤
(xcbj (t + 1))←bj .
Proof. We can get this result by following the same procedure in the proof of Lemma 20.
This result indicates that the buyer will accept sellers’ lowest equilibrium price in com-
plete information bargaining, i.e., agents will reach a final agreement at time t− 2 in
complete information bargaining.
Agents’ optimal strategies when any seller s has the wrong belief about the type
of the buyer b are shown in the following theorem:
Theorem 22. If seller s has the wrong belief about the type of b, the optimal strategies
of any seller s are those in complete information bargaining. The optimal strategies
σ∗bi(t)|{bj} of buyer bi when it’s believed to be bj are:
σ∗bi(t)|{bj} =
{
accept y if y ≤ (xcbj (t))←bi
offer xcbj (t) otherwise
The optimal strategies σ∗bj (t)|{bi} of the buyer bj when it’s believed to be bi are:
σ∗bj (t)|{bi} =
{
accept y if y ≤ min{(xcbi(t))←bj ,RPj}
offer min{xcbi(t),RPj} otherwise
Proof. Case 1 (bi is believed to be bj). If sellers’ lowest offer at time t−2 is xcbj (t−1),
buyer bi’s optimal strategy is to accept it as the minimum price that the seller
would accept at time t + 1, i.e., xcbj (t), gives bi a utility lesser than x
c
bj
(t − 1) since
(xcbj (t))←bi > (x
c
bj
(t))←bj ≥ x
c
bj
(t− 1). If the seller acts off the equilibrium path and
offers a price y lower than xcbj (t−1), the optimal strategy of bi is obviously to accept
y. If the seller offers a price y higher than xcbj (t− 1), the optimal strategy of bi is to
accept y only if y ≤ (xcbj (t))←bi, otherwise bi’s optimal strategy is to reject y and to
offer xcbj (t). Note that x
c
bi
(t) ≤ RPi and xcbj (t) ≤ RPi.
Case 2 (bj is believed to be bi). This case is more complicated as sellers’ lowest
offer xcbi(t−1) at time t on its equilibrium path may be not acceptable to bj as when
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bj offers x
c
bi
(t) at time t, it follows that (xcbi(t))←bj < (x
c
bi
(t))←bi and (x
c
bi
(t))←bi ≥
xcbi(t − 1) (Lemma 21). In addition, bj may not offer x
c
bi
(t) if xcbi(t) is higher than
RPj . Therefore, bj ’s optimal offer at time t is min{xcbi(t),RPj}. Thus, bj will accept
an offer y at time t such that y ≤ min{(xcbi(t))←bj ,RPj}.
4.3.3 Our Approach
While having multiple buyers increases the complexity of computing sequential
equilibria, we can extend our approach for bilateral bargaining with uncertainty in
Chapter 3 to handle one-to-many bargaining with uncertainty. When it is the buyer’s
turn to make an offer, we consider different choice rules. Note that the number of
choice rules does not depend on the number of sellers since when buyer types are
making an acceptable offer, they only need to consider the offer that is acceptable
to the seller with the lowest reserve price due to the market competition between
different sellers. When it is the seller’s turn to make an offer, we consider different
reject update rules. Due to competition between different sellers, we only need to
consider the reject update rule of the seller with the lowest reserve price. However,
when we compute the optimal offer for the seller or a buyer type, market competition
should be taken into account. In what follows we briefly discuss how to compute
agents’ equilibrium offers while using the algorithm presented in Chapter 3.
4.3.4 The Buyer’s Equilibrium Offer
Now we consider the buyer’s equilibrium offer at a continuation game Γ(t,∆b)
such that ι(t) = b. If t = T − 1, it is the buyer agent’s dominant strategy to accept
any offer which is not worse than its reserve price. At time t = T − 2, different buyer
types’ optimal offer is RPS1
T
since seller S1T will accept the offer at time T−1. If |∆b| =
1, agents’ equilibrium strategies are the equilibrium strategies of the corresponding
complete information bargaining. When |∆b| > 1 at time t < T − 2, buyer types
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have multiple choice rules and we need to consider the equilibrium strategies for each
choice rule.
4.3.4.1 Pooling Choice Rule
When b employs a pooling choice rule at a continuation game Γ(t,∆b), seller
s will not change its belief after observing the buyer’s equilibrium offer since all
buyer types will behave in the same way. Thus, we need to consider all sequential
equilibria SE(∆b, t + 1) of the continuation game with belief ∆b at time t + 1. If
SE(∆b, t+ 1) = ∅, there is no sequential equilibrium for this choice rule. Otherwise,
for each sequential equilibrium ℘ ∈ SE(∆b, t + 1), we compute buyer types’ optimal
offer and check the satisfaction of equilibrium existence conditions.
First we consider the accepting pooling choice rule. Let et+1
S1t+3
|∆b be S1t+3’s equiv-
alent offer at time t + 1 given the belief ∆b in the sequential equilibrium ℘. At
time t + 1, the equilibrium strategy of S1t+3 is that S
1
t+3 will accept any offer y if
y ≥ (et+1
S1t+3
|∆b)←S1t+3. Note that if TS1t+2 = t + 2, seller S
1
t+2 is willing to accept any
offer which is no worse than its reserve price. Therefore, the equilibrium offer of buyer
bi ∈ ∆b at time t is
x∗bi(t)|∆b =


RPS1t+2 TS1t+2 = t+ 2
min{(et+1
S1t+3
|∆b)←S1t+3,RPS2t+2} TS1t+2 6= t+ 2 and |St+2| > 1
(et+1
S1t+3
|∆b)←S1t+3 TS1t+2 6= t+ 2 and |St+2| = 1
The corresponding offer update rule is the following: µ(t + 1) = ∆b if σb(t) =
offer x∗bi(t)|∆b; µ(t + 1) = {bh(∆b)}, otherwise. If buyer bi ∈ ∆b deviates from
offering x∗bi(t)|∆b, it will be believed to be of type bh(∆b). Following Theorem 22,
when a buyer bi is believed to be of type bh(∆b) which has a reserve price no less
than RPi, bi’s optimal offer at time t is x
∗
bi
(t)|{bh(∆b)}. Thus, the condition of
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equilibrium existence needed to be checked is x∗bi(t)|∆b ≤ x
∗
bi
(t)|{bh(∆b)} for all
bi ∈ ∆b. If the equilibrium existence conditions are satisfied, there is a sequential
equilibrium with buyer types’ offer x∗bi(t)|∆b and ℘ as the sequential equilibrium for
the continuation game from time t + 1. Buyer bi’s equilibrium bargaining outcome
in this equilibrium is EBO(bi, x
∗
bi
(t)|∆b, t) = (x
∗
bi
(t)|∆b, t + 1) since x
∗
bi
(t)|∆b is
acceptable to the seller. Thus buyer bi’s equivalent offer is e
t
bi
|∆b = x∗bi(t)|∆b.
Next we consider the rejecting pooling choice rule where all buyer types ∆b
will make an offer (i.e., −1) that will be rejected by the seller. Buyer bi’s equi-
librium bargaining outcome is the bargaining outcome in the sequential equilib-
rium ℘, i.e., EBO(bi,−1, t) = EBO(bi, ℘). Thus buyer bi’s equivalent offer is
etbi |∆b = ρ(bi, t, EBO(bi, ℘)) where function ρ(bi, t, EBO(bi, ℘)) which satisfies
Ubi(ρ(bi, t, EBO(bi, ℘)), t + 1) = Ubi(EBO(bi, ℘)). The corresponding offer update
rule is the following: µ(t + 1) = ∆b if σb(t) = offer − 1; µ(t + 1) = {bh(∆b)},
otherwise. If buyer b deviates from offering −1 at time t, it will be treated as buyer
type bh(∆b) and the equilibrium existence condition is e
t
bi
|∆b ≤ x∗bi(t)|{bh(∆b)} for
all bi ∈ ∆b.
4.3.4.2 Separating Choice Rule
Now we consider agents’ equilibrium strategies at a continuation game Γ(t,∆b)
when buyer b employs the separating choice rule where buyer types ∆ab make an
acceptable offer while buyer types ∆rb make a rejectable offer −1. For this choice
rule, the reasonable beliefs of its continuation game are ∆ab and ∆
r
b. If one of the
continuation games has no sequential equilibrium, there is no sequential equilibrium
for this choice rule. In what follows we show how to compute agents’ equilibrium
strategies at time t given a sequential equilibrium ℘a ∈ SE(∆ab, t+1) and a sequential
equilibrium ℘r ∈ SE(∆rb, t+ 1).
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Let et+1
S1t+3
|∆ab be s’s equivalent offer at time t+1 in the equilibrium ℘
a. Let et+1
S1t+3
|∆rb
(xt+1|∆rb, respectively) be S
1
t+3’s equivalent offer (equilibrium offer, respectively) at
time t + 1 in the equilibrium ℘r. By convention, the equilibrium offer of buyer type
bj ∈ ∆rb at time t is −1. Buyer bj ’s equilibrium bargaining outcome is the bargain-
ing outcome EBO(bj, ℘
r) in the sequential equilibrium ℘r. Thus buyer bj ∈ ∆
r
b’s
equivalent offer is etbj |∆b = ρ(bj , t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)). Similar to the pooling acceptance
choice rule, the optimal offer of buyer types ∆ab at time t is as follows
x∗bi(t)|∆b =


RPS1t+2 TS1t+2 = t+ 2
min{(et+1
S1t+3
|∆ab)←S1t+3,RPS2t+2} TS1t+2 6= t+ 2 and |St+2| > 1
(et+1
S1t+3
|∆ab)←S1t+3 TS1t+2 6= t+ 2 and |St+2| = 1
Accordingly, buyer bi ∈ ∆
a
b’s equivalent offer is e
t
bi
|∆b = x
∗
bi
(t)|∆b since its
equilibrium bargaining outcome is (x∗bi(t)|∆b, t+ 1). Seller s will update its belief to
∆ab when it receives an offer x
∗
bi
(t)|∆b. If it receives an offer −1, it will update its
belief to ∆rb. Otherwise, it will update its belief to bh(∆b). The existence of such an
equilibrium depends on the following conditions:
• Any buyer type bi ∈ ∆ab has no incentive to behave as any buyer type bj ∈ ∆
r
b.
If bi pretends to be bj , it will offer −1 at time t and its equilibrium bargaining
outcome will be EBO(bj,−1, t) = EBO(bj, ℘r). Therefore, this condition
requires that Ubi(EBO(bi, x
∗
bi
(t)|∆b, t)) ≥ Ubi(EBO(bj, ℘
r)) or equivalently,
x∗bi(t)|∆b ≤ ρ(bi, t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)).
• Any buyer type bj ∈ ∆rb must have no incentive to behave as bi ∈ ∆
a
b. If bj be-
haves as bi, it will offer x
∗
bi
(t)|∆b at time t and the offer will be accepted. bj will
not choose to behave as bi if Ubj (EBO(bj, ℘
r) ≥ Ubj (EBO(bj, x
∗
bi
(t)|∆b, t)))
or equivalently, ρ(bj , t, EBO(bj, ℘
r)) ≤ x∗bi(t)|∆b.
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• No buyer type has an incentive to offer a price different from the above two
equilibrium offers. If a buyer type bi ∈ ∆b offers a price different from x∗bi(t)|∆b
and −1, it will be treated as buyer type bh(∆b) and its optimal offer at time t is
then x∗bi(t)|{bh(∆b)}. Buyer type bi will not choose to act off the equilibrium
path if etbi |∆b ≤ x
∗
bi
(t)|{bh(∆b)}.
If all the three conditions are satisfied, buyer types’ optimal offers, the belief update
rule, and the sequential equilibria ℘a and ℘r for the continuation game starting from
time t + 1 consists of a sequential equilibrium for the continuation game Γ(t,∆b).
4.3.5 The Seller’s Equilibrium Offer
Now we show how to compute the seller’s equilibrium offer at a continuation game
Γ(t,∆b) such that ι(t) = S. If t = T −1, it is the seller’s dominant strategy to accept
any offer which is not worse than its reserve price. At time t = T − 2, there are two
cases. If |St+2| = 1, seller S1t+2 has multiple choices, each for one buyer type in ∆b.
The optimal offer of seller S1t+2 for buyer type bi ∈ ∆b is RPi, which gives seller S
1
t+2
an expected utility EUS1t+2(RPi, t + 2) =
∑
bj∈∆b,RPj≥RPi
ωbj (∆b)US1t+2(RPi, t + 2)
since RPi is only acceptable to a buyer type with a reserve price no less than RPi.
The optimal offer of S1t+2 at time t = T − 2 is y = argmaxy∈{RPi|bi∈∆b}EUS1t+2(y, t)
and its equivalent offer is et
S1t+2
|∆b such that US1t+2(e
t
S1t+2
|∆b, t + 2) = EUS1t+2(y, t).
If |St+2| > 1, seller S
1
t+2’s optimal offer at time t is RPS2t+2 due to the competition
between sellers. Thus, the equivalent price of the optimal offer of agent S1t+2 in
this case is RPS2t+2. If |∆b| = 1, agents’ equilibrium strategies are the equilibrium
strategies of the corresponding complete information bargaining.
Now we show how to compute the seller S1t+2’s equilibrium offer given a belief ∆b
(|∆b| > 1) at time t < T − 2. We consider a reject update rule in which buyer types
∆′b will reject the seller S
1
t+2’s offer and buyer types ∆b − ∆
′
b will accept the seller
S1t+2’s offer such that such that RPi > RPj for any bi ∈ ∆b −∆
′
b and bj ∈ ∆
′
b. We
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first compute all the sequential equilibria SE(∆′b, t + 1) for the continuation game
with belief ∆′b starting from time t + 1. If there is no sequential equilibrium for the
continuation game Γ(t+1,∆′b), there is no sequential equilibrium for this reject update
rule. Otherwise, for each sequential equilibrium ℘ ∈ SE(∆′b, t+1), we check whether
there exists a price x such that the price, the reject update rule, and the sequential
equilibrium ℘ constitute a sequential equilibrium for the continuation game Γ(t,∆b).
Such a price x exists if and only if the following three conditions are satisfied:
1. bi is willing to accept the offer x and does not want to behave as bj. That is,
for any bi ∈ ∆b − ∆′b and bj ∈ ∆
′
b, Ubi(x, t + 2) ≥ Ubi(EBO(bj, ℘)) where
EBO(bj, ℘) is the bi’s equilibrium bargaining outcome when it behaves as bj .
This condition can be reformulated as x ≤ minbi∈∆b−∆′b,bj∈∆′b ρ(bi, t, EBO(bj, ℘)),
which provides an upper bound for seller’s offering price x.
2. bj will reject the offer x. That is, each buyer type bj ∈ ∆′b has no incentive
to behave as bi, i.e., Ubj (x, t + 2) < Ubj (EBO(bj, ℘)). This condition can be
rewritten as x > maxbj∈∆′b ρ(bj , t, EBO(bj, ℘)), which provides a lower bound
for the offering price x.
3. Seller s has no incentive to choose a price other than x given the reject update
rule and the sequential equilibrium ℘ of the continuation game Γ(t+ 1,∆′b);
The third equilibrium existence condition requires that the price x is seller S1t+2’s
optimal offer given the reject update rule and the sequential equilibrium ℘ for the
continuation game. Any buyer type can either accept the seller S1t+2’s offer x or
reject it and receive a bargaining outcome in the sequential equilibrium ℘ for the
continuation game. Formally, buyer type bj ∈ ∆′b will accept a price x if and only if
x ≤ ρ(bj , t, EBO(bj, ℘)). Buyer type bi ∈ ∆b −∆′b will accept a price x if and only
if x ≤ minbj∈∆′b ρ(bi, t, EBO(bj, ℘)). We can define the acceptance price φ(bi,∆
′
b, ℘)
of each buyer type bi ∈ ∆b as follows:
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φ(bi,∆
′
b, ℘) = min{φ
′(bi,∆
′
b, ℘),RPS2t+2}
where φ′(bi,∆
′
b, ℘) is the acceptance price of each buyer type bi ∈ ∆b given the
sequential equilibrium ℘:
φ′(bi,∆
′
b, ℘) =


ρ(bi, t, EBO(bi, ℘) if bi ∈ ∆′b
minbj∈∆′b ρ(bi, t, EBO(bj, ℘)) otherwise
Seller S1t+2’s expected utility of making an offer x given the sequential equilibrium
℘ is defined as
EUs(x, t) =
∑
bi∈∆b
ωbi(∆b)EUs(x, t,bi)
where EUs(x, t,bi) is seller S
1
t+2’s utility if the buyer is of type bi, which is defined
as


Us(x, t + 1) if x ≤ φ(bi,∆′b, ℘)
Us(EBO(bi, ℘)) if x > φ(bi,∆
′
b, ℘) and bi ∈ ∆
′
b
Us(minbj∈∆′b ρ(bi, t, EBO(bj, ℘)), t+ 1) otherwise
It is easy to see that the optimal offer the seller S1t+2 should be either one buyer
type’s acceptance price or a price that will be rejected by all buyer types (i.e., ̟). If
the seller S1t+2’s optimal offer x satisfies the first two equilibrium existence conditions,
there is a sequential equilibrium in which the seller S1t+2 offers price x and buyer
types ∆′b will reject the offer with the sequential equilibrium ℘. Otherwise there is
no sequential equilibrium given this reject update rule and the continuation game
equilibrium ℘.
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In addition to the above reject update rules under which at least one buyer
type will choose to reject the offer, the seller S1t+2 can also make an offer such
that it is all buyer types’ equilibrium strategies to accept the offer. It is easy to
see that the highest offer that will be accepted by all buyer types in equilibrium is
x = min{RPS2t+2,minbi∈∆b(x
∗
bi
(t+1)|bh(∆b))←bi} since if a seller offers a price larger
than x, at least one buyer type has an incentive to deviate from accepting the offer. If
the buyer rejects x, the seller will update its belief to bh(∆b). The acceptance price of
buyer type bi for this reject update rule is thus (x
∗
bi
(t+1)|bh(∆b))←bi. If the optimal
offer of the seller in this case is not acceptable to all the buyer types (i.e., the optimal
offer is not minbi∈∆b(x
∗
bi
(t + 1)|bh(∆b))←bi), there is no sequential equilibrium for
this null reject update rule. Otherwise, there is a sequential equilibrium in which the
seller will make an offer which will be accepted by all buyer types.
4.4 Summary
This chapter analyzes agents’ strategic behavior in concurrent one-to-many ne-
gotiation and many-to-many negotiation when agents follow the alternating-offers
protocol. The analysis can provide insights and suggestions for designing negotiation
agents in practical electronic marketplaces in which agents are involved in many-to-
many negotiations. The contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• We extend the alternating-offers protocol to handle multiple trading opportuni-
ties and market competition. We provide an algorithm based on backward in-
duction to compute the subgame perfect equilibrium of concurrent one-to-many
negotiation and many-to-many negotiation. We observe that agents’ bargaining
power are affected by the proposing ordering and market competition.
• For the complete information setting, we show that the computational com-
plexity when there are many buyers and many sellers in our protocol lineally
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increases with the number of buyers and sellers. We find that for a large subset
of the space of the parameters, agents’ equilibrium strategies depend on the
values of a narrow number of parameters. The computation of the equilibrium
for realistic ranges of the parameters in one-to-many settings reduces to the
computation of the equilibrium either in one-to-one settings with uncertainty
or in one-to-many settings without uncertainty. We also compare the efficiency
of the negotiation mechanism with that of some other mechanisms like VCG
auction.
• We provide an algorithm to find a pure strategy sequential equilibrium in one-
to-many negotiation where there is uncertainty regarding the reserve price of
one agent. Our algorithm combines together game theoretic analysis with state
space search techniques and it is sound and complete.
The assumptions made in this chapter are not more restrictive than related work
in the literature. The assumption of the existence of deadline and reserve price
in bargaining is widely used in the literature (e.g., [57, 61, 102, 112]). Computing
agents’ equilibrium strategies in incomplete information bargaining is extremely dif-
ficult and most related work only considers one type of uncertainty. For instance,
Rubinstein [112] considered bilateral bargaining with uncertainty over two possible
discount factors. Gatti et al. [61] analyzed bilateral bargaining with one-sided un-
certain deadlines. In this chapter, we consider the uncertain information about the
reserve price of an agent while assuming complete information about other negotia-
tion parameters. As in most related work, we consider the negotiation over a single
issue, price of a good. However, our analysis can be easily extended to the multi-
attribute negotiations in which the attributes are negotiated simultaneously [61]. The
next chapters of this thesis will consider more realistic negotiation problems and will
present heuristic based negotiation strategies and also protocols.
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CHAPTER 5
STRATEGIC AGENTS FOR MULTI-RESOURCE
NEGOTIATION
This chapter investigates automated negotiation in resource allocation among re-
source providers (sellers) and consumers (buyers), where consumer agents may require
multiple resources to successfully complete their tasks. Therefore, consumer agents
may need to engage in multiple negotiations. If the multiple negotiations are not all
successful, consumers gain nothing. This is a simple form of multi-linked negotiation
where the resources are interrelated in the sense that, from the perspective of the
overall negotiation, resources are dependent as an agent’s utility from the overall ne-
gotiation depends on obtaining overall agreements on all the resources. This chapter
presents the design and implementation of agents that concurrently negotiate with
other entities for acquiring multiple resources.
5.1 Background
In electronic commerce markets where selfish agents behave individually, agents
often have to acquire multiple resources in order to accomplish a high level task
with each resource acquisition requiring negotiations with multiple resource providers.
Such scenarios widely exist in practical applications. For example, a complex task
may need several robots to work together and the absence of any robot results in
the failure of the task. This is a simple form of multi-linked negotiation where the
resources are independent but are interrelated. Resources are independent in the sense
that there is no dependence between different resources, i.e., acquiring one resource
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doesn’t constrain how the other resources are acquired. However, from the perspective
of the overall negotiation, resources are dependent as an agent’s utility from the
overall negotiation depends on obtaining overall agreements on all the resources. The
negotiation problem in this chapter has the following three features:
1. When acquiring multiple resources, a consumer agent only knows the reserve
price available for the entire set of resources, i.e., the highest price the agent
can pay for all the resources, rather than the reserve price of each separate
resource. In practice, given a plan and its resource requirements, an agent can
easily decide the reserve price for all the resources in that plan based on the
overall worth of the task. However, it is difficult (even impossible) for a resource
consumer to understand how to set the reserve price for each separate resource.
In fact, we show experimentally that it is undesirable to set a fixed reserve price
for an individual resource prior to beginning negotiations.
2. Agents can decommit from tentative agreements at the cost of paying a penalty.
Decommitment allows agents to profitably accommodate new tasks arriving
or new negotiation events. If these events make some existing contracts less
profitable or infeasible for an agent, that agent can decommit from those con-
tracts [121].
3. Negotiation agents are assumed to have incomplete information about other
agents, for example, a buyer agent knows the distribution of the reserve price
of a seller agent and the number of trading competitors. However, an agent’s
negotiation status (the set of proposals it has received) and negotiation strategy
are its private information. For strategic reasons, a negotiation agent won’t
disclose such information during negotiation. During negotiation, negotiation
agents can quit negotiation at any time, even without notifying their trading
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partners. When a buyer acquires multiple resources, it concurrently negotiates
with sellers to reach agreements for all the resources.
Currently, there are limited techniques based on auctions or independent negotia-
tions over single resources for performing the assembly of multiple resources required
by a task. A centralized approach such as reverse combinatorial auctions [42, 99]
requires a controlling agent (the auctioneer) for determining which agents receive
which resources based on the bids submitted by individual agents. However, the auc-
tioneer may face significant computational overload due to a large number of bids
with complex structure. Assume that each buyer runs a reverse combinatorial auc-
tion, each seller may participate in multiple auctions as there are multiple buyers
requiring its resource. It’s difficult for each seller to derive its optimal bids for all
the concurrent auctions. An alternative approach is that each buyer (seller) submits
its resource requirement (supply) to a super agent and the super agent runs auctions
for all the buyers (sellers). However, it may be difficult to find such an auctioneer
agent that selfish agents can trust and can comply with the decisions made by the
auctioneer. Moreover, in dynamic environments that resource supply and demand
arrive randomly, it is very difficult for the auctioneer to decide optimally when to run
auctions. In our distributed approach, allocations emerge as the result of a sequence
of distributed negotiations and each selfish agent acts on behalf of itself. An agent
can negotiate with other agents when needed. The distributed model is also more
suitable for the situation when the needed resources are from multiple electronic mar-
ketplaces (i.e., no centralized auction is possible), and more natural in cases where
resources belong to different selfish agents and finding optimal allocations may be
(computationally) infeasible. We feel it is key that the acquisition of multiple re-
sources necessary is seen as an integrated process in which the results/status of any
one negotiation affects all other negotiations.
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Because resource providers and consumers may have different goals, preferences,
interests, and policies, the problem of negotiating an optimal allocation of resources
within a group of agents has been found to be intractable both in terms of the amount
of computation [45] and communication needed [47]. The multi-resource negotia-
tion studied in this chapter is even more complex due to the possibility of agents’
decommiting from previously made agreements. An agent’s bargaining position in
each round is determined by many factors such as market competition, negotiation
deadlines, current agreement set, trading partners’ proposals, and market dynamics.
During each round of negotiation, an agent has to make decisions on how to proceed
with each negotiation thread and there are many possible choices for each decision
based on a variety of factors. Thus, it is difficult to construct an integrated framework
in which all these factors are optimized concurrently. Rather than explicitly modeling
these inter-dependent factors and then determining each agent’s best decisions by an
intractable combined optimization, this work tries to connect those inter-dependent
factors indirectly and develops a set of heuristics to approximate agents’ decision
making during negotiation. The distinguishing feature of negotiation agents in this
chapter is their flexibility; they can adjust 1) the number of tentative agreements for
each resource and 2) the amount of concession by reacting to i) changing market con-
ditions, and ii) the current negotiation status of all concurrently negotiating threads.
In our approach, agents utilize a time-dependent negotiation strategy in which the
reserve price of each resource is dynamically determined by 1) the likelihood that ne-
gotiation will not be successful (conflict probability), 2) the expected agreement price
of the resource, and 3) the expected number of final agreements given the set of tenta-
tive agreements made so far. The negotiation deadline of each resource is determined
by both its scarcity and the overall deadline for the entire negotiation. A buyer agent
can make more than one tentative agreement for each resource and the maximum
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number of tentative agreements is constrained by the market situation in order to
avoid the agent’s making more agreements than necessary.
Our work here is connected to several lines of research in agent-mediated ne-
gotiation including multi-issue negotiation (e.g., [49, 50, 51, 80, 81, 82, 130, 133]),
one-to-many negotiation [13, 14, 28, 96, 97, 106], negotiation strategies (e.g., [48, 78,
124, 125, 127]), and decommitment (e.g., [5, 98, 121]). This chapter presents the
first design of negotiation agents in dynamic and uncertain environments in which
1) a consumer negotiates for multiple resources and its negotiation fails if it fails to
get some resources, and 2) agents can choose to decommit from existing agreements
within a fixed period. This research is intellectually challenging because of both the
complex interactions among concurrent negotiations for multiple resources and the
uncertainty associated with the outcome of these negotiations. This research pro-
vides a deep understanding of the influence of sophisticated negotiation mechanisms
on individual agents’ performance in dynamic environments, and hence contributes to
the construction of effective problem-solving approaches in open environments. The
proposed approach can be used for designing negotiation agents in many practical ap-
plications like service composition [105], grid resource management [126], and supply
chain [138].
5.2 Negotiation mechanism
5.2.1 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions about agents’ knowledge and strategies:
1) Agents have incomplete information about each other. The assumption of in-
complete information is intuitive because in practice, agents have private information,
and for strategic reasons, they do not reveal their strategies, constraints, or prefer-
ences. In [109, p.54], it was noted that the strategy of a trading agent corresponds
to its internal program, and extracting the true internal decision process would be
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difficult. Moreover, when selfish agents have competing interests, they may have in-
centive to deviate from protocols or to lie to other agents about their preferences. This
chapter assumes that 1) agents know the number of trading partners and competitors
and 2) the distributions of trading partners’ reserve price. The assumption that the
number of trading partners is known is less restrictive or similar to the assumptions in
most related work (e.g., [50, 87, 96, 97, 98]). We consider both assumptions are real-
istic in practice. For example, consider the streaming processing system CLASP [27],
in which each resource provider (consumer) always posts its resource supply (require-
ment). Further, the distribution of trading partners’ reserve prices can be learned
as a result of repeated interaction with agents in the marketplace. We explored the
sensitivity of these assumptions in the experiment section.
2) A consumer agent negotiates over multiple resources in parallel and, for each
resource, the agent concurrently negotiates with its trading partners. Given that the
buyer doesn’t know how to appropriately set the reserve price of each of its resources,
one approach that requires no prior knowledge of the marketplace about current
resource scarcity and expected competition of a specific resource is for a consumer
to negotiate over all the resources in parallel. For each resource, there are multiple
trading partners and the agent concurrently negotiates with all the trading partners.
Therefore, each negotiation thread of one resource has multiple concurrently existing
outside options. Generally, a buyer obtains more desirable negotiation outcomes when
it negotiates concurrently with all the sellers in competitive situations in which there
is information uncertainty and there is a deadline for the negotiation to complete [96,
97]. Additionally, inefficiency may arise in sequential negotiation when considering
the overall time cost to complete all the necessary negotiations [51].
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Buyer a … … 
Resource Il
Sellers for resource I1
Resource I1
Sellers for resource Il
Figure 5.1. Buyer a’s multi-resource negotiation problem
5.2.2 The Negotiation Problem
All the analysis in this chapter is from the perspective of a randomly selected
buyer a (see Figure 5.1). Let I = {I1, I2, . . . , Il} be the set of resources needed by
a and τ be a’s negotiation deadline. Let a negotiation period of a be denoted by t,
t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , τ − 1}. For resource Ij , a has a set T P
t
j of trading partners (sellers)
at round t. Also, a has a set CP tj of trading competitors (buyers) for resource Ij at
round t. φta→s is the proposal of a to its trading partner s ∈ T P
t
j at round t. φ
t
s→a
is the proposal of seller agent s to a at round t. RP and IP are respectively, the
reserve price (maximum amount of money a can spend) and the desirable price of a
before negotiation begins, respectively. IPj is a’s initial proposal price for resource
Ij , i.e., φ
0
a→s, and it follows that
∑
j IPj = IP . RP
t is a’s reserve price for all
negotiating resources It at round t. Once a tentative agreement (defined below) for
Ij becomes a final agreement, a doesn’t need further negotiation about Ij . Therefore,
It ⊆ It−1 ⊆ I.
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An agent can decommit from an agreement within λ rounds after the agreement
has been made. Assume a makes an agreement Ag about resource Ij with agent s at
round Tm(Ag) = t and the agreement price is Prc(Ag). Assume a decommits from the
agreement Ag at round t′ where t′−Tm(Ag) ≤ λ. The penalty of the decommitment
is defined by ρ(Prc(Ag), t, t′, λ). This chapter assumes that 1) penalty functions
are nonnegative, continuous, and nondecreasing with time and agreement price, and
2) the maximum penalty is less than the agreement price. Therefore, if an agent
makes unnecessary agreements for a resource, it will decommit from these unnecessary
agreements. An example of such a penalty function is 0.1 × Prc(Ag)×
(
(t′ − t)/λ
)ς
where ς > 0.
Penalties could be different from one resource to another resource. If the two
parties decommit at the same time, they don’t need to pay a penalty to each other.
An agreement made in the bargaining process is called a tentative agreement and it
becomes a final agreement if neither party decommits from the agreement in the λ
rounds after the agreement was made. Agent a needs to fulfill all its final agreements,
i.e., a needs to pay for all final agreements, even through it needs only one final
agreement for each resource. a tries to make agreements for all its resources and a
gains nothing if it fails to make an agreement for any resource in I, no matter how
many and how good the agreements for other resources are. In other words, a requires
a set of resources and only receives a positive utility if it acquires all of them, and
zero otherwise. This assumption makes sense in some practical domains like some
supply chain or Grid applications where the failure of one step (or one sub-task) will
result in the failure of the whole task. The utility function of a when a makes at least
one final agreement for each resource is defined as:
ua = RP −
∑
Ij∈I
∑
Ag∈FAGτ+λj
Prc(Ag) +
τ+λ∑
t=0
(
ρtin − ρ
t
out
)
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where τ + λ is the maximum period that a was involved in negotiation and decom-
mitment, FAGτ+λj is the set of final agreements for resource Ij at τ + λ, ρ
t
out is the
penalty a pays to other agents at t when it decommits, and ρtin is the payment of
penalty a receives from other agents at t if they decommit.
If a fails to make a final agreement for at least one resource, a gains nothing and
its utility is defined as:
ua = −
∑
Ij∈I
∑
Ag∈FAGτ+λj
Prc(Ag) +
τ+λ∑
t=0
(
ρtin − ρ
t
out
)
In this case, a does not get the value RP since its task cannot be completed and
thus its utility may be negative. Its only “income” in this case is the penalty received
from its trading partners.
5.2.3 The Negotiation Protocol
As agents can choose to decommit from agreements, negotiation consists of a
bargaining stage and a decommitment stage for each negotiation thread. This work
adopts the well known alternating offers protocol (see [111, p.100]) so that a pair of
buyer and seller agents in a negotiation thread bargain by making proposals to each
other. At each round, one agent makes a proposal first, then the other agent has
three choices in the bargaining stage: 1) accept the proposal, 2) reject the proposal,
or 3) make a counter proposal. For ease of analysis, this work assumes that buyers
always propose first to sellers during negotiation. Many buyer-seller pairs can bargain
simultaneously since each pair is in a negotiation thread. If the seller accepts the
proposal of the buyer, negotiation terminates with a tentative agreement. If the
seller rejects the proposal of the buyer, negotiation terminates with no agreement.
If the seller makes a counter proposal, bargaining proceeds to another round and
the buyer can accept the proposal, reject the proposal, or make a counter proposal.
Bargaining between two agents terminates 1) when an agreement is reached or 2)
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with a conflict (i.e., no agreement is made) when one of the two agents’ deadline is
reached or one agent quits the negotiation. After a tentative agreement is made, an
agent has the opportunity to decommit from the agreement and the decommiting
agent pays the penalty to the other party involved in the decommited agreement.
5.2.4 The Negotiation Strategy
An agent’s negotiation strategy is a function from the negotiation history to its
actions at each negotiation round [109]. An agent a’s negotiation strategy can be
represented as a sequence of functions fa = {f ta}
∞
t=0, where f
t
a is a’s strategy at round
t. As the agent is negotiating for multiple resources and there are multiple negotiation
threads for each resource, the agent’s negotiation strategy f ta specifies for the agent
what to do at round t for each of the active negotiation thread. For each trading
partner s, the agent a has four choices: 1) accept the proposal by s, 2) reject the
proposal by s, 3) make a counter proposal to s in the bargaining stage, or 4) decommit
from the agreement between a and s in the decommitment stage.
A strategy profile F = (fa, fT P , fCP) is a collection of strategies, one for each
agent, where fT P and fCP are the strategies for a’s trading partners and trading com-
petitors, respectively. Let ℑ : F → O be a social choice function which determines
the negotiation result given the negotiation strategies F of all the agents. Given the
strategy profile of all the agents, game theory has been widely applied in analyzing
the equilibria of bargaining models (e.g., Nash equilibria, Sub-game perfect equilibria,
Sequential equilibria) [100]. The analytic complexity of equilibrium analysis increases
rapidly when more elements (e.g., deadline, outside options, bargaining costs, market
competition) and more agents are included in the model. As a result, in most models,
only one or two elements are considered. For example, Rubinstein [111] studies a two-
player sequential bargaining game in which bargaining cost is considered. The latest
advance in computing sequential equilibrium strategies only considers a bilateral bar-
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gaining model in which one agent has incomplete information about the deadline of
the other agent [61]. We take a set of elements into account, for example, dead-
line, outside option, market competition, multiple resources, and decommitment. In
addition, we are not assuming that agents have complete information about the fac-
tors considered in our framework, which makes agents’ reasoning even more difficult.
Therefore, we feel that it is impractical to formally model the complex interaction
that occurs between the bargaining and decommitment nor the interaction among
multiple resources in the framework.
If we assume that each agent has information, which could be a probabilistic dis-
tribution, about other agents’ strategies (i.e., fT P and fCP), the optimization problem
of agent a is to find the optimal negotiation strategy f ∗a from the set Fa of possible
negotiation strategies:
f ∗a = argmaxfa∈Faua
(
ℑ(fa, fT P , fCP)
)
where ua(ℑ(fa, fT P , fCP)) is a’s utility of the negotiation result ℑ(fa, fT P , fCP). Agent
a’s optimization problem at each negotiation round t can be formulated as a Markov
Decision Process (MDP) < S,A, P,R > where the state set S can be characterized by
the market situation (e.g., the number of buyers or sellers, the agreement set of each
buyer or seller), action set A consists of all the actions each agent can choose (e.g., a
counter-proposal including the price, or decommitment decision), transition function
P is determined by agents’ negotiation strategies and the change of market with time,
reward function R is based on the utility each agent can gain from a specific state.
As the action space A is infinite, solving the MDP problem could be computationally
intractable [22]. Moreover, as stated before, it’s impractical to assume that agents
have information about other agents’ negotiation strategies. For strategy or privacy
reasons, an agent is unwilling to broadcast its decisions.
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Given that 1) it’s hard (even impossible) to compute agents’ equilibrium strategies,
and 2) it’s not appropriate to assume that a knows other agents’ negotiation strategies,
this chapter presents a set of heuristics for agents to make negotiation decisions at
each negotiation round. The set of heuristics consider many relevant issues such as
the risk that their negotiation partners may decommit (and therefore the fact that
ideally a buyer needs to secure more than one agreement for any given resource), the
competition that buyers face from other buyers, uncertainty about the reserve prices
of their trading partners, multiple opportunities of reaching an agreement, the set of
available tentative agreements, deadline, and negotiation history.
5.3 Heuristics based Strategies
Agent a has l resources to acquire, and for each resource, a conducts multi-
threaded negotiation with a set of trading partners. For each negotiation thread
associated with the acquisition of a resource, a needs to decide 1) what is its proposal
during the bargaining stage and 2) when and whether to decommit from an agreement
in the decommitment stage.
5.3.1 An overview of negotiation strategies
Algorithm 3 gives an overview of a’s strategy during the bargaining stage and the
decommitment stage.
At round t = 0, a needs to make an initial proposal IPj to each trading partner s.
During each later round (t > 0), a will always first update its information structures
(see Algorithm 4). First, if another agent decommits from an agreement, then remove
the agreement from the tentative agreement set. Second, if another agent sends a
message indicating rejection of the current proposal, the corresponding negotiation
thread terminates. If another agent accepts a proposal, then add the agreement to
the tentative agreement set. If one tentative agreement becomes a final agreement (no
145
Table 5.1. Symbols used in this chapter
τ deadline of agent a
Ij resource j
RP reserve price for all resources
IP desirable price for all resources
IPj initial proposal for resource Ij
τ tj deadline of agent a for resource Ij at round t
It the set of resources at round t
T P tj the set of partners (sellers) about Ij at round t
CP tj the set of competitors (buyers) about Ij at round t
φta→s a’s proposal to s at round t
P tj a’s trading partners’ proposals about Ij at round t
RP t a’s reserve price for all negotiating resources at round t
RP tj a’s reserve price for resource Ij at round t
T AGtj a’s set of tentative agreements for resource Ij at round t
FAGtj a’s set of final agreements for resource Ij at round t
Prc(Ag) price of the agreement Ag
Tm(Ag) time when the agreement Ag was made
ρtout the penalty a pays to other agents at round t
ρtin the payment of penalty a receives at round t
Ctj the scarcity of resource Ij at t
RCtj the relative scarcity of resource Ij at t
δtj the concession rate with respect to resource Ij at round t
χtj the conflict probability of the negotiation for Ij at t
̟tj the expected agreement price of resource Ij at t
ωts(Ag) the probability of s’s decommiting from Ag at t
ϕ(T AGtj) the expected number of final agreements given T AG
t
j
γ(T AGtk) model how ϕ(T AG
t
j) affects the offering price
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decommitment allowed) for the resource Ij as the negotiation moves to a new round,
then a will decommit from all tentative agreements about Ij, stop all negotiation
threads for Ij , and remove Ij from It.1
Next a computes the negotiation deadline τ tj for each resource Ij ∈ I
t (Sec-
tion 5.3.2) and generates a proposal φta→s to each trading partner s ∈ T P
t
j (Sec-
tion 5.3.3). If φta→s < φ
t−1
s→a (i.e., s’s last proposal is not acceptable), then a sends the
proposal φta→s to s directly. Otherwise, it adds < φ
t−1
s→a, t > into tentative agreement
set T AGtj.
For resource Ij, a checks whether the current set of agreements are sufficient. If the
current set of agreements is more than needed, a recursively removes agreements from
the tentative agreement set (Section 5.3.4). Assume that Ag needs to be removed
and the trading partner in the agreement Ag is seller s. If Ag ∈ T AGt−1j , then
a decommits from the agreement. If Ag is not in T AGt−1j , the agreement Ag has
been just added to T AGtj by a at time t but the seller involved in the agreement
hasn’t received the “accept” message from a. Although a doesn’t intend to make the
agreement Ag and a can quit the negotiation with s, it’s better for a to continue the
negotiation with s and try to get better agreements than an agreement in the current
tentative agreement set T AGtj. Therefore, a removes Ag from T AG
t
j and sends s a
proposal with lower price than the price in the agreement Ag. Finally, if an agreement
Ag is contained in T AGtj but is not in T AG
t−1
j , then a sends an accept proposal to
the corresponding seller involved in the agreement Ag.
1The only additional value that can be achieved by keeping alive any future negotiation is the
possibility that a trading partner is likely to decommit. In this case, it would be profitable to delay
decommitment and thus the agent does not need to pay the decommitment penalty but receives
the penalty from its trading partner. However, since each buyer does not know whether a seller
will decommit from an agreement and the penalty increases with time, the buyer may have to
pay a higher penalty if it has to decommit before the unnecessary tentative agreement becomes
a final agreement. We evaluated the benefit of delaying decommitment through experimentation
and found that delaying decommitment did not increase the buyer’s average utility. In the current
implementation, we do not take this into account.
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Algorithm 3: Negotiation Strategy of Agent a
Data Structure: Tentative agreement set T AGtj , final agreement set FAG
t
j ,
sellers’ proposal set for each resource Ij at round t.
Output: Final agreement set FAGtj for each Ij
1: Initial proposing: Let t = 0 and propose IPj to every trading partner s about Ij.
2: repeat
3: t++;
4: It = It−1;
5: T AGtj = T AG
t−1
j , FAG
t
j = FAG
t−1
j for Ij ∈ I
t;
6: Step 1: initialization (Algorithm 2)
7: Step 2: deadline calculation (Section 5.3.2)
8: Step 3: proposal generation (Section 5.3.3)
9: Step 4: meet the agreement number constraint (Section 5.3.4)
10: Step 5: send left proposals
11: until 1) t ≥ τ + λ, or 2) |FAGtj | > 0 for each Ij, or 3)|T AG
t
j| = 0 for some Ij at
t ≥ τ tj
The overall negotiation process will terminate if 1) the deadline is reached, or 2) a
makes a final agreement for each resource Ij , or 3) |T AG
t
j | = 0 for some Ij at t ≥ τ
t
j ,
which means it no longer makes any sense for a to make any other agreements.
This work assumes that a buyer agent always offers the same price to all trading
partners of one resource. Formal analysis of concurrent negotiation [7] suggests that
it is an agent’s dominant strategy to make the same offer to all trading partners.
While this chapter considers more complex negotiation, it is still intuitive to not
make price discrimination proposals for the same resource. While making an offer,
a buyer hopes that the offer would be accepted. If there are two offers which have
the same probability of being accepted, the buyer will choose the offer with the lower
price.
5.3.2 Different deadlines for different resources
The number of buyers and sellers for different resources varies. A resource is
easy to obtain if the number of sellers is much larger than the number of buyers. In
contrast, if there are more buyers and less sellers, the resource is relatively difficult to
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Algorithm 4: Initialization
1: for each Ij ∈ I
t do
2: for each s ∈ T P t−1j do
3: if φts→a=“decommit from Ag” then
4: remove Ag from T AGtj
5: else
6: if φts→a=“reject” then
7: remove s from T P tj
8: end if
9: else
10: if φts→a=“accept” then
11: add < φt−1s→a, t > into T AG
t
j
12: end if
13: end if
14: end for
15: for each Ag ∈ T AGtj do
16: if t− Tm(Ag) > λ then
17: remove Ag from T AGtj and add it to FAG
t
j
18: end if
19: end for
20: if |FAGtj| > 0 then
21: decommit from all agreements in T AGtj , stop all negotiation threads for Ij,
and remove Ij from It.
22: end if
23: end for
obtain since the resource seems “scarce” in terms of the ratio of supply to demand.
The intuition behind using different negotiation deadlines for different resources is
based on the following scenario: a makes an agreement about a scarce resource Ij
before the deadline approaches. However, the other party involved in the agreement
later decommits from the agreement. Then, the overall negotiation fails as it’s difficult
for agent a to get another agreement for the scarce resource Ij in the remaining
time and thus a needs to pay the penalty for its other agreements. To decrease the
possibility of this situation happening, we can reduce the deadlines of scarce resources
to increase the likelihood that we have a final agreement for those resources in place
before the overall negotiation deadline. In other words, we would like to quickly secure
one final agreement for a scarce resource. On one hand, by decreasing one resource’s
149
artificial deadline, a is inclined to make larger concessions to its trading partners and
thus its probability of making a final agreement for the resource increases. On the
other hand, if it’s difficult for a to make a final agreement for one resource, a can
know this earlier. Thus a can pay less decommitment penalties by decommiting from
agreements earlier as penalties increase with time. However, the determination of this
virtual deadline for scarce resources is a dynamic process which can either decrease
or increase the deadline as conditions change in the future.
The scarcity of a resource Ij is evaluated based on the competition situation of
the negotiation over resource Ij . A negotiator’s bargaining “power” is affected by the
number of competitors and trading alternatives. Multiple options give a negotiator
more “power” since the negotiating party needs not pursue the negotiation with
any sense of urgency. The competition situation of an agent is determined by the
probability that it is considered as the most preferred trading partner [127]. An
agent’s preferred trading partner refers to the one who makes the best proposal to
the agent. a has CP tj competitors and T P
t
j partners. While it’s impossible for a to
compute exactly the probability that it is considered as the most preferred trading
partner since a doesn’t know other agents’ negotiation strategies, the probability
can be approximated in the following way. The probability that a is not the most
preferred trading partner of any trading partner is CP tj/(CP
t
j+1). The probability of
the agent a not being the most preferred trading partner of all the trading partners
is approximated by
Ctj =
( CP tj
CP tj + 1
)T Ptj
Ctj measures the scarcity of resource Ij at t. With more trading partners, it is
relatively less difficult to acquire the resource and Ctj will decrease. With more trading
competitors, it is relatively more difficult to acquire the resource and Ctj will increase.
If resource Ij is scarce and the other resources are not scarce, it’s reasonable to
decrease Ij’s deadline in order to decrease the probability that the overall negotiation
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fails due to the failure of the negotiation about resource Ij . However, if all the
desired resources are scarce, it may not be necessary to decrease the deadline of all
the resources. In other words, whether to decrease the deadline of the resource Ij may
not depend on the absolute scarcity of the resource, but rather its “relative scarcity”.
The relative scarcity of the resource Ij is defined as the ratio of the Ij ’s scarcity
measure to the harmonic mean of the scarcity measure of all the resources:
RCtj =
Ctj
|It|
∑
Ik∈I
t
1
Ct
k
=
Ctj
∑
Ik∈It
1
Ct
k
|It|
Using harmonic mean, the scarcer resource dominates the deadline calculation,
which is close to the practice. Given the relative scarcity of each resource Ij ∈ I
t,
the deadline of resource Ij at time t is given as follows
τ tj =


τ if RCtj < 1
(RCtj)
̺τ if RCtj ≥ 1
where ̺ < 0. If the resource Ij is not scarce as compared with most resources, the
deadline for resource Ij will be the deadline of the overall negotiation. Otherwise,
i.e., RCtj ≥ 1, its deadline τ
t
j is smaller than τ as (RC
t
j)
̺ < 1, and it can be found
that τ tj will decrease with the increase of RC
t
j. That is, a relatively scarcer resource
will have a shorter deadline.
5.3.3 Generating proposals
Since bargaining is fundamentally time-dependent [78, 48], agents utilize a time-
dependent strategy when making concessions. Assume that a is negotiating with s
about resource Ij . Then, a’s proposal to s at round t is given by:
φta→s = IPj + (RP
t
j − IPj)δ
t
j
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where RP tj is agent a’s current reserve price of resource Ij at round t and δ
t
j is agent
a’s concession rate with respect to resource Ij at round t, which is given by
δtj = T (t, τ
t
j , ε) = (t/τ
t
j )
ε
With infinitely many values of ε, there are infinitely many possible strategies
in making concessions with respect to the remaining time. However, they can be
classified into: 1) Linear : ε = 1, 2) Conciliatory : 0 < ε < 1, and 3) Conservative:
ε > 1 [127]. ε reflects an agent’s mental state about its eagerness for finishing the
negotiation earlier [78, 48]. Before making proposals, a needs to decide its reserve
price RP tj . To calculate RP
t
j , we consider three factors: 1) the conflict probability χ
t
j
which measures the aspiration level of the current negotiation for resource Ij , 2) the
expected agreement price ̟tj of resource Ij , and 3) the expected number ϕ(T AG
t
j)
of final agreements based on the estimation of the decommitment probabilities of the
current tentative agreement set. Function γ(T AGtk) is used to model the effect of the
expected number ϕ(T AGtj) of final agreements.
RP tj is defined as:
RP tj = RP
t
χtj̟
t
jγ(T AG
t
j)∑
Ik∈It
χtk̟
t
kγ(T AG
t
k)
where RP t= RP −
∑
Ij∈I
∑
Ag∈FAGtj
Prc(Ag) +
∑t−1
t=0(ρ
t
in − ρ
t
out) is agent a’s reserve
price for all resources at round t, i.e., the maximum amount of money that it can
spend to acquire all the remaining resources. We can see that the reserve price RP tj
increases with the increase of the conflict probability χtj and expected agreement
price ̟tj . If the current negotiation for resource Ij seems difficult, a needs to set a
higher reserve price for resource Ij . Similarly, a needs to set a higher reserve price for
resource Ij if the expected agreement price for resource Ij is high. Later we will show
that γ(T AGtj) decreases with the increase of ϕ(T AG
t
j). Thus, the reserve price RP
t
j
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decreases with the increase of the expected number ϕ(T AGtj) of final agreements,
which is intuitive as buyers don’t need to set a higher reserve price for a resource Ij
when a has already made enough tentative agreements for Ij .
Conflict probability χtj : Suppose that at round t, a’s last proposal φ
t−1
a→s gen-
erates a utility of va for itself and vs for s, and its trading partner s’s proposal φ
t−1
s→a
generates a utility of ws for itself and wa for a. Since a and s are utility maximizing
agents, va > wa and vs < ws. If a accepts s’s last proposal, then it will obtain wa
with certainty. If a insists on its last proposal and 1) s accepts it, a obtains va and
2) s does not accept it, a may be subjected to a conflict utility ca. ca is the worst
possible utility for a (i.e., a’s utility in the absence of an agreement with s). If s does
not accept a’s last proposal, a may ultimately have to settle with lower utilities (the
lowest possible being the conflict utility), if there are changes in the market situation
in subsequent cycles. For instance, a may face more competitions in the next or sub-
sequent cycles and may have to ultimately accept a utility that is lower than wa (even
ca). If the subjective probability of obtaining ca is pc (conflict probability) and the
probability that a achieving va is 1− pc, and if a insists on holding its last proposal,
a will obtain a utility of (1− pc)va + pcca. Hence, a will find that it is advantageous
to insist on its last proposal only if
(1− pc)va + pcca ≥ wa
i.e., pc ≤ (va − wa)/(va − ca) [124, 125, 127]. The maximum value of pc = (va −
wa)/(va − ca) is the highest probability of a conflict that a may encounter in which
va = RP
t
j − φ
t−1
a→s and wa = RP
t
j − φ
t−1
s→a. pc is a ratio of two utility differences.
While va−wa measures the cost of accepting the trading agent’s last proposal, va−ca
measures the cost of provoking a conflict. va − ca represents the range of possible
values of utilities between the best case utility and the worst case (conflict) utility.
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If there is no tentative agreement for resource Ij, i.e., |T AG
t
j| = 0, the worst case
utility ca is 0. If |T AG
t
j| > 0, a can use one of its tentative agreements as the finally
agreement and ca is defined as
max
Ag∈T AGtj
(
RP tj − Prc(Ag)− Pnt(T AG
t
j −Ag, t, λ)
)
where Pnt(T AG, t, λ) is an estimation of the penalty a needs to pay while decommit-
ing from the set of agreements T AG. Pnt(T AG, t, λ) is defined as
∑
Ag∈T AG
∑Tm(Ag)+λ
t′=t ρ(Prc(Ag),Tm(Ag), t
′, λ)
Tm(Ag) + λ− t + 1
in which any agreement Ag ∈ T AG can be decommited at any time before the
decommitment stage expires.
Aggregated Probability of Conflict : Let pic be the conflict probability of a with
any of its trading partner s and wia be a’s utility if it accepts s’s proposal, then the
aggregated conflict probability of a with all of its trading partners about Ij is given
as follows [124, 125, 127]:
χtj =
|T Ptj |∏
i=1
pic =
|T Ptj |∏
i=1
va − wia
va − ca
=
∏|T Ptj |
i=1 (va − w
i
a)
(va − ca)
|T Ptj |
Expected agreement price ̟tj: Different resources have different ranges of
agreement prices. For example, you may need to spend $20,000 for a car but only need
$500 for a bike. Therefore, it’s necessary to consider a resource’s expected agreement
price ̟tj while determining the reserve price of the resource. ̟
t
j is computed based on
agent a’s estimation of the reservation price of a trading partner. The estimation is
characterized by a probability distribution Fs(.), where Fs(y) denotes the probability
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that the reservation price of a trading partner s is no greater than y. Fs(y) is identical
and independent across all sellers.2 This probability distribution is the prior belief of
the buyer. For simplicity, let Fj(y) = Fs(y) denote the probability that the reservation
price of any trading partner s ∈ T P tj is no greater than y. The probability density
function of Fj(y) is denoted by fj(y). The desirable price IPj for resource Ij is simply
computed by considering sellers’ reserve price for resource Ij: IPj =
∫∞
−∞
fj(y)ydy.
Let F kj (y) be the probability distributions of the k
th highest maximum reserve
price. The probability density function of F kj (y) is denoted by f
k
j (y). F
1
j (y) is equal
to the product of the probabilities that the maximum reserve price is less than or
equal to y in each thread. F 2j (y) is equal to F
1
j (y) plus the probability that the
highest maximum reserve price is greater than y, and the second highest maximum
reserve price is less than or equal to y. These probabilities can be calculated by the
following formulas:
F 1j (y) =
(
Fj(y)
)|T Ptj |
F 2j (y) = F
1
j (y) + C
1
|T Ptj |
(
1− Fj(y)
)2−1(
Fj(y)
)|T Ptj |−1
F kj (y) = F
k−1
j (y) + C
k−1
|T Ptj |
(
1− Fj(y)
)k−1(
Fj(y)
)|T Ptj |−k+1
The corresponding probability density functions are:
2Our model can also be extended to allow Fs(y) to be different for different trading partners.
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f 1j (y) = |T P
t
j|
(
Fj(y)
)|T Ptj |−1
f 2j (y) = f
1
j (y)− C
1
|T Ptj |
fj(y)
(
Fj(y)
)|T Ptj |−1 + C1|T Ptj |
(|T P tj | − 1)fj(y)
(
1− Fj(y)
)2−1(
Fj(y)
)|T Ptj |−2
fkj (y) = f
k−1
j (y)− C
k−1
|T Ptj |
(k − 1)fj(y)(
1− Fj(y)
)k−2(
Fj(x)
)|T Ptj |−k+1
+ Ck−1
|T Ptj |
fj(y)
(
1− Fj(y)
)k−1(
Fj(y)
)|T Ptj |−k+1
We provide a heuristic approach to estimate the expected agreement price for
resource Ij . When the number of trading partners is less than the number of trading
competitors, the agreement price follows the highest maximum reserve price distribu-
tion. Otherwise, the agreement price follows a lower reserve price distribution. This
is also the case with less trading competitors. The intuition behind the heuristic is
as follows. Consider the single-shot negotiation between buyers and sellers in which
buyers make offers first and then sellers decide whether to accept or not. If there is
no competitors, the equilibrium offer of the buyer a is sellers’ lowest reserve price.
If there is one competitor, the equilibrium offer of the buyer a is the second lowest
reserve price. In the same way, if there are |CP tj | competitors, the equilibrium offer
is the (|CP tj |+ 1)
th lowest reserve price, i.e., (|T P tj| − |CP
t
j|)
th highest reserve price.
Since in our model buyers don’t know sellers’ exact reserve prices, distributions are
used instead. Formally, ̟tj is given as follows:
̟tj =


∫∞
−∞
f
|T Ptj |−|CP
t
j |
j (y)ydy if |T P
t
j | > |CP
t
j |∫∞
−∞
f 1j (y)ydy if |T P
t
j | ≤ |CP
t
j|
where y¯ is the upper bound of the possible reserve price for resource Ij. The above es-
timation is “conservative” in the sense that we assume that agent a is less competitive
than its trading competitors.
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γ(T AGtj) models how the current set T AG
t
j of agreements will affect agent a’s re-
serve price for resource Ij at round t. a will set a lower reserve price if it has made more
agreements. Since current agreements may be decommited in the future. Rather than
considering the number |T AGtj | of agreements having already made, it’s more prudent
to use the expected number of final agreements, which can be computed based on the
decommitment probabilities of agreement set T AGtj. The decommitment probability
of an agreement Ag ∈ T AGtj between a and s is approximated by considering the
competition situation of negotiation over resource Ij and s’s satisfaction about the
agreement Ag.
The competition situation of negotiation over resource Ij is evaluated by the
probability that the agent s is not the most preferred trading partner is [(T P tj −
1)/T P tj]
CPtj+1 [124, 125, 127]. s’s satisfaction about the agreement Ag is estimated
by the probability that the agreement is no worse than the trading partner’s reserve
price. The price of the agreement Ag ∈ T AGtj is Prc(Ag), s’s satisfaction about the
agreement Ag is Fj(Prc(Ag)).
Hence, the approximation of the probability of s’s decommiting from agreement
Ag ∈ T AGtj is defined as:
ωts(Ag) = ϑ×
(
1−
(T P tj − 1
T P tj
)CPtj+1)(1− Fj(Prc(Ag)))
For the tentative agreement set T AGtj , the expected number of final agreements
is ϕ(T AGtj) =
∑
Ag∈T AGtj
(1 − ωts(Ag)). Given ϕ(T AG
t
j), buyer a can determine how
it will affect the reserve price about resource Ij at round t. γ(T AG
t
j) decreases with
the increase of ϕ(T AGtj) and can be defined as:
γ(T AGtj) =
1(
1 + ϕ(T AGtj)
)2
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5.3.4 Maximum number of final agreements
Since trading partners may decommit from agreements, a may need to make more
than one tentative agreement for resource Ij . Then, how many agreements are enough
for the resource Ij? For an agreement Ag between a and a trading partner s, s may
be inclined to decommit if there are many buyers requesting the resource. On the
other hand, s may be inclined to decommit if the agreement price is not favorable
from s’s perspective. Here we provide an approach to decide the maximum number
of agreements a can make on resource Ij at round t based on the expected number
of final agreements. Given the expected number ϕ(T AGtj) of final agreements about
resource Ij at t, a needs to decide whether the tentative agreements is enough or
insufficient. If T AGtj is more than needed, a may decommit from some agreements.
If the agreement set is insufficient, a will make more agreements if the negotiation
deadline hasn’t approached. This work assumes that a only needs to make one final
agreement for each resource. Therefore, by intuition, the most favorable result for
agent a is that a makes exactly one final agreement for each resource.
As a only needs one final agreement about resource Ij, if ϕ(T AG
t
j) ≫ 1, only
part of the final agreements will be used by a, which corresponds to the tentative
agreement set T AG ⊂ T AGtj . Maintaining the tentative agreement set T AG is better
than maintaining the tentative agreement set T AGtj as in the later case, a needs to
pay more for redundant agreements. Therefore, it’s better for a to decommit from
some agreements in T AGtj.
Let ϕtj be the satisfactory number of final agreements about resource Ij at t which
represents the upper bound of the number of final agreements needed. Before the
deadline is reached, a has the opportunity to make more agreements and thus reach
one final agreement. Thus, the satisfactory number of final agreements about resource
Ij at t < τ is 1, ϕ
t
j = 1. After the negotiation deadline, a will determine whether
to decommit from any agreement T AGtj for resource Ij at round τ ≤ t < t + λ.
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Is it the best option for a to set the satisfactory number of final agreements about
resource Ij at t be 1? Consider the following scenario, at t, the expected number
of final agreements for resource Ij is 1 and the expected number of final agreements
about any other resource is close to 0, which implies that the negotiation about other
resources has a very high failure probability. If a sets ϕtj to be 1, it’s with very high
probability that a would need to decommit from all its agreements. Therefore, a
will not set a high ϕtj value if ϕ(T AG
t
k) is small for another resource Ik. On the
other hand, a will try to increase the probability of making one final agreement for
each resource as it’s desirable for a to make one final agreement for each resource.
Concerning above, ϕtj is defined as:
ϕtj =


1 if t < τ
minIk∈It ϕ(T AG
t
k) if τ ≤ t < t + λ
If
∑
Ag∈T AGtj
(1−ωts(Ag)) < ϕ
t
j, a needs to make more agreements as the expected
number of agreements is less than ϕtj . If
∑
Ag∈T AGtj
(1 − ωts(Ag)) > ϕ
t
j, a needs
to decommit from some agreements. Let the set of tentative agreement set after
removing unnecessary agreements be T AG. The optimization problem of computing
T AG is given by
min
T AG
∑
Ag∈T AGtj−T AG
ρ(Prc(Ag),Tm(Ag), t, λ)
where T AG satisfies
∑
Ag∈T AG(1− ω
t
s(Ag)) ≤ ϕ
t
j.
Theorem 23. The optimization problem of removing redundant tentative agreements
is NP-complete.
Proof. We show that the problem is NP-complete by formulating the problem as a
0-1 Knapsack problem, which is well known to be NP-complete.
159
Formal definition of 0-1 Knapsack problem: There is a knapsack of capacity c > 0
and N items. Each item has value vi > 0 and weight wi > 0. Find the selection
of items (δi = 1 if selected, 0 if not) that fit,
∑N
i=1 δiwi ≤ c, and the total value,∑N
i=1 δivi, is maximized.
The set of tentative agreements T AGtj = {Ag1, . . . , AgN} can be treated as items.
The value of each item Agi is defined as the penalty if a decommits from the agree-
ment, i.e., vi = ρ(Prc(Agi),Tm(Agi), t, λ). The weight of each item Agi is defined
as the probability that Agi will not be decommited by a’s trading partner, i.e.,
wi = 1 − ω
t
s(Agi). The capacity of the knapsack is defined as c = ϕ
t
j. δi = 1
implies that Agi will be not decommited by agent a.
The constraint of the optimization problem can be rewritten as the exact con-
straint
∑N
i=1 δiwi ≤ c of the 0-1 Knapsack problem. The optimization formula can be
rewritten as
min
N∑
i=1
(1− δi)vi =
N∑
i=1
vi +min
N∑
i=1
−δivi
which is equivalent to
max
N∑
i=1
δivi
Thus, the optimization problem can be formulated as a 0-1 Knapsack problem
and it’s NP-complete.
A simple greedy approximation algorithm is used to compute the set of agreements
which will not be decommited by a (Algorithm 5) [44]: first sort all the tentative
agreements T AGtj by decreasing ratio of penalty to probability that an agreement
will not be decommited by a’s trading partners, then greedily pick agreements in this
order (starting from the first agreement) until when adding a new agreement will
violate the constraint of the maximum expected number of final agreements. For a
removed agreement Ag ∈ T AGtj , a decommits from the agreement; otherwise, a sends
the agent s a proposal worse than φts→a.
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Algorithm 5: Decommit from unnecessary agreements
Input: Tentative agreement set T AGtj.
Output: Tentative agreement set T AGtj satisfying the constraint of the
maximum number of final agreements.
1: Sort all the tentative agreements T AGtj by decreasing ratio of ρ(Prc(Agi),
Tm(Ag), t, λ) to 1− ωts(Ag).
2: Set T AG = ∅, i = 1, and Ag be the ith agreement in T AGtj .
3: while
∑
Ag′∈(T AG+Ag)(1− ω
t
s(Ag
′)) ≤ ϕtj do
4: Add Ag into T AG;
5: i++, and let Ag be the ith agreement in T AGtj;
6: end while
7: return T AG
5.4 Empirical evaluation and analysis
In this section, we first detail the methodology for analyzing the performance of
the developed negotiation strategies. We then proceed to the actual empirical study
of the proposed strategies. Finally, some properties of our negotiation strategies are
analyzed.
5.4.1 The methodology
To evaluate the performance of negotiation agents, a simulation testbed consist-
ing of a virtual e-Marketplace, a society of trading agents and a controller was im-
plemented using JAVA. The controller generates agents, randomly determines their
parameters (e.g., their roles as buyers or sellers, set of resources they provide or ac-
quire, initial prices, reserve prices, deadlines), simulates the entrance of agents to the
virtual e-Marketplace, and handles message passing and payment transfer.
5.4.1.1 Agent design
While there has been a lot of research in agent-mediated negotiation [70, 81, 90],
most work focuses either on bilateral multi-issue negotiation (e.g., [49, 50, 51, 80,
81, 82, 133]) or single issue one-to-many negotiation (e.g., [13, 14, 28, 96, 97, 106]).
One exception is [130] which studies concurrent one-to-many negotiations for multiple
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resources. But in [130], an agent is assumed to know the reserve price of each resource.
Given that there is no existing negotiation agents dealing with our multi-resource
negotiation problem, for comparison reason, we implemented three other types of
buyers based on existing techniques for single resource negotiation and negotiation
with decommitment: 1) TDAs using a time-dependent strategy, 2) MTDAs using a
market based time-dependent strategy, and 3) ACMAs using an adaptive commitment
management strategy detailed in [130]. Experiments were carried out to study and
compare the performance of our buyer agents (HBAs, heuristic-based buyer agents)
with TDAs, MTDAs, and ACMAs.
TDAs,MTDAs and ACMAs adopt the strategy suggested by Nguyen and Jennings
[98] and make at most one tentative agreement for each resource. TDAs, MTDAs and
ACMAs use the same approach to determine the reserve price of each resource and use
existing single resource negotiation strategies for the negotiation for each resource.
The reserve price of resource Ij of each TDA (or MTDA and ACMA) is determined
by considering the distribution of the reserve price of resource Ij . Specifically, the
reserve price of resource Ij is proportional to its average reserve price. That is,
RP tj = RP
t
∫∞
−∞
fj(y)∑l
i=1
∫∞
−∞
fi(y)
where l is the number of resources (i.e., issues) to acquire.
Similar to HBAs, TDAs, MTDAs and ACMAs generate proposals using a time-
dependent negotiation decision function [48], which is widely used for designing ne-
gotiation agents (e.g., [13, 14, 48, 51, 97, 98, 124, 125, 127, 130]). However TDAs,
MTDAs and ACMAs adopts different concession making strategies, i.e., they take
different ε values. As HBAs, TDAs adopt the linear concession strategy, i.e., ε = 1.
In contrast, MTDAs take market competition into account when making proposals.
An MTDA’s parameter ε for concession making is adjusted in the following way:
while the number of sellers are less than the number of buyers, an MTDA chooses
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Table 5.2. Experimental settings
Input Data Possible Values
Market Type Favorable Balanced unfavorable
supply/demand 10:1, 5:1, 2:1 1:1 1:2, 1:5, 1:10
Market Density Sparse Moderate Dense
No. of agents 6− 35 36− 65 66− 95
Deadline Short Moderate Long
Tmax 10− 30 35− 55 60− 80
Resources/job Lower range Mid-range High range
l 1− 3 4− 6 7− 9
the conciliatory concession strategy by setting ε < 1. Otherwise, an MTDA uses
the conservative or linear concession strategy by setting ε ≥ 1. MTDAs’ adaptive
concession making strategy based on market competition has been shown to make
minimally sufficient concessions in single resource negotiation [125]. ACMAs use the
adaptive commitment management strategy used in [130] for each single resource ne-
gotiation. Specifically, ACMAs use a fuzzy decision making approach for deriving
adaptive commitment management strategy profiles of buyers. The value of ε of a
resource is determined dynamically at each round using fuzzy rules.
Each seller agent in the market randomly chooses a negotiation strategy from
the set of alternations outlined in [48]: the time-dependent function (linear, con-
ceder, conservative) and the behavior-dependent function (e.g., tit-for-tat). Each
seller agent can only make at most one tentative agreement and it will decommit
from an agreement if and only if it can benefit from the decommitment.
5.4.1.2 Experimental settings
In the experiments, agents were subjected to different market densities, market
types, deadlines, number of resources to acquire or sell, and supply/demand ratio of
each resource (see Table 5.2). Both market density and market type depend on the
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probability of generating an agent in each round and the probability of the agent
being a buyer (or a seller). When the number of agents are in the range of 6 − 35
(respectively, 36− 65 and 66− 95), the market is sparse (respectively, moderate and
dense). The lifespan of an agent in the e-market, i.e., its deadline, is randomly selected
from [10, 80]. The range of [10, 80] for deadline was adopted based on experimental
tuning and agents’ behaviors. In our experimental setting, we found that: 1) for
a very short deadline (< 10), very few agents could complete deals, and 2) for a
deadlines longer than 80, there was little or no difference in the performance of agents.
Hence, for the purpose of experimentation, a deadline between the range of 10 − 30
(respectively, 35 − 55 and 60 − 80) is considered as short (respectively, moderate
and long). Each buyer may have different number of resources to acquire through
negotiation. The number of resources each job (or task) needs is randomly selected
from 1 to 9, where 1 − 3 (respectively, 4 − 6 and 7 − 9) is considered as lower range
(respectively, mid-range and upper range). The value of ε (eagerness) is randomly
generated from [0.1, 8] as it was found that when ε > 8 (respectively, ε < 0.1), there
was little or no difference in performance of agents.
Each resource’s demand (i.e., the number of buyers who want to buy the resource)
may not be equal to its supply (i.e., the number of sellers who want to sell the re-
source). If one buyer is negotiating for multiple resources, there are two situations:
1) All the resources have the same supply/demand ratio. From a buyer agent’s per-
spective, for a favorable (respectively, an unfavorable) market, the supply is much
higher (respectively, lower) than the demand. 2) The resources have different sup-
ply/demand ratios. Then the range and variance of resources’ supply/demand ratios
will affect agents’ performance. All our discussions of supply/demand ratio implicitly
assume that the supply/demand ratio of each resource is randomly chosen.
There are four kinds of buyers (i.e., HBA, TDA, andMTDA, ACMA) and different
kinds of sellers. The number of buyers (or sellers) of each kind is decided in a random
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Table 5.3. Performance Measure
Success Rate Rsuc = Nsuccess/Ntotal
Expected Utility Uexp = (
∑Ntotal
i=1 Ui)/Ntotal
Agreement per ResourceAGaver =
∑Ntotal
i=1
∑ISi
j=1A
j
i
∑Ntotal
i=1 ISi
Rate of Recovery from
Decommitment
RRaver =
SDtotal
Dtotal
Message per Resource Maver =
∑Ntotal
i=1
∑ISi
j=1M
j
i
∑Ntotal
i=1 ISi
Ntotal Total number of runs
Nsuccess No. of runs that reached consensus
Ui Utility of the i
th run
ISi The number of resources in the i
th run
Aji The number of tentative agreement for resource j in
the ith run
M ji The number of messages for resource j in the i
th run
Dtotal The number of runs in which one resource’s tentative
agreements were all decommited
SDtotal The number of runs in which negotiation is success-
ful after one resource’s tentative agreements were all
decommited
way. Without loss of generality, we assume that, there is at least one agent for each
kind of agent.
5.4.1.3 Performance measure
We use a number of performance measures in the experiments (Table 5.3). An-
alyzing agents’ utility can provide insights into how effective a strategy is. Since
negotiation outcomes of each agent are uncertain (i.e., there are two possibilities:
eventually reaching a consensus or not reaching a consensus), it seems more prudent
to use expected utility for all runs (rather than expected utility for all successful runs)
as a performance measure. For ease of analysis, agent a’s utility ua (defined in Sec-
tion 5.2.2) is normalized in each experiment in the following way: u′a = ua/|RPa−IPa|,
which implies that u′a ≤ 1 if not considering the penalty a received from sellers. This
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Table 5.4. Experimental results for 106 runs (performance measures are defined in
Table 5.3)
Strategy Uexp Rsuc AGaver RRaver Maver
HBA 0.206 0.59 1.34 478
1356
= 0.35 86
HBA-1 0.153 0.58 1.27 597
2389
= 0.25 91
HBA-2 0.111 0.50 1.33 835
3134
= 0.27 89
HBA-3 0.144 0.43 0.63 3052
8945
= 0.34 88
HBA-12 0.135 0.47 1.23 2933
9578
= 0.31 92
HBA-13 0.144 0.42 0.63 2704
9362
= 0.29 88
HBA-23 0.087 0.35 0.59 3171
10489
= 0.30 84
ACMA 0.033 0.27 0.59 3737
13347
= 0.28 85
MTDA 0.021 0.25 0.57 4423
15584
= 0.28 84
TDA 0.019 0.25 0.72 9200
33459
= 0.27 86
normalization is the same for agents with different strategies. It was pointed out in
[70, 129] that in addition to optimizing agents’ overall utility, enhancing the success
rate is also an important evaluation criterion for designing negotiation agents.
In addition to the expected utility and success rate, it’s necessary to compare
the number of messages sent and received by each buyer during negotiation. As
the number of resources each buyer is acquiring may be different at each time, it’s
intuitive to compare the number of messages sent or accepted for each resource. As an
agent may make more than one tentative agreement for each resource, measuring the
average number of tentative agreements for each resource is also important. During
negotiation, it’s possible that all of one agent’s tentative agreements for one resource
are decommited by its trading partners and thus an agent’s ability to recover from such
situation is extremely important. Therefore, we also record and compare the number
of cases where an agent makes a final agreement after all its tentative agreements for
one resource are decommited by its trading partners.
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5.4.1.4 Results
A “matched-pair” study was conducted to evaluate the performance of HBAs, as
compared with TDAs, MTDAs, and ACMAs. At the beginning of each run (experi-
ment), the controller of the testbed will generate all the agents and set the parameters
of all the agents according to the experimental setting, e.g., the number of agents,
the supply/demand ratio of each resource, etc. Among all the buyers, there are some
target buyers, one for each negotiation strategy we want to compare. All the target
agents at each run have the same properties. For example, when we want to compare
the performance of HBAs with TDAs, MTDAs, and ACMAs, we create one target
HBA, one target TDA, one targetMTDA and one target ACMA, which have the same
properties (e.g., the set of resources to acquire, the reserve price, the initial price)
except that they use different negotiation strategies. Then all the agents negotiate
and compete with each other. At the end of this experiment, the controller will record
the experimental results for each target agent, which will be averaged and analyzed
on a large number of runs.
Extensive stochastic simulations were carried out for all the combinations of mar-
ket density, market type and other agents’ characterizations. All the values of differ-
ent performance measures were averaged based on more than 106 runs. In addition,
we tried different decommitment deadlines and penalties functions. Even though
experiments were carried out for all the situations, due to space limitations, only rep-
resentative results are presented in this section. For the empirical results presented
in this section, the market is of moderate density, λ = 4 is chosen as the decommit-
ment period and the penalty function is 0.06 × Prc(Ag) × ((t′ − t)/λ)1/2. λ = 4 is
chosen based on the value of negotiation deadline. The shortest negotiation deadline
is 10 in our experiments and setting a decommitment period shorter than negotia-
tion deadline is reasonable. As in [5, 98], we choose a penalty function in which the
penalty increases with the contract price and the period between agreement making
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and decommiting. The multiplier 0.06 in the penalty function is chosen to make the
decommitment penalty smaller than the contracting price. In the sensitivity analysis
section (Section 5.4.2.6), we discussed the effect of changing the decommitment pe-
riod and the penalty function. We also found that the confidence interval for each
reported value is not wider than 0.001, which is negligible as compared with each
value. Therefore, the experimental results can be trusted, which is mainly due to the
large sample size.
5.4.2 Observations
5.4.2.1 Observation 1
HBA agents use three heuristics: Heuristic 1 (Section 5.3.2) is used to decide the
deadline for each resource; Heuristic 2 (Section 5.3.3) is used to make a proposal for
each resource in which the reserve price of each resource is dynamically chosen based
on current market dynamics; Heuristic 3 (Section 5.3.4) is used to decide the number
of tentative agreements to be made for each resource. Is it possible that a buyer in
fact can get better negotiation performance by just using one or two heuristics? To
verify that agents can get better negotiation performance by using all three heuristics
simultaneously, we also compare the performance of HBAs with a special kind of
buyers (called HBA-s here) which only use part of the heuristics used by HBAs. When
a HBA doesn’t use heuristic 2, it will use MTDAs’ strategy to make proposals. When
a HBA doesn’t use heuristic 3, it makes at most one tentative agreement for each
resource. HBA-1 s are HBAs which don’t use heuristic 1 and HBA-12 s are HBAs
which don’t use heuristic 1 and heuristic 2. HBA-123 s are equivalent to MTDAs.
Table 5.4 shows the performance of TDAs, MTDAs, ACMAs, HBAs, and different
types of HBA-s which only use part of HBAs’ three heuristics.
From column 2 of Table 5.4, we can find that HBAs gain a higher expected utility
Uexp than agents using other strategies. We also found that HBA-s get higher utilities
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than ACMAs, MTDAs, and TDAs. In addition, heuristic 2 seems more important
than the other two heuristics. HBA-2 s’ expected utility is lower than that of HBA-
1 s and HBA-3 s. The average utility of HBA-s when HBA-s don’t use heuristic 2 is
(0.111 + 0.135 + 0.087)/3 = 0.111. The average utility of HBA-s when HBA-s don’t
use heuristic 1 is (0.153 + 0.135 + 0.144)/3 = 0.144. The average utility of HBA-s
when HBA-s don’t use heuristic 3 is (0.144 + 0.144 + 0.087)/3 = 0.125. Therefore,
HBA-s will get lower utility when they don’t use heuristic 2, as compared with not
using either heuristic 1 or heuristic 3. In the same way, we can conclude that heuristic
3 is more important than heuristic 1. However, the above observations are based on
the averaged results in all scenarios and they don’t suggest that the heuristic 1 is
more important than the other two heuristics in every specific scenario. When the
supply/demand ratio of all the resources has a large variance, the average utility of
HBA-s when HBA-s don’t use heuristic 1 (respectively, heuristic 2 and heuristic 3) is
0.101 (respectively, 0.107 and 0.114 ), which implies that heuristic 1 is more important
than the other two heuristics in this specific context. For all the values in columns 2
and 3, a t-test analysis with confidence level 95% was carried out and the difference
between every two different values for the same performance is significant.
Column 3 of Table 5.4 shows that HBAs have higher success rates Rsuc than agents
using other strategies and HBA-s have higher success rates than ACMAs, MTDAs,
and TDAs. In addition, heuristic 3 is more important than the other two heuristics
from the perspective of achieving a higher success rate. This observation is intuitive
since without using heuristic 3, each buyer makes only one tentative agreement and
its probability of making a final agreement will be low if one or more trading partner
decommits from an agreement. For the same reason, from column 4 of Table 5.4, we
can see that HBAs have the highest number AGaver of tentative agreements for each
resource. HBA-s using heuristic 3 have more tentative agreements than HBA-s not
using heuristic 3 which make at most one tentative agreement for each resource.
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HBAs’ number of runs in which all tentative agreements are decommited is lower
than all other kinds of buyers (see column 5 of Table 5.4). The recovery rate RRaver of
HBAs is also higher than the recovery rate of other kinds of buyers. For example, the
recovery rate RRaver of HBAs is
478
1356
= 0.35 indicating that there were 1356 situations
in which all the tentative agreements for one resource were decommited and 476 of the
situations in which the agent made a final agreement. This observation corresponds
with the intuition that HBAs are good at organizing and balancing the multi-resource
negotiation. It’s not surprising that HBAs will send more messages during negotiation
as it may make more than one tentative agreement for each resource, which is mainly
due to the use of heuristic 3. However, HBAs’ average number Maver of messages
transferred for each resource is less than 3% higher than that of all other kinds of
agents.
5.4.2.2 Observation 2
Our negotiation strategy uses the estimation of sellers’ probability of decommit-
ment. The decommitment probability is an approximation of the real probability,
which is unknown to the buyer. It’s impossible to justify our estimated “probabil-
ities” with theory without making strong assumptions about knowing other agents’
private information. Moreover, a seller’s probability of decommiting from a tenta-
tive agreement is determined by many factors, e.g., its deadline, reserve price, its
negotiation situation, which is unknown to a buyer.
Here we use an empirical approach to verify the accuracy of HBAs’ estimation of
decommitment probabilities. More specifically, HBAs’ estimation of decommitment
probabilities are compared with their trading partners’ real decommiting actions dur-
ing negotiation. Assume HBAs made n predictions <ωts(Ag1), . . . , ω
t
s(Agn)> for tenta-
tive agreements <Ag1, . . . , Agn> throughout all the experiments in which ω
t
s(Agi) is a
HBA’s predicted probability that its trading partner s will decommit from the agree-
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Figure 5.2. Prediction accuracy of HBAs
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ment Agi. Then HBAs’ accuracy of predicting decommiting probabilities is given
by:
AP =
∑
1≤i≤nAP (ω
t
s(Agi))
n
where
AP (ωts(Agi)) =


ωts(Agi) if s decommits from Agi
1− ωts(Agi) otherwise
The average prediction accuracy in more than 106 runs is 0.774. Figure 5.2 shows
the factors affecting the prediction accuracy. First, the prediction accuracy increases
with the increase of HBAs’ deadlines (Figure 5.2(a)). This result is intuitive as, with
the increase of deadline, negotiation agents have longer time to interact with other
agents. Then agents have a better understanding of the market and thus agents can
make more precise predictions. Second, the prediction accuracy decreases with the
increase of supply/demand ratio when all resources have the same supply/demand
ratio (Figure 5.2(b)). When the supply/demand ratio is low, HBAs face high pressure
of competition and decommitment is more likely to happen for each tentative agree-
ment. As a consequence, it’s more difficult to make a precise prediction. Finally, the
prediction accuracy changes little with the change of the number of resources (Fig-
ure 5.2(c)). This observation is also intuitive as, a seller’s decommitment decision is
only affected by the agreement price, its reserve price and market competition. It has
nothing to do with the negotiation status of other resources.
Our function of decommitment probability is based on our intuitions about which
factors affect agents’ decision to decommitment. The parameter ϑ = 0.68 is a pa-
rameter of the function for computing trading partners’ decommitment probabilities,
which is based on experimental tuning. With the experimental tuning, we were able
to get 77.4% accuracy averaged over all environments. However, it is unclear to
us whether we can get a better result considering that HBAs do not know other
agents’ strategies nor their exact reserve prices. On a more positive note, our heuris-
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tic function performs in ways that would be expected. For instance, when a HBA’s
uncertainty reduces (e.g., change the distribution of sellers’ reserve prices), it gains
higher prediction accuracy. A reasonable prediction approach should have the prop-
erty that the prediction accuracy increases with the decrease of uncertainty which our
approach does. Although we can reduce uncertainty in the market and thus get higher
prediction accuracy, our experiments will become less interesting. In addition, it’s
impractical to assume that agents have (almost) complete information about others.
Sim et al. [128, 130] also proposed a function for evaluating a trading partner’s
decommiting probability, which are used by ACMAs and achieved an average 38%
accuracy in all the scenarios. Although the function in [130] appears to be simpler as
it only considers the prices of the proposals it has received, it is noted that [130] did
not make the assumption that an agent has knowledge of the number of competitors.
In contrast, our function takes both market competition and the trading partner’s
satisfaction of agreements based on each agent’s knowledge about 1) the number of
trading competitors and 2) the reserve price of each trading partner.
5.4.2.3 Observation 3
The experimental results in Figure 5.3 show that: 1) Negotiation results become
more favorable with the increase of the deadline for all kinds of buyers. With short
(respectively, long) deadlines, different kinds of agents have equally insufficient (re-
spectively, sufficient) time to optimize their agreements. 2) Given the same deadline,
HBAs achieved higher utilities than ACMAs, MTDAs, and TDAs. 3) The advantages
of HBAs over MTDAs and TDAs decreases when the market becomes more favorable.
Experimental results in Figure 5.4 indicate that the success rate of HBAs are
always higher than that of ACMAs, MTDAs, and TDAs. However, this advantage
decreases when the market become more favorable. In addition, with the increase
of deadline, agents’ success rates have a large increase at the beginning and slightly
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Figure 5.3. Deadline and expected utility
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Figure 5.4. Deadline and success rate
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Figure 5.5. Number of resources and expected utility
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Figure 5.6. Number of resources and success rate
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Figure 5.7. Supply/demand ratio and expected utility
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Figure 5.8. Supply/demand ratio and success rate
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decrease when the deadlines are long. When agents have long deadlines, agents have
more time to bargain with other agents and seek good agreements with the increase of
deadlines. Since agents use time-dependent strategies, buyers with longer deadlines
are inclined to make less concessions at each time as agents will prefer to propose
their reserve prices when their deadlines approach. Thus, buyers will become more
patient and will not accept proposals which are not favorable enough while considering
their future opportunities to make better agreements. Therefore, buyers with longer
deadlines will fail to make agreements with some sellers, especially sellers with shorter
deadlines. Although buyers’ success rates decrease with the increase of deadlines when
deadlines are relatively long, buyers’ utilities increase with the increase of deadlines.
This is because buyers will set higher expectation about the agreements with the
increase of deadlines. Thus, the agreements made by buyers with longer deadlines are
more favorable as compared with agreements made by buyers with shorter deadlines.
5.4.2.4 Observation 4
From Figure 5.5 we can see that, as the number of resources to be acquired
increases, the utilities of all kinds of agents decrease. That is because, with the
increase of the number of resources each agent acquires, it’s harder to manage all
the negotiations and the probability that the overall negotiation fails increases, which
directly correlates with the decreased success rates in the strategies explored here.
HBAs always achieved higher utilities than ACMAs, MTDAs, and TDAs.
Experimental results in Figure 5.6 indicate that the success rate of HBAs are
always higher than that of ACMAs, MTDAs, and TDAs. However, this advantage
decreases when agents have longer deadlines as in this case, all agents have enough
time to negotiate for agreements. Agents’ success rate decreases significantly as a
small number of resources (e.g., 1 or 2). With more resources, it’s more difficult for
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buyers to manage and establish agreements for all resources because of the difficulties
of managing all the negotiation threads.
5.4.2.5 Observation 5
It can be observed from Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 that HBAs always get higher
utilities (respectively, success rates) than ACMAs, MTDAs, and TDAs when all re-
sources have the same supply/demand ratios. Additionally, when the supply/demand
ratio is high (e.g., 10), the average utilities of the three types of agents are close espe-
cially in the long deadline case since agents have many choices and can easily switch
from one agreement to another agreement, i.e., there is limited space to optimize
the agreements. The advantage of HBAs in success rate decreases when agents have
longer deadlines. Since buyer agents with different strategies compete with each
other, it is possible that one strategy achieved much better negotiation results than
another strategy in a specific market. Due the strategic interaction among agents,
one strategy may achieve a good performance in only certain markets. In Figure 7
we can see that when the ratio is in the range 0.5-0.7, MTDAs achieved very low
utilities as compared with the utilities when the ratio less than 0.5 or higher than
0.7. When the ratio is in the range 0.5-0.7, HBAs achieved higher utility than that
when the ratio less than 0.5 or higher than 0.7. When the supply/demand ratio is
very low (e.g., 0.2-0.4), it is difficult for an agent to get agreements, thus all different
strategies achieved low utilities. When the supply/demand ratio are slightly low (e.g.,
0.5-0.7), some HBAs may make agreements for all required resources. An MTDA can
also make agreements for some of its resources using its market-driven concession
strategy. However, since MTDAs are lacking of the ability of coordinating their ne-
gotiation for multiple resources. They often can only satisfy part of their resources.
Therefore, when the whole negotiation failes, an MTDA either pays a lot of penalties
to decommit from its agreements or pays for some final agreements which have not
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been decommited. Accordingly, MTDAs often get negative utilities. When MTDAs
decommit from agreements, HBAs have a better chance to make new agreements in
this situation. The experimental results also show that when the supply/demand is
in the range 0.5-0.7, MTDAs made more agreements (including both tentative and
final) than TDAs and ACMAs but the success rate of MTDAs is not higher than that
of TDAs and ACMAs. When the market is almost balanced (e.g., the supply/demand
is in the range of 0.8-1), it is easier for MTDAs to make agreements which can satisfy
their resource requirements and their utilities are much higher than that when the
supply/demand is in the range 0.5-0.7.
5.4.2.6 Sensitivity analysis
We also did additional experiments to explore how sensitive are our experimental
results to changes of the parameters of our experimental environments or assumptions
about our negotiation model.
1) With the increase of penalty, the average utility of agents including HBAs
decreases. For example, when we double the penalty fee, the average utility of HBAs
is decreased by 7%. The main reason is that with a higher penalty, a buyer is more
likely to commit to an early agreement, which may have a low utility value. When
the penalty fee is low, a buyer will decommit from an early agreement and make a
new agreement with a higher utility value. Similarly, each seller is also more likely
to stick to an early agreement when the penalty is high. HBAs always have better
performance than other types of buyers when using different penalty functions.
2) With the increase of decommitment period λ, the average utility of agents in-
cluding HBAs decreases. For instance, when we set a decommitment period λ = 6
instead of 4, the average utility of HBAs is decreased by 8%. With a longer decom-
mitment period, the probability that an agreement will be decommited will increase,
and thus the probability that a buyer will get a final agreement decreases. However,
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the advantage of HBAs over other types of buyers increases with the increase of the
decommitment period λ as buyers like ACMAs, MTDAs, and TDAs make at most
one tentative agreement for each resource.
3) When agents have more accurate information about other agents, agents in-
cluding HBAs achieved better performance. This chapter assume that a buyer knows
the probability distribution of sellers’ reserve prices and the number of competitors.
We find that that the accuracy of this information does have an effect on agents’ ne-
gotiation performance. When a buyer’s knowledge becomes less accurate, its utility
decreases. For example, when the believed number of competitors is less than half
of the actual number of competitors, the average utility of HBAs is 7% lower than
that of HBAs knowing the actual number of competitors. However, even with this
level incorrect information, HBAs still achieved better performance than other types
of agents.
4) While keeping the supply/demand ratio of each resource constant, market den-
sity has little effect on agents’ performance. In a moderate density market, agents’
average utilities are 2% lower than that in a market of dense density and are 1%
higher than that in a market of sparse density.
5.4.3 Analysis of properties
Typically, agents use a monotonic concession protocol by insisting on their previ-
ous proposals or raising/reducing their proposals monotonically until an agreement is
reached. In a dynamic negotiation environment, market competition and agents’ eval-
uation may change over time, protocols that are not monotonic may achieve higher
average utilities. Negotiation agents in this chapter make a proposal based on market
situation and the negotiation situations of other threads. Therefore, the proposed
negotiation protocol is not monotonic.
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In a favorable market, there are fewer competitors and more trading partners.
Hence, an agent has stronger bargaining power and doesn’t need to make large con-
cessions. In an unfavorable market, an agent experiences more competition, and
it may attempt to make more concessions. With respect to competition, an agent
strives to avoid making large concessions in favorable markets or making too large
concessions in unfavorable markets. Additionally, when the expected number of final
agreements is high, an agent is inclined to make less concession as it only needs one
final agreement.
Property 24. Agents will make less concession with the increase of the expected
number of final agreements when the worst possible utility doesn’t increase.
Take the resource Ij for example. The number of agreements has no effect on
the expected agreement price ̟tj. As the worst possible utility doesn’t increase, the
conflict probability χtj will not increase. γ(T AG
t
j) will decrease with the expected
number of final agreements ϕ(T AGtj). Therefore, the reserve price of resource Ij will
decrease and thus agents will make less concession.
Property 25. Agents will make less (respectively, more) concession with the increase
of the number of trading partners (respectively, competitors).
Take resource Ij for example. The number of trading partners has no effect on
γ(T AGtj). With the increase of trading partners, χ
t
j will not increase and ̟
t
j will
also not increase. Thus, the reserve price of resource Ij will not increase and thus
agents make less concessions. Similarly, with the increase of trading competitors, ̟tj
will decrease. Thus, the reserve price of resource Ij will increase and thus agents will
make more concession.
Property 26. When competition is high and penalty is very low, agents may make
agreements with all the trading partners.
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Take resource Ij for example. The decommitment probability increases with the
increase of competition. As the penalty is very low, an agent with more tentative
agreements won’t pay too much penalty when it has to decommit from some tentative
agreements. An extreme situation is that the agent can even make agreements with
all the trading partners.
From Properties 2 and 3 we can learn that the market competition places an
important role on deciding the amount of concessions and the number of tentative
agreements. With respect to competition, a negotiation agent decides the maximum
number of agreements. In a favorable market, there are fewer competitors and more
trading partners. Hence, an agent doesn’t need to make many agreements (conces-
sions, respectively). In an unfavorable market, an agent’s bargaining power decreases
as it experiences more competition, and it may attempt to make more agreements
(concessions, respectively) as its trading partners are more likely to decommit from
agreements.
One possible strategy is to make agreements later and thus potentially a buyer
will pay less decommitment penalties given that the penalty will increase with time.
However, “delaying” agreements will also increase the probability that the whole ne-
gotiation fails. In addition, generally a buyer will increase its offering price gradually
and it is possible that it can get some resources with a cheap price in the early ne-
gotiation stages. While taking the “delaying” strategy, the buyer will miss those
cheap resources and buy expensive resources in a later time. Another disadvantage
of delaying agreements is that the buyer may fail to get all resources when one seller
decommits from agreements when the deadline is approaching. In our model, no
agent can decommit from an agreement after a fixed time period based on when the
agreement was made. Accordingly, making agreements earlier can potentially avoid
negotiation’s “collapsing” at the last minute. We examined agents’ performance when
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they choose delaying agreements and found that such strategic “delaying” do not im-
prove agents’ performance.
As a result of this extensive empirical analysis, we have verified that the negoti-
ation strategy for multi-resource acquisitions is both very effective in comparison to
existing approaches and behaves in a consistent and appropriate manner as important
characteristics of the marketplace are varied.
5.5 Summary
This chapter presents the design and implementation of negotiation agents that
negotiate for multiple resources where agents don’t know the reserve price of each
resource and are allowed to decommit from existing agreements. The contributions
of this chapter include: 1) To avoid the risk of the “collapse” of the overall nego-
tiation due to failing to acquire some scarce resources, negotiation agents have the
flexibility to adjust the deadline for different resources based on market competition,
which allows agents to response to uncertainties in resource planning. 2) Each agent
utilizes a time-dependent strategy in which the reserve price of each resource is dy-
namically determined by considering (conflict probability), expected agreement price,
and expected number of final agreements. 3) As agents are permitted to decommit
from agreements, an agent can make more than one agreement for each resource and
the maximum number of agreements is constrained by the market situation. 4) An
extensive set of experiments were carried out and the experiments results show that
each of the proposed heuristics contributes to improve agents’ performance and our
proposed approach achieved better negotiation results than representative samples of
existing negotiation strategies.
The experimental results showed that HBAs achieved better negotiation results
(higher expected utilities and higher success rates) than ACMAs, MTDAs, and TDAs.
Moreover, it’s better for HBAs to use all the three heuristics together as each heuris-
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tic has different features. The heuristic for proposal creation seems more important
than the other two heuristics. From our experimental results we can see that, when
the negotiation environment is either very “tough” (i.e., short deadline, high compe-
tition, and more resource to negotiate) or very “favorable” (i.e., long deadline, less
competition, and less resource to negotiate), HBAs did not significantly outperform
MTDAs and TDAs. That is because in a “tough” market, all the agents have little
opportunity for making individual agreements, and thus it’s very hard to find a good
set of agreements that satisfy all the resource requirements. In contrast, in a very
“favorable” market, agents can easily make good agreement set. It is in the middle
ground that you see the significant advantage of our approach.
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CHAPTER 6
NEGOTIATION WITH DECOMMITMENT FOR
DYNAMIC RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN CLOUD
COMPUTING
We consider the problem of allocating networked resources in dynamic environ-
ment, such as cloud computing platforms, where providers strategically price resources
to maximize their utility. Resource allocation in these environments, where both
providers and consumers are selfish agents, presents numerous challenges since the
number of consumers and their resource demand is highly dynamic. While numerous
auction-based approaches have been proposed in the literature, this work explores
an alternative approach where providers and consumers automatically negotiate re-
source leasing contracts. Since resource demand and supply can be dynamic and
uncertain, we propose a distributed negotiation mechanism where agents negotiate
over both a contract price and a decommitment penalty, which allows agents to de-
commit from contracts at a cost. We compare our approach experimentally, using
representative scenarios and workloads, to both combinatorial auctions and the fixed-
price model used by Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud, and show that the negotiation
model achieves a higher social welfare. Different from designing negotiation strategies
to maximize an agent’s utility in the previous chapter, the focus in this chapter is
designing a mechanism to maximize the social welfare (i.e., the sum of all agents’
utilities). The cloud computing resource allocation problem in this chapter is dif-
ferent from the resource allocation problem in the previous chapter in a number of
aspects. For instance, a seller can sell multiple resources to a buyer and thus the
buyer needs to consider different “plans” (each plan specifies the set of resources to
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buy from different sellers) to satisfy its resource requirement. In addition, sellers need
to provide resources during a fixed time period. These differences lead to the need
for new approaches that were not considered in the Chapter 5. Before introducing
the cloud computing problem and our resource allocation mechanism, we first discuss
the idea of negotiating over penalty and its advantages.
6.1 Negotiation Over Decommitment Penalty
In automated negotiation systems for self-interested agents, contracts have tradi-
tionally been binding and do not allow agents to efficiently deal with future events in
the environment. Sandholm and Lesser [121] proposed leveled-commitment contracts
which allow an agent to be freed from an existing contract at the cost of simply pay-
ing a penalty to the other contract party. A self-interested agent will be reluctant to
decommit because the other contract party might decommit, in which case the former
agent gets freed from the contract, does not incur a penalty, and collects a penalty
from the other party. Despite such strategic decommiting, leveled-commitment in-
creases the expected payoffs of all contract parties and can enable deals that are
impossible under full commitment [121]. This approach has been applied in a num-
ber of different applications [5, 11, 97, 98].
In leveled-commitment contracting, both contract parties strategically choose
their level of commitment based on the contract price and decommitment penalty
which are determined prior to the start of the decommiting game. The efficiency of
leveled-commitment contracting depends on how the contract price and decommit-
ment penalty are set. In Sandholm et al.’s model of leveled-commitment contracts
[116, 121, 122], both the contract prices and decommitment penalties are assumed
to be known to the contract parties before the decommiting game. Although algo-
rithms are provided to optimize the social welfare of the equilibrium outcome [116],
the optimization is not for the favor of each contract party. In existing applications
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(e.g., [5, 11, 97, 98]) of automated negotiation with decommitment, decommitment
penalties are set by third parties (e.g., system designers) and are either fixed or a
function of contract prices.
Negotiating simultaneously over contract prices and decommitment penalties is
appropriate for several reasons. First, it is difficult for system designers to decide
optimal contract prices and decommitment penalties to maximize the social welfare,
especially when there are multiple agents and agents have incomplete information. It
is also intractable to compute agents’ rational equilibrium strategies in many practical
sequential games. Furthermore, it is not appropriate to assume that system designers
have complete knowledge about agents in the system. Finally, a selfish agent may
feel it is advantageous for it to decide the contract price and penalty by itself. When
agents are allowed to negotiate over penalties, each agent has a larger strategy space
which gives it more options for how to react to the current situation and it may be
able to achieve a utility which cannot be achieved when it is not allowed to negotiate
over penalty.
This section analyzes agents’ strategic behavior in the bilateral contracting game
prior to the decommiting game to make agreements on a contract and a decommiting
penalty. One selfish contract party may prefer another pair of contract price and
decommiting penalty to the contract price and decommitment penalty which max-
imize the social welfare. The leveled-commitment contracting we propose includes
two games: a contracting game where the two parties bargain over contract price
and decommitment penalty and a decommiting game in which the two agents make
strategically decommiting decisions. During the decommiting game, agents will make
optimal decommiting decisions while taking into account the contract price and de-
commitment penalty previously agreed upon. Therefore, in the contracting game,
each agent will try to make the best contract price and penalty which will maximize
its utility in the decommiting game.
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As in [116, 121, 122], we consider a contracting setting with two risk neutral agents
who attempt to maximize their own expected payoff: contractor b who pays to get
a task done, and contractee s who gets paid for handling the task. The setting can
be interpreted as modeling a variety of scenarios, for example bargaining between
a buyer and a seller in e-commerce. In our model, b and s negotiate over contract
price and decommitment penalty before additional offers (outside offers) from other
agents become available. Then they strategically choose to decommit or not when
their outside offers are available.
6.1.1 Leveled-commitment contracting
We study a setting where the future of agents involves uncertainty. We model this
as agents’ potentially receiving outside offers as in [116, 121, 122]. The contractor’s
outside offers could come from some other contractees which can provide the service
requested by the contractor. The contractor can make agreements with those con-
tractees in the future. The contractor’s best (lowest) outside offer v is characterized
by a probability density function f(v). The contractee’s best (highest) outside offer
w is characterized by a probability density function g(w). f(v) and g(w) are assumed
statistically independent and are common knowledge [116, 121, 122]. That is, both
agents have symmetric information as they both don’t know the value of v and w.
The contractor’s options are either to make a contract with the contractee or to
wait for future option v. Similarly, the contractee’s options are either to make a
contract with the contractor or to wait for future option w. The two agents could
make a full commitment contract at some price. Alternatively, they can make a
leveled-commitment contract which is specified by a contract price, ρ, and a decom-
mitment penalty q. If one agent decommits from the agreement, it needs to pay the
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penalty q to the other agent.1 When the decommitment penalty q is very large, a
leveled-commitment contract is equivalent to a full contract as no agent will choose to
decommit. Therefore, full commitment contracts are a subset of leveled-commitment
contracts.
One implicit assumption is that during the contracting game, the contractor can
only bargain with one contractee and the contractee can also only negotiate with one
contractor. The other assumption is that the bargaining game finishes before outside
options become available. Bargaining protocols can be used to control the length of
negotiation. Moreover, even if agents are allowed to conduct infinite time negotiation,
negotiation often stops soon since bargaining agents usually have deadline constraints
and often face bargaining costs.
The leveled-commitment contracting consists of two stages. In the first stage,
which we call the contracting game, the agents make agreements on both a contract
price and a decommiting penalty. In the second stage, which we call the decommiting
game, the agents decide on whether to decommit or not. Clearly, the equilibrium
of the decommiting game affects the agents’ preferences over contract prices and
decommitment penalties in the contracting game. There is no decommiting game if
agents make a null contract (i.e., no agreement is made) in the contracting game.
6.1.1.1 Contracting game
We consider the widely used one-shot protocol [111]. Formally, agent a ∈ {b, s}
makes an offer [ρ, q] where ρ is contract price and q is decommitment penalty. The
other agent aˆ can choose to 1) accept or 2) reject. If aˆ accepts the offer , the
1Our analysis can be easily extended to handle the setting where the penalties for the contractor
and the contractee are different. Setting different penalties for contractor and contractee only makes
it difficult to solve the decommitment game, which has been thoroughly analyzed in the work by
Sandholm et al. [121]. For the contracting game, a new variable will be added but the analysis will
be the same.
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bargaining outcome is [ρ, q]. Otherwise, the bargaining fails and the outcome is null
contract.
6.1.1.2 Decommiting game
The decommitting game happens only when the two agents make a leveled-
commitment contract [ρ, q]. In the decommiting game, each agent has exactly one
chance to decommit and there are different decommiting mechanisms depending on
who decommits first [116, 121, 122]: 1) contractee has to reveal its decision first; 2)
contractor has to reveal its decision first; and 3) agents reveal their decisions simulta-
neously. We consider the first decommiting mechanism, i.e., contractee takes actions
first and contractor moves next. The other mechanisms can be analyzed analogously.
6.1.2 Optimal contracts
Agents’ bargaining strategies in the contracting game are affected by the outcome
of the decommiting game: each agent wants to make theoptimal contract that maxi-
mizes its expected utility in the decommiting game. There may be multiple optimal
contracts or theoptimal contract may be the null contract.
We follow the same analysis as in [121] to compute agents’ optimal contracts.
Assume that the contract made during the contracting game is [ρ, q]. In a sequential
decommiting game where the contractee has to decommit first, if the contractee has
decommited, the contractor’s best move is not to decommit as q ≥ 0. In the subgame
where the contractee has not decommited, the contractor’s best move is to decommit
if −v − q > −ρ, i.e., the contractor decommits if its outside offer, v, is below a
threshold v∗ = ρ− q. So, the probability that it decommits is pb =
∫ v∗
−∞
f(v)dv.
The contractee gets w− q if it decommits, w+ q if it does not but the contractor
does, and ρ if neither decommits. Thus the contractee decommits if w − q > pb(w +
q)+(1−pb)ρ. When pb < 1 the inequality above shows that the contractee decommits
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if its outside offer exceeds a threshold w∗ = ρ+q(1+pb)/(1−pb). So, the probability
that it decommits is ps =
∫∞
w∗
g(w)dw.
Given agents’ equilibrium strategies under contract c = [ρ, q], b’s expected payoff
πb(c, f(v), g(w)) (πb(c, f, g) for short) is
ps
∫ ∞
−∞
(q−v)f(v)dv+ (1− ps)[
∫ v∗
−∞
−(v+ q)f(v)dv −
∫ ∞
v∗
ρf(v)dv]
The expected payoff πs(c, f, g) of contractee s is
∫ ∞
w∗
g(w)(w − q)dw +
∫ w∗
−∞
g(w)
[
pb(w + q) + (1− pb)ρ
]
dw
If agents fail to make a contract, an agent can wait for its best outside of-
fer. Thus, agents’ expected utilities under the null contract are πb(null, f, g) =∫∞
−∞
−f(v)vdv = −E(v) and πs(null, f, g) =
∫∞
−∞
g(w)wdw = E(w).
Based on this analysis developed previously by Sandholm et al. [116, 121, 122],
we now extend it to a contracting game and discuss agents’ optimal contracts when
agents negotiate over contract prices and decommitment penalties. We assume that
agents are individually rational (IR), i.e., no agent will accept a contract worse than
the null contract. A contract c is IR if it is individually rational for both agents.
Formally, the set C(f, g) of IR contracts based on agents’ beliefs f(v) and g(w) are
{c|πb(c, f, g) ≥ −E(v), πs(c, f, g) ≥ E(w)}
We assume that C(f, g) is not empty. The contract c∗b(f, g) (c
∗
s(f, g)) which maxi-
mizes the contractor’s (contractee’s) expected utility is the contractor’s (contractee’s)
optimal contract. Formally,
c∗b(f, g) = argmax
c∈C(f,g)
πb(c, f, g)
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c∗s(f, g) = argmax
c∈C(f,g)
πs(c, f, g)
Therefore, the utility a can get is in the range [πa(null, f, g), πa(c
∗
a(f, g), f, g)].
6.1.3 Efficiency of Negotiating Over Penalty in Two-player Game
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the efficiency of negotiating over penalty
in the two-player game considered by Sandholm et al. [116, 121, 122]. Each game is
characterized by contractor’s best (lowest) outside offer v is characterized by proba-
bility density functions f(v) and g(w). For each game, we compare the contracting
results when agents’ decommitment penalties are determined by negotiation and re-
sults where decommitment penalties are determined exogenously. While there are
many methods to exogenously set decommitment penalties [5, 11, 15, 97, 98], the
following two approaches are the most widely used: 1) fixed penalty independent of
contract prices and 2) penalty as a percentage of contract prices. We compare our
negotiation based approach with the above two approaches. For fixed penalty, the
penalty is chosen from {0, 10, 20, 40}. When the decommitment penalty is a percent-
age of a contract price, the rate is chosen from {0.1, 0.3, 0.5}, i.e., q = 0.1ρ, q = 0.3ρ
or q = 0.5ρ. Thus, there are 8 approaches to set penalties: 4 fixed penalty values, 4
penalty functions in which a penalty is a fraction of contract price, and the bargaining
approach. For the bargaining approach, one agent is randomly chosen to offer to the
other agent.
When the penalty is set exogenously, it is possible that two agents fail to make
an agreement whereas they can make an agreement while negotiating over penalty.
For instance, when both v and w are uniformly distributed between 30 and 90, the
two agents can make an agreement when they are negotiating over penalty. However,
they cannot make any agreement when the penalty is q = 40 or q = 0.5ρ for the
special distributions, no matter which agent is the offering agent.
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We extensively evaluated the average social welfare (i.e., the sum of both agents’
average utilities) of different mechanisms in a variety of settings. We found that the
negotiating over penalty achieved higher social welfare than other penalty setting
approaches. Figure 6.1 shows the performance of different mechanisms as well as
the maximum social welfare (which is achieved when the offering agent or a third
party chooses to maximize the social welfare rather than its utility) when f(v) and
g(w) are uniform distributions. f(v) is defined by [vmin, vmax] and g(w) is defined by
[wmin, wmax] where 1) 0 < vmin, vmax, wmin, wmax ≤ 100 and 2) vmax ≥ wmin. That
is, the outside offers v and w are in the range of (0, 100] with the constraint that the
contractor’s outside offer v is not always less than the contractee’s outside offer w.2
All values reported in Figure 6.1 is the average value in 10000 randomly generated
settings. We can see that negotiating over penalty achieved much higher utility than
other exogenous penalty setting mechanisms. It can also be seen from Figure 6.1
that, even when the offering agent always chooses the price and penalty to maximize
its utility, the social welfare is close to the maximum social welfare.
Figure 6.2 shows the performance of different mechanisms under the same setting
except 50 < vmin, vmax ≤ 100, 0 < wmin, wmax ≤ 50. That is, the contractor’s outside
offer v is always no less than the contractee’s outside offer w. In this situation, the
optimal offer of the offering agent is the pair so that no agent has an incentive to
deviate from the contract. Consider that the contractor is the offering agent as an
example. The optimal price the contractor is E(w) and its optimal penalty q is
one value such that the contractee has no incentive to decommit. Obviously, the
contractor will also not decommit since E(w) < E(v). If the contractor offers a price
lower than E(w), the contractee will not accept it. The corresponding social welfare
is then 0. In this situation, the maximum social welfare which can be achieved by
2Note that if v < w, the two agents cannot make a contract.
196
Bargain Fixed−0 Fixed−10 Fixed−20 Fixed−40 Rate−0.1 Rate−0.3 Rate−0.5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Different penalty setting approaches
So
ci
al
 w
el
fa
re
 
 
Offering agent maximizes its utility
Offering agent maximizes social welfare
Figure 6.1. Efficiency comparison in two-player game (1)
exogenously setting the offer is always 0 when they make an agreement. We can find
that negotiating over penalty can always achieve the maximum social welfare. We
also noticed from Figure 6.2 that by exogenously setting a high penalty (40 in this
special case), agents can also achieve the maximum social welfare.
We have shown that in the canonical two player leveled decommitment games,
negotiating over penalty achieved higher social welfare than exogenous penalty setting
mechanisms. In the two player games, agents have symmetric information and the
offering agent is able to compute its optimal offer by solving the contracting games
and decommitment games. In more realistic scenarios in which there are usually more
than two agents and agents have more uncertainties (e.g., outside options), it may
be intractable to compute the optimal penalty to optimize the social welfare. Strong
assumptions in the two player games leads us to investigate the benefits of negotiating
over penalty in more realistic scenarios.
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Figure 6.2. Efficiency comparison in two-player game (2)
We have shown that in the canonical two player leveled decommitment games,
negotiating over penalty achieved higher social welfare than exogenous penalty setting
mechanisms. In the two player games, agents have symmetric information and the
offering agent is able to compute its optimal offer by solving the contracting games
and decommitment games. In more realistic scenarios in which there are usually
more than two agents and agents have more uncertainties (e.g., outside options), it
may be intractable to compute the optimal penalty to optimize the social welfare.
Strong assumptions in the two player games leads us to investigate the benefits of
negotiating over penalty in more realistic scenarios such as the resource allocation
problem in GENI.
6.2 Resource Allocation in GENI
We explore our resource allocation problem in the context of NSF’s GENI ini-
tiative [1], which is building a prototype of a shared experimental infrastructure to
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investigate next-generation Internet applications. GENI is similar to other cloud plat-
forms in that it exposes network-accessible APIs for consumers to lease virtualized
hardware components, although GENI offers a more diverse collection of resources
donated by many providers, such as universities and industry research labs. The
intent is for researchers to experiment with new Internet protocols and applications
by reserving collections of geographically distributed hardware components and the
network links connecting them, e.g., via Internet2 or NLR. A core concept for GENI
and other cloud computing platforms is resource leasing.
Since GENI allocates resources from multiple providers, it uses one or more Clear-
inghouses to mediate the allocation. Providers delegate the right to allocate their re-
sources to these Clearinghouses, which aggregate the resources and allocate them to
researchers. As with Amazon’s EC2 and EBS, GENI allocates virtualized hardware
components to leverage statistical multiplexing and allow multiple researchers to use
one hardware component simultaneously.
GENI consists of multiple consumers that acquire resources from one or more
Clearinghouses that act as brokers for transactions between providers and consumers.
The initial intent is for the GENI Project Office to operate a small number of Clear-
inghouses, but, in general, there may be multiple Clearinghouses operated by gov-
ernments, companies, or university-led consortiums. While the initial prototype’s
scale does not warrant market-based allocation mechanisms, reaching GENI’s goal
for Internet-scale operation—allocating millions of components—motivates a market-
oriented approach. Further, decentralizing resource allocation among multiple Clear-
inghouses gives GENI the flexibility to introduce market-oriented approaches incre-
mentally in only a few Clearinghouses initially. We chose GENI as our motivation
because its decentralized design is amenable to incrementally introducing market-
oriented approaches and its structure is still open for debate. Further, we believe
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GENI’s goal as a platform for experimental research should also include research on
its own resource allocation mechanisms.
In a market-oriented GENI, consumers increase their utility by purchasing re-
sources from Clearinghouses and satisfying their resource requirements. Clearing-
houses allocate resources to maximize their profit—the difference between their rev-
enue from consumers and their cost of providing resources. As motivation for a
market-oriented approach, we also assume that the demand for GENI’s resources will
exceed its supply, which has been the case for GENI’s primary predecessor Planet-
Lab [19, 55]. In general, the market mechanism to determine the resource allocation
could be either centralized, e.g., auction, or distributed, e.g., negotiation. Distributed
approaches like negotiation, where allocations emerge as the result of a sequence of
interactions between self-interested agents, are well-suited to GENI, since its scale
and dynamics preclude a once-and-for-all global optimization of resource usage [1].
6.3 The Negotiation Model
6.3.1 The Resource Allocation Problem
We treat each consumer as a buyer and each provider as a seller, where B denotes
the set of buyers and S denotes the set of sellers. Each buyer b ∈ B has a high level
task τ , such as an experiment. The task τ of buyer b has the following attributes:
• A resource set Rb and the quantity of units τ requires. For a resource r ∈ Rb,
τ requires q(Rb, r) units of resource r.
• Task generation time tg(b) when the task is generated.
• Earliest start time est(b) where task τ cannot start before time est(b). Gener-
ally est(b) > tg(b) and b can use the time between est(b) and tg(b) to acquire
resources.
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• The period pd(b) of resource usage, such that b must use resources Rb for a
period of length pd(b).
• Deadline dl(b) that indicates the latest start time of the task of a buyer b. Since
dl(b) ≥ est(b). If dl(b) > est(b), the buyer has the flexibility to determine the
start time of the experiment. Note that the task must finish before dl(b)+pd(b),
and a rational buyer will not negotiate after dl(b).
• Value vb(t) represents the value b attaches to task completion as a function of
completion time t. Following [86], b has its maximum value at time est(b) +
pd(b) and its minimum value at time dl(b) + pd(b).
Each seller s ∈ S has different types of resources Rs in varying quantities, q(Rs, r)
units of resource r ∈ Rs, and suffers a cost cs(r) for providing each unit of resource
r ∈ Rs for a unit time period. This model follows GENI in that sellers have different
types of resources, although we simplify our problem by allowing only one “plan”
for each task. While we specify only a single set of resources to satisfy each task,
in general, multiple different types of resources may be able to satisfy a task. For
example, a researcher may either plan an experiment with a small number of resources
for a long duration, or a large number of resources and a short duration. In these
cases, we can extend our formulation to include multiple plans.
We assume each buyer is able to discover the set of resources each seller provides.
This assumption is reasonable since each seller is willing to let others to know its
capability, and, from a single agent’s perspective, knowing other agents’ information
may help it to develop appropriate strategies. For example, if a buyer knows that the
resource competition is low, it may offer a lower price. We assume that 1) each buyer
knows each seller’s expected cost cb(r) of providing a resource r ; and 2) each agent
has knowledge about the demand/supply ratio ψ(r) of resource r over time. This
assumption is not more restrictive than related work [11, 98]. Further, in dynamic
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Table 6.1. Symbols used in this chapter
Rb the set of resources needed by buyer b
Rs the set of resources provided by seller s
q(Rb, r) the quantity of resource r needed by buyer b
q(Rs, r) the quantity of resource r provided by seller s
tg(b) b’s task generation time
est(b) earliest start time of b’s task
pd(b) resource usage period of b’s task
dl(b) deadline of b’s task
vb(t) b’s value of completing its task at time t
cs(r) s’s cost for providing one unit of r for a unit time period
ψ(r) demand/supply ratio of resource r
Ab/As b/s’s final agreements
T Ab/T As b/s’s tentative agreement set
Afb/T A
f
b the set of final/tentative full agreements
R(A) the set of resources provided by the agreement set A
RAs s’s running agreements
KAs s’s set of final agreements not to decommit
KT As s’s set of tentative agreements to not to cancel
AOs s’s set of offers to accept
markets, a buyer can estimate a seller’s cost and market competition by analyzing its
negotiation history. We explore the sensitivity of this assumption in our experiments.
6.3.2 Negotiation Protocol
This work extends the alternating offers protocol [111], which has been widely
used for bilateral bargaining. Before we formally define the protocol, we first define
agents’ possible actions:
• offer [o], where o is buyer b’s offer to a seller s. An offer o is of the form
〈pr, pe,R, est, pd, dl〉 where pr is the offering price, pe is the decommitment
penalty, R specifies the set of required resources and their quantities, est is the
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Figure 6.3. Finite state machine for the negotiation protocol
earliest start time of providing resources, pd is the duration, and dl is the latest
time for providing resources. Note that when dl > est, the buyer provides a
flexible schedule and the receiving seller is able to decide the exact start time
of providing resources.
• accept [o]. When a seller s receives an offer o′, s is able to accept the offer
resulting in the two agents reaching a tentative agreement. If dl(o′) > est(o′), s
must decide the exact start time of providing R(o′) and dl(o) should be equal
to est(o).
• bid [Q]. When a seller s receives an offer o′ and the offer is not acceptable, s
can send quotes Q for its available resources. Each quote Q ∈ Q describes the
quantity of resource r ∈ R(o′) and its asking price.
• confirm[o]. When a seller s accepts an offer o, two agents reach a tentative
agreement and the buyer can confirm the tentative agreement. If b confirms
the tentative agreement, then the agreement becomes a final agreement.
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• cancel [o]. After two agents make a tentative agreement, any agent can cancel
the agreement without paying a penalty. Then, negotiation between the two
agents fails with no agreement.
• decommit[o]. After a final agreement is made, an agent has the opportunity
to decommit from the agreement and the decommiting agent pays the penalty
to the other party. Note that after time est(o), no agent can decommit from
the agreement. Furthermore, the decommiting agent pays the penalty after
decommitment happens.
Figure 6.3 shows the finite state machine for the negotiation between b and s.
The initial state is “buyer reasoning” in which b decides how to make the offer. After
b sends an offer to s, the state is “seller reasoning” in which s is deciding whether to
accept the offer or make a bid. If s accepts the offer, a tentative agreement is made.
Otherwise, s sends a bid to b and then it is b’s turn to decide its offer. If b confirms
a tentative agreement, the negotiation is in the “final agreement” state. If one agent
cancels a tentative agreement or decommits from a final agreement, their negotiation
fails and b can restart to make an offer.
An important feature of our negotiation model is that many buyer-seller pairs can
negotiate simultaneously. In addition to the decommiting action, we also introduce
another pair of actions “confirm’ ’ and “cancel’ ’. With the two actions, if a seller
accepts an offer, a buyer can still have the chance to “decommit” from the agreement
without paying a penalty. Assume that b only needs one resource. In absence of the
action cancel, if b makes offers to multiple sellers that all accept, b must buy multiple
items or decommit from agreements by paying penalties. Accordingly, b may only
propose to one seller. In presence of actions cancel and confirm, b can choose only
one contract while negotiating with multiple sellers simultaneously.
Next we formalize the notion of utility. The utility of buyer b depends on its task
completion time and its payment, including 1) its payment for getting resources, and
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2) penalties it pays to other agents and receives from other agents. b’s utility at time
t is
ub(t) =
{
vb(t) + ρb if b’s task is finished
ρb otherwise
where ρb is the balance of the buyer b—the difference between the payment received
and the payment paid to other agents.
The total utility of each seller s ∈ S from time 0 to time t is us(t) = ρs− cs where
ρs is the balance of the seller s at time t and cs is seller s’s cost for providing resources
from the beginning to time t.
6.4 Buyers’ Negotiation Strategy
Before formally defining a buyer b’s negotiation strategy, we first discuss other
important factors we consider:
• Deadline Pressure. b must satisfy its resource requirements by the deadline
dl(b), which is a hard constraint.
• Sellers’ Cost. A rational seller will not accept a price lower than its cost. A
buyer needs to offer different prices for different resources which have different
costs.
• Single Provider. If Rb ⊆ Rs, b can make a full agreement with a single
seller s which can satisfy b’s resource requirements. Otherwise, it must request
resources from different sellers and make a set of partial agreements, each of
which can only satisfy part of b’s resource requirements. The negotiation for the
latter case is more complex since b must have contracts with multiple sellers,
and making no agreement may be better than making agreements which cannot
satisfy b’s requirements. Furthermore, if b’s resource requirements are satisfied
through a set of contracts, the set of contracts should be compatible in that all
contracts should provide resources during the same time frame.
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In summary, a buyer agent’s optimal action at each time point is affected by
many factors and it is impossible to construct an integrated framework in which all
these factors are optimized concurrently. Instead, this work connects those inter-
dependent factors indirectly and develops a set of heuristics to approximate agents’
decision making. In what follows we first introduce buyer b’s strategy (Algorithm 6)
informally and then present it formally.
Algorithm 6: Negotiation strategy of buyer b
Set Ab = ∅ , T Ab = ∅, t is the real time (initially, t = tg(b)).
Let estp = est(b), dlp = dl(b) be the earliest start time and deadline for negotiating partial contracts.
Let κ (e.g., 4) be the total number of times to try different execution schedules of partial agreements. Let
Tbk = (dl(b) − tg(b))/κ + tg(b).
while t < dl(b) and the task has not started to run do /* main loop */
foreach s ∈ S such that Rs ∩Rb 6= ∅ and b is not negotiating with s do
send offer GENERATE OFFER(Ab,T Ab, s) to seller s;
end
if seller s sends a bid Q then
update the bid set;
end
if seller s accepts offer o then
EVALUATE ACCEPT(Ab, T Ab, o, s);
end
if t > estp then
decommit (cancel) agreements Ab −A
f
b
(T Ab − T A
f
b
);
set estp = max{t, est(b)}, dlp = dl(b);
end
if t ≥ Tbk then
κ−−, Tbk = (dl(b) − t)/κ + t;
if R(Ab + T Ab −A
f
b
− T Af
b
) ⊂ Rb then
decommit (cancel) agreements Ab −A
f
b
(T Ab − T A
f
b
);
set estp = max{t, est(b)}, dlp = dl(b);
end
end
if seller s decommits from agreement o then
remove o from Ab;
end
if seller s cancel tentative agreement o then
remove o from T Ab;
end
if seller s has not responded to b’s proposing o for a period ǫ then
send offer GENERATE OFFER(Ab,T Ab, s) to seller s;
end
if seller s has not responded to b’s accepting offer o for a period ǫ then
cancel the tentative agreement o and remove o from T Ab;
end
end
cancel from all tentative agreements T Ab ;
if the task has started to run then
decommit from each agreement o ∈ Ab if o is useless and pr(o) > pe(o);
else
decommit from each agreement o ∈ Ab if pr(o) > pe(o);
end
One distinguishing feature of b’s negotiation strategy is that it always tries to
make two sets of agreements both of which can satisfy its resource requirements.
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Therefore, if a set of agreements is decommited, b can use the other agreement set
to satisfy its resource requirements. If both set of agreements are not decommited,
when one set of agreements starts execution, b can decommit from the other set of
agreements. If the start time of two sets of agreements are the same, b will choose one
set of agreements to decommit before the execution starts. Specifically, b is always
trying to make a final full agreement and a set of partial final agreements both of
which can satisfy its resource requirements. In case no single seller can satisfy b’s
resource requirements, b makes two sets of partial final agreements. In addition,
b sets a small penalty for each partial agreement and thus it only needs to pay a
small penalty for decommiting from any partial agreement. While a buyer can make
more agreements to increase the probability that its task can be finished, it has to
pay more for those agreements since for each unnecessary agreement, it has to pay
either the penalty or the agreement price. Alternatively, if a buyer only makes one
set of agreements, it may be difficult to find another set of agreements to satisfy the
buyer’s resource requirements when some agreements are decommited. Experimental
results show that making two sets of agreements is better than making only one set of
agreements and making more than two sets of agreements. While the cloud resource
allocation problem is different from the problem in the previous chapter, our results
correspond to our findings in the previous chapter that a buyer making two or three
tentative agreements always gained the highest utility.
Another distinguishing feature of b’s negotiation strategy is that while deciding
the offering price pr(R, est, dl, t) of requesting resources R at time t with earliest
start time est and latest start time dl, the following factors are considered. First,
the pressure of deadline. The buyer makes more concessions when the deadline ap-
proaches. Such time-dependent concession strategies have been widely used in the
literature [11, 48]. Second, the cost cb(r) of resource r. Intuitively, a buyer needs
to pay more for a resource with a higher cost. Third, the demand/supply ratio ψ(r)
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Algorithm 7: GENERATE OFFER(Ab, T Ab, s)
if |Af
b
∪ T Af
b
| = 0 and Rb ⊆ Rs then
Let price be pr = pr(Rb,max{t, est(b)}, dl(b), t) using Eq. (6.1);
Let the penalty be pe = vb(max{t, est(b)} + pd(b)) − pr;
return offer o = 〈pr, pe,Rb,max{t, est(b)}, pd(b), dl(b)〉;
else
Let R = Rs ∩ (Rb −R(Ab + T Ab −A
f
b
− T Af
b
));
if R = ∅ then
return offer o = null;
end
if estp 6= dlp then
If possible, set the value of estp = dlp > t+ σ based on bids from sellers such that the available
resource from estp to estp+ pd(b) can satisfy b’s resource requirements;
end
Let price be pr = pr(R, estp, dlp, t) using Eq. (6.2);
Let the penalty be pe = α · pr (e.g., α = 0.05);
return offer o = 〈pr, pe,R, estp, pd(b), dlp〉;
end
Algorithm 8: EVALUATE ACCEPT(Ab, T Ab, o, s)
Let new offer o′ = GENERATE OFFER(Ab, T Ab, s);
if 1) R(o) = R(o′) = Rb, |A
f
b
∪ T Af
b
| = 0, and pr(o) ≤ pr(o′) or 2) R(o) = R(o′),
est(o) = est(o′) = estp = dlp, and pr(o) ≤ pr(o′) then
confirm agreement o and add it to Ab;
else
cancel agreement o;
end
of a resource r. The higher the ratio, the higher the price for the resource. Market
(resource) competition has the largest effect on the equilibrium price [7]. Formally,
the offering price pr(Rb, est, dl, t) for all resources Rb is defined as
c(Rb) +
(
RP (est, dl)− c(Rb)
)
(
t− tg(b)
dl(b) − tg(b)
)ε (6.1)
where c(Rb) =
∑
r∈Rb
cb(r)q(Rb, r)pd(b) is the expected cost of resources Rb and
RP (est, dl) is the expected value of finishing the task with earliest start time est and
latest start time dl. Formally,
RP (est, dl) =
{ ∫ dl
est
vb(pd(b)+t
′)dt′
dl−est if dl 6= est
vb(pd(b) + est) otherwise
When t = tg(b), pr(Rb, est, dl, t) = c(Rb), which is the lowest offer acceptable
to sellers. When t = dl(b), pr(Rb, est, dl, t) = RP (est, dl), which is the highest
offering price of b since the buyer will get negative utility if it pays more than its
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value of finishing the task. Parameter ε > 0 is used to model how the buyer b
increases its offering price with the increase of time t. With infinitely many values
of ε, there are infinitely many possible strategies in making concessions with respect
to the remaining time. However, they can be classified into: 1) Linear : ε = 1, 2)
Conciliatory : 0 < ε < 1, and 3) Conservative: ε > 1 [48]. We adopt the linear
strategy for b.
By considering both resources’ costs and market competition, the buyer’s offering
price for R ⊂ Rb is calculated in the following way:
pr(R, est, dl, t) =
∑
r∈R
q(R, r)pd(b)pr(r, est, dl, t) (6.2)
pr(r, est, dl, t) = cb(r) +
(
pr(Rb, est, dl, t) − c(Rb)
)
ψ(r)cb(r)
pd(b)
∑
r∈Rb
ψ(r)cb(r)q(Rb, r)
pr(r, est, dl, t) is the price for one unit of resource r and it increases with its cost
cb(r) and the demand/supply ratio ψ(r).
Let Ab be b’s final agreements and T Ab be b’s tentative agreement set. Let
Afb ⊆ Ab (T A
f
b ⊆ T Ab, respectively) be the set of final full (tentative, respectively)
agreements. Let R(A) be the set of resources provided by the agreement set A. If
b has no full agreement, i.e., |Afb ∪ T A
f
b| = 0, it will request for all resources Rb
from sellers which can satisfy its full resource requirements and request for resources
Rs∩ (Rb−R(Ab+T Ab−A
f
b−T A
f
b)) from each seller s which can only satisfy part
of its resource requirements. If b has a full agreement, it will request for resources
Rs ∩ (Rb − R(Ab + T Ab −A
f
b − T A
f
b)) from each seller s ∈ S.
When buyer b wants to acquire resources R from seller s at time t, in addition
to specifying the offering price, it also decides the decommitment penalty pe, and
the task execution period. First consider the case in which |Afb ∪ T A
f
b| = 0 and
R = Rb. In this case, b simply requests its earliest execution start time est(b),
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deadline dl(b), and the execution period dl(b). The seller will decide the exact
start time. We use a simple rule to decide the decommitment penalty: the lower
the price pr(Rb, est, dl, t), the higher the penalty. In other words, b does not want
a cheap full agreement to be decommited. One example rule to set the penalty is
pe = vb(max{t, est(b)} + pd(b))− pr.
We also consider the case |Afb∪T A
f
b| > 0 or R 6= Rb. In this case, b must decide
what time period to request resources since different sellers need to provide resources
in the same time period and this decision making is difficult due to uncertainty and
agents’ selfishness. In this work, b decides the task execution schedule for partial
agreements based on its information about sellers’ available resources, which can be
obtained from the bid messages and acceptance messages from sellers. Note that there
is no guarantee that b can get part or all of s’s available resources due to the market
dynamics. Specifically, b searches from time max{t + σ, est(b)} until dl(b) and sets
the task start time est as the earliest time point from which sellers’ available resources
from time est to est + pd(b) can satisfy the buyer’s resource requirements. We use
the parameter σ > 0 to allow the buyer the flexibility to negotiate for resources. We
choose this simple rule for two reasons. First, since a buyer’s value of finishing a
task generally decreases with the task start time, the buyer can potentially achieve
a higher utility if it negotiates for a set of agreements with an early task start time.
Second, due to market dynamics and agents’ strategic interaction, it is impossible to
determine the best start time. If there is no start time for which the buyer’s resource
requirements can be satisfied, the buyer simply sets est = est(b) and dl = dl(b)
and it will not confirm any partial agreement. Using our simple rule, we set the
decommitment penalty in this case to pe = α · pr, where 0 < α < 0.2.
Once the task execution schedule of partial agreements is determined, buyer b
will request resources from sellers according to the task execution schedule. However,
the selected task execution schedule may cause buyer b to fail to find agreements
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to satisfy its resource requirements. Therefore, it is important for buyer b to try
other task execution schedules if it fails to get agreements with the current schedule.
In other words, buyer b should have the “backtracking” ability of changing its task
execution schedule. In this work, a buyer agent will change its task execution schedule
if it fails to satisfy its resource requirements for a given time. When a buyer b changes
its task execution schedule, it will first decommit from its other partial agreements.
6.5 Sellers’ Negotiation Strategy
Algorithm 9: Negotiation strategy of seller s
Set As = ∅, T As = ∅;
if buyer b decommits from agreement o then
remove o from Ab;
end
if buyer b cancels tentative agreement o then
remove o from T Ab;
end
if buyer b confirms tentative agreement o then
remove o from T Ab and add o to Ab;
end
if buyer b sends an offer o then
run the greedy algorithm for OPTs(RAs,As,T As,Os);
end
if buyer b has not responded to s’s proposing o for a period ǫ then
send offer to buyer s with a price cs(r)ϕ(r, t) for each resource r;
end
if buyer b has not responded to s’s accepting offer o for a period ǫ then
cancel the tentative agreement o and remove o from T As;
end
Our negotiation strategy for the seller (Algorithm 9) has two features. First, the
seller adopts a “myopic” negotiation strategy in the sense that it accepts an offer if
and only if it can gain some immediate payoff by accepting the offer, and will not
consider the effect of its current action on the future utilities. Part of the reason
is that the seller has limited information about other agents in the market and it
is impractical to make assumptions about behavior of other selfish agents in the
market. In addition, when a seller receives an offer, it will first make acceptance
and decommitment decisions, and then generate bids to the buyer if the offer is not
acceptable. Second, the seller decides the acceptable price for a set of resources based
on resource competition and cost of resources.
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If the competition of a resource is high, a seller has an expectation that it will
receive a high price for the resource. When a seller receives an offer o, it first generates
a threshold price φ(o). If pr(o) < φ(o), it will not accept the offer. The threshold
price φ(o) is defined as
φ(o) =
∑
r∈R(o)
q(R(o), r)cs(r)(1 + ψ(r))pd(o)
in which cs(r)(1 + ψ(r))pd(o) is seller s’s “asking” price for one unit of resource r.
Obviously, φ(o) > cost(o) =
∑
r∈R(o) q(R(o), r)cs(r)pd(o). If an offer is not accept-
able, the seller will simply report its available resources in the buyer’s request, as well
as the unit price of each resource r as cs(r)(1 + ψ(r)).
Since an agent can decommit from a final agreement, a seller can make more
agreements than its capacity. In this case, a seller can decommit from an unsatis-
fiable agreement before the resource providing time. However, since an agent does
not know whether the other agent will decommit from an agreement and the seller
may pay a high penalty, we have chosen a seller’s strategy where the seller may not
make agreements beyond its capability. That is, without decommiting from any fi-
nal agreement or canceling any tentative agreement, the seller must be able to fulfill
its current running agreements RAs, final agreements As, and tentative agreements
T As [115]. This strategy also implies that when a seller receives a message indicating
confirmation of an agreement, it can fulfill the agreement without decommiting from
any final agreement or cancel any tentative agreement.
The most difficult decision problem for the seller is how to handle a set of accept-
able offers, which can be formulated as an optimization problemOPTs(RAs,As, T As,Os):
Given the running agreements RAs, final agreements As, tentative agreements T As,
and offers Os, compute the set KAs of final agreements not to decommit, the set
KT As of tentative agreements to not to cancel, and the set AOs of offers to accept
to maximize the following objective function
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∑
o∈KAs∪KT As∪AOs
pr(o)− cost(o)−
∑
o∈As−KAs
pe(o)
with the constraint that s can fulfill final agreements KAs and tentative agreements
T As ∪AOs.
Theorem 27. The optimization problem OPTs(RAs,As, T As,Os) is NP-complete.
The theorem’s proof is a straightforward reduction from the 0-1 Knapsack prob-
lem. Thus, we propose a greedy algorithm to handle this computationally costly opti-
mization problem. First, an agreement is treated as an offer and let Ω = As∪T As∪Os
be the set of offers that must be considered. s’s revenue of accepting offer o ∈ Ω is
rv(o) =
{
pr(o)− cost(o) + pe(o) if o ∈ As
pr(o)− cost(o) otherwise
Next, all the offers Ω are sorted by decreasing revenue and offers are greedily picked
in this order, starting with the first offer, and until no offers remain. Let Ω′ = ∅ be
the set of accepted offers. When an offer o is picked, add o to Ω′ and check whether
the seller is able to fulfill all agreements Ω′. Note that if o ∈ Os and dl(o) > est(o),
the seller must decide the schedule (the start time of providing resources and end
time of providing resources) for providing resources specified in the offer. If the seller
can fulfill all the agreements in Ω′ and o is an offer from a buyer, the seller will send
an acceptance message to the buyer. If the seller cannot fulfill all the agreements in
Ω′, remove o from Ω′. If o ∈ As, then send a decommitment message to the buyer
involved in the agreement and pay the penalty. If o ∈ T As, send a cancel message to
the buyer involved in the agreement.
6.6 Empirical evaluation
To evaluate the performance of our mechanism, we implement a simulation testbed
consisting of a discrete time virtual marketplace and a set of trading agents. We
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Table 6.2. Variables
Variables Values
Number of sellers [5, 20]
No. of resource types per seller [2, 8]
Quantity of a resource per seller [2, 20]
Unit cost of a resource [10, 100]
No. of resource types per buyer [2, 6]
Quantity of a resource per buyer [2, 8]
Value/cost ratio [1.2, 5]
pd(b) [10, 50]
dl(b)−pd(b)−est(b)+1
pd(b) (task execution flexibility) [0, 7]
est(b)−tg(b)+1
pd(b) (negotiation time ratio) [1, 8]
resource demand/supply ratio ψ(r) [0.2, 10]
generate all seller agents before the market opens and buyers dynamically enter the
market, which matches real-world environments with a fixed number of well-known
sellers.
6.6.1 Different Mechanisms
Negotiation mechanism (NG): When a buyer enters the market, it negotiates with
sellers following the protocol described in Section 6.3.2. At each time point, first
all buyers are triggered and then all sellers are triggered. All agents employ the
negotiation strategies described in Sections 6.4 and 6.5. A buyer quits the market
when its task is finished or it fails to satisfy its resource requirements by its deadline.
For comparison, we also implemented two other widely used mechanisms:
• Combinatorial reverse auction (CRA): In combinatorial auctions [42], a large
number of items are auctioned concurrently. In combinatorial reverse auctions,
a buyer buys goods from many competing sellers. When a buyer enters the
market, it announces its resource requirements, and sellers submit bids indi-
cating the set of resources and their prices. Finally, the buyer determines the
set of contracts. The buyer uses the well-known strategy-proof Vickrey auction
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mechanism. We assume that each seller has no knowledge of other buyers and,
thus, each seller truthfully reports its available resources and their costs.
• Fixed price scheme (Amazon) [3] : Amazon EC2 is a web service that provides
resizable compute capacity. The primary pricing mechanism for Amazon is a
fixed price scheme with hourly charges per virtual machine. While using the
Amazon scheme, a seller sets its price for each resource in advance and sellers
constantly update their available resources. When a buyer enters the market,
it decides the set of resources to buy. In our experiments, we tried different
methods for setting price of each resource, where the price/cost ratio is 1, 2, 3,
or 5.
The Amazon scheme is similar to CRA, except that in the Amazon scheme, a
seller’s payment from buyers is decided by the seller. In contrast, a seller’s payment
in CRA is the opportunity cost that its presence introduces to all the other agents.
Note that when the price/cost in the Amazon scheme is 1, the Amazon scheme is
equivalent to CRA in terms of the allocation since each seller will only charge its
cost. Our negotiation model is also similar to CRA since sellers’ accepting offers in
the negotiation model are equivalent to submitting bids in the auction model. There
are two main differences between our negotiation model and the other two models.
First, in the negotiation model, agents are allowed to decommit from agreements.
Second, there is a dynamic bargaining process in the negotiation model.
6.6.2 Experimental Settings and Measures
We performed a series of experiments in a variety of test environments using the
parameters from Table 6.2. The parameters are inspired by the current design of the
GENI infrastructure [1]. In the experiments, the number of sellers are in the range of
[5, 20], where each seller can provide 4 to 8 different types of resources. The quantity of
a resource a seller can provide is in the range of [2, 20]. The cost of a resource per unit
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Figure 6.4. Social welfare and resource competition
time is in the range of [10, 100]. Each buyer needs 2 to 6 different types of resources,
and for each type of resource, a buyer needs 2 to 6 units. The length of resource usage
is in the range of [10, 50]. The ratio dl(b)−pd(b)−est(b)+1
pd(b)
∈ [0, 7] describes a buyer’s
flexibility of deciding when to start its task. Similarly, ratio est(b)−tg(b)+1
pd(b)
∈ [1, 8]
represents a buyer’s time to negotiate for resources. We assume that each buyer
has a linear value function in which the buyer gets the highest value when the task
starts from est(b) and the buyer gets the lowest value when the task starts at dl(b).
Value/cost ratio is used to generate a buyer’s maximum value and minimum value
based on sellers’ cost of providing resources. ψ(r) ∈ [0.2, 10] is the ratio of total
resource requirements to total resource supply through the whole experiment horizon.
The main performance measure is the social welfare—the sum of all agents’ utili-
ties. Since the social welfare of a mechanism in different settings could be significantly
different, we report the ratio of the social welfare of CRA and the Amazon mechanism
to the social welfare of NG. We also report the success rate of different mechanisms—
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Figure 6.5. Success rate and resource competition
the percentage of buyers which successfully complete their tasks. Note that a high
success rate does not imply a high social welfare.
6.6.3 Results
Extensive stochastic simulations were carried out for all the combinations of vari-
ables in Table 6.2. For each combination, we randomly generated over 5000 exper-
iments and for each experiment, and tried all the three mechanisms and generated
average performance measures. Even though extensive stochastic simulations were
carried out for all the situations, due to space limitations, we only present the repre-
sentative results. The length of each experiment is 1000 time units. We found that
the confidence interval for each average value is very tight around the value, so the
confidence intervals are not reported.
6.6.3.1 Performance of the negotiation mechanism
Observation 1 : NG achieved about 13% higher social welfare than any other eval-
uated mechanism. Figure 6.4 shows how the social welfare of different mechanisms
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Figure 6.6. Social welfare and number of resource to acquire
changes with resource demand/supply ratio ψ(r). We can observe that in all situa-
tions, NG ’s social welfare is always higher than any other mechanism. Furthermore,
when ψ(r) is small (e.g., 0.2), CRA or the Amazon scheme with lower prices (e.g.,
Amazon-1.5) achieved higher social welfare than with higher prices (e.g., Amazon-8).
In contrast, when ψ(r) is large (e.g., 6), the Amazon scheme with higher prices (e.g.,
Amazon-8) achieved higher social welfare than CRA or Amazon scheme with lower
prices. This observation is intuitive: When the resource competition is low, there
are plenty of resources and each buyer can find them. However, when the resource
competition is high, a mechanism can achieve a high social welfare if tasks with high
revenues can be completed. If the price of each resource is low, a task with low rev-
enue may get resources and a task with high revenue may fail to get resources since
the resource were prematurely committed to the low revenue buyer and there was
no way to decommit from the decision. In contrast, if a high price is set for each
resource, only tasks with high revenues can get resources.
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Figure 6.7. Success rate and number of resource to acquire
Figure 6.5 shows how the success rates of different mechanisms change with re-
source demand/supply ratio. First, a mechanism with a higher price has a lower
success rate than that of a mechanism with a lower price. NG ’s success rate is lower
than some mechanisms with lower prices due to fact that in negotiation, each agent
will not accept or offer any offer worse than its expectation. However, NG ’s success
rate is lower than that of any other mechanisms by no more than 10% when the
resource demand/supply ratio is low and is almost the highest when the resource
demand/supply ratio is higher than 1. Second, with the increase of resource competi-
tion, the success rate of each mechanism decreases, which corresponds to the intuition
that with higher resource competition, it is more difficult to acquire resources.
Observation 2 : Figure 6.6 shows how the social welfare of different mecha-
nisms changes with the average number of resources acquired by buyers, which is∑
r∈Rb
q(Rb, r). We can observe that the advantage of NG over other mechanisms
increases with the number of resources to acquire. Figure 6.7 shows that the success
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Figure 6.8. Social welfare and the flexibility of starting a task
rate decreases with the number of resources to acquire, which is intuitive since it is
difficult to acquire more resources which have to be provided during the same period.
Observation 3 : In some cases, the difference between a deadline and the earliest
start time is large and each buyer has more flexility of deciding when to start its task.
A buyer b can use the time between est(b) and dl(b) to negotiate for resources. As
shown in Figure 6.9, the success rate ofNG increases when buyers have more flexibility
to decide when to start task execution. However, an agreement’s probability of being
decommited increases with more flexibility. Accordingly, a buyer may fail to get
resources due to the decommitment. Figure 6.8 shows that, with the increase of the
flexibility, the advantage of NG over the other mechanisms increases at the beginning
and slightly decreases when buyers have a lot of flexibility to decide when to start
task execution, which is mainly due to sellers’ decommitment.
Observation 4 : A buyer b can start negotiation at time tg(b) and its task cannot
start before est(b). Figure 6.11 shows that NG ’s success rate increases with (est(b)−
tg(b))/pd(b) since a buyer has more time to negotiate for resources. However, as
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Figure 6.9. Success rate and the flexibility of starting a task
shown in Figure 6.10, the advantage of NG does not strictly increase with negotiation
time: its advantage decreases when buyers have a long negotiation time. The reason
is that a buyer’s agreements made at an early stage may be decommited by sellers
when there is a long negotiation deadline.
Observation 5 : In addition to a fully distributed auction (CRA), we also designed
a super buyer which receives requests from buyers and buys resources for buyers. The
super buyer runs the auction when it has received a certain number of requests or
one requesting buyer’s deadline is approaching, whichever occurs first. Experimental
results show that NG still beat the centralized CRA by 11%. The centralized CRA
beat the distributed CRA by no more than 2%.
One major difference between the distributed auction model and our negotiation
mechanism is that in the negotiation mechanism agents are allowed to decommit
from existing contracts at the cost of paying penalties. For comparison reason, we
also allow agents to decommit in the auction model where decommitment penalties
are set exogenously [11, 98], e.g., fixed penalties (e.g., {0, 10, 20, 40}) or penalty as a
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Figure 6.10. Social welfare and negotiation time
percentage (e.g., {0.1, 0.3, 0.5}) of a contract price. Experimental results show that
CRA with decommitment is better than CRA without decommitment by no more
than 3.5%.
6.6.3.2 Evaluating agents’ negotiation strategies
Observation 6 : Since it is impossible to find out agents’ equilibrium strategies in
the complex bargaining game, we designed strategies for agents by taking into account
some important factors which are considered in the literature. While negotiation
agents with the strategies achieved higher social welfare than other mechanisms, one
may ask whether agents have an incentive to switch to other strategies. To answer
this question, we tried some other strategies as follows: 1) each buyer makes only one
set of agreements, 2) each buyer makes three sets of agreements, 3) when an agent
decide to decommit from an agreement o, it decommits before est(o) rather than
decommits immediately, 4) and a seller makes contracts beyond its capability.
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Figure 6.11. Success rate and negotiation time
We found that making these changes did not improve either utilities of agents
with new strategies or NG ’s performance. Always making two sets of contracts is
a good choice due to the tradeoff between failing to finish the task and paying too
much. While delaying decommitment does not “hurt” an agent directly, it hurts the
agent “indirectly” since resource competition will increase if each agent holds more
contracts. Further, it is better for a seller not to make contracts beyond its capability:
if the resource competition is low, generally a seller cannot make contracts beyond its
capability, and if the resource competition is high, a buyer is less likely to decommit
from a contract and a seller may have to pay more penalties for contracts beyond its
capability.
6.6.3.3 Sensitivity analysis
We also did additional experiments to explore the sensitivity of our experimental
results to changes to the parameters of our experimental environments or assumptions
about our negotiation model.
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Observation 7 : This work assumes that each agent knows the demand/supply
ratio of each resource. In reality, an agent may not know the demand/supply ratio. We
tested the negotiation model without this assumption and alternatively, each agent
predicts the demand/supply ratio through its interaction with buyers. Specifically,
a seller can estimate the competition of a resource according to 1) the requests for
the resource from all the buyers in the last λ time points and 2) the total number
of resources provided by other sellers. A buyer can estimate the competition of a
resource according to bids from sellers. In this case, we found that the social welfare
of NG is still 10% higher than other mechanisms.
Observation 8 : This work also assumes that each agent knows each seller’s cost
of a resource. We found that that the accuracy of this information does have a slight
effect on agents’ negotiation performance. When the believed cost is less than half
of the actual cost, the average social welfare of NG is 6% lower than that of NG in
which each buyer knows the actual cost.
Observation 9 : Different from existing work on automated negotiation with
recommitment, in our framework agents negotiate over both price and decomitment
penalty. We compared setting penalties through negotiation with exogenous mecha-
nisms for setting penalties [11, 98], e.g., fixed penalties (e.g., {0, 10, 20, 40}) or penalty
as a percentage (e.g., {0.1, 0.3, 0.5}) of a contract price. We found that setting penal-
ties through negotiation achieved much higher social welfare than those exogenous
mechanisms for setting penalties. In fact, setting a decommitment penalty (function)
to maximize social welfare is a difficult problem for the system designer due to lack
of knowledge and agents’ strategic behavior. Accordingly, it may be a good idea to
give agents the flexibility to decide the decommitment penalty.
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6.7 Summary
This chapter presents the design and implementation of a negotiation mechanism
for dynamic resource allocation problem in cloud computing. Our negotiation model
goes beyond the state of the art in the following aspects: 1) Multiple buyers and
sellers are allowed to negotiate with each other concurrently and an agent is allowed
to decommimt from an agreement at the cost of paying a penalty; 2) Agents are
allowed to negotiate over both price and penalty; 3) Negotiation strategies for both
buyers and sellers consider important factors widely studied in the literature. Ex-
perimental results show that the proposed negotiation model outperforms different
combinatorial auction mechanisms and Amazon’s fixed price model. In general, the
proposed mechanism can be applied in wide range of dynamic resource allocation
problems. This chapter also complements previous work on leveled-commitment con-
tracting by integrating a strategic contracting game with the leveled decommiting
game and analyzing agents’ equilibrium strategies in the contracting game.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This thesis set out to investigate the role of automated negotiation in various
aspects of complex multi-agent resource allocation problems. In this final chapter, we
will summarize the research contributions of this work, as well as discuss directions
for future research.
7.1 Contributions
The work described in this thesis makes a number of important contributions to
the state of the art in the area of agent mediated negotiation by extending both theo-
retical and heuristic bargaining approaches to more realistic settings involving uncer-
tainty, market competition, decommitment, and acquirement of multiple resources.
The contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
• We present a novel algorithm to find pure strategy sequential equilibria in bi-
lateral bargaining with multi-type uncertainty [6, 8]. Our algorithm combines
together game theoretic analysis with search techniques. Our algorithm goes
beyond existing algorithms dealing with complete information settings. Se-
quential games of incomplete information are ubiquitous and our approach is
not specific to an application since it can be applied to other uncertainty set-
tings, e.g., multi-issue negotiation with uncertain weight functions [51]. Our
study shows that there exists at least one sequential equilibrium in more than
99.7% of scenarios we have tried in which there are deadline constraints and
incomplete information. We also compared the performance of the equilibrium
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strategies and representative heuristic based strategies. Empirical results show
that agents with equilibrium strategies achieved higher utilities than agents with
heuristic based strategies. Furthermore, when both agents adopt the equilib-
rium strategies, the agents achieved much higher social welfare than that in all
other strategy combinations.
• We extend the alternating-offers protocol to handle multiple trading opportu-
nities and market competition [7]. We provide an algorithm based on backward
induction to compute the subgame perfect equilibrium of concurrent one-to-
many negotiation and many-to-many negotiation. This is the first work on
analyzing agents’ equilibrium strategies in concurrent negotiation in markets.
We observe that agents’ bargaining power are affected by the proposing order-
ing and market competition. We find that for a large subset of the space of
the parameters, agents’ equilibrium strategies depend on the values of a narrow
number of parameters. We also provide an algorithm to find a pure strategy
sequential equilibrium in one-to-many negotiation where there is uncertainty
regarding the reserve price of one agent.
• We develop and experimentally evaluate negotiation agents that negotiate for
multiple resources where agents don’t know the reserve price of each resource
and are allowed to decommit from existing agreements. Existing work only
considers single resource negotiation and often make unrealistic assumptions
about agents’ knowledge. The distinguishing feature of negotiation agents is
that they are designed with the flexibility to adjust 1) the number of tentative
agreements for each resource and 2) the amount of concession by reacting to i)
changing market conditions, and ii) the current negotiation status of all con-
currently negotiating threads. In addition, to avoid the risk of the “collapse”
of the overall negotiation due to failing to acquire some scarce resources, nego-
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tiation agents have the flexibility to adjust the deadline for different resources
based on market competition, which allows agents to response to uncertainties
in resource planning. An extensive set of experiments were carried out and the
experiments results show that each of the proposed heuristics contributes to
improve agents’ performance and our proposed approach achieved better nego-
tiation results than representative samples of existing negotiation strategies.
• We propose a distributed negotiation mechanism for the problem of allocating
networked resources in dynamic environment, such as cloud computing plat-
forms. In the negotiation model, multiple buyers and sellers are allowed to
negotiate with each other concurrently and an agent is allowed to decommimt
from an agreement at the cost of paying a penalty. Furthermore, agents nego-
tiate over both a contract price and a decommitment penalty. We also propose
negotiation strategies for both buyers and sellers considering important factors
widely studied in the literature. Experimental results show the advantage of the
negotiation model over different combinatorial auction mechanisms and Ama-
zon’s fixed price model. In general, the proposed mechanism can be applied in
wide range of dynamic resource allocation problems. This is the first work that
shows the importance of negotiation over decommitment penalties.
7.2 Future Research
Future research in negotiation theory includes attacking some challenging open
negotiation problems concerning issue multiplicity, information incompleteness, and
negotiation involving multiple agents. The problem of efficient negotiation over mul-
tiple issues is more difficult than simple issue negotiation due to difficulties in finding
efficient mechanisms that produce Pareto optimal agreements. In presence of in-
complete information, it is often difficult to compute agents’ (sequential) equilibrium
strategies. We have proposed a general algorithm dealing with bargaining with un-
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certainty and there are several natural directions suggested by our research. The
first one concerns the extension of our results in bargaining situations where there
are two-sided uncertainty or other parameters are uncertain (e.g., discount factor).
Second, we have seen from experimental results that there are more than one pure
strategy sequential equilibrium in some scenarios. It would be useful to design coor-
dination mechanisms for choosing certain equilibrium strategies for agents to play. In
addition, characterizing bargaining games with no sequential equilibrium is also on
the agenda. Finally, our experiments about the performance of equilibrium strategies
thus far have focused on scenarios ranging from low to moderate complexity, but
we wish to investigate much larger problems where there are longer deadlines and
more buyer types. Regarding multiple agents, a central research topic in bargaining
theory is understanding bargaining power, which is related to the relative abilities
of agents in a situation to exert influence over each other. In bilateral bargaining,
each agent’s bargaining power is affected by its reserve price, patience attitude, dead-
line, etc. When many buyers and sellers are involved in negotiation, it is important
to investigate how the market competition will affect agents’ equilibrium bargaining
strategies. With a large number of buyers and sellers, a single agent is unlikely to
have much influence on the market equilibrium.
Another future research direction is looking at new applications of automated
negotiation for complex multi-agent resource allocation. In practical multi-agent re-
source allocation problems (e.g., the two resource allocation problem discussed in
Chapter 1), information incompleteness and existence of market competition make it
intractable to compute agents’ equilibrium strategies. The community has explored
solutions which are alternative to the classic game theoretic solution by bounding
agents’ rationality. In such situations, designing heuristics that perform well is still
a challenging problem. First, an agent needs to learn knowledge from its negotia-
tion history. Second, market dynamics may require an agent to reason about future
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trading opportunities. In addition, each agent needs to reason about other agents’
strategies. I will try to apply the distributed negotiation approach for resource allo-
cation in new applications I have not looked into before, e.g., electronic commerce,
supply chain, web/grid service composition, workflow, and enterprise integration.
In addition to designing negotiation strategies to maximizing an agent’s utility,
designing negotiation mechanisms that maximize some global performance measures
(e.g., social welfare) is also a future research direction. One line of research is in-
vestigating some simplified bargaining games. For instance, Athey and Segal [16]
consider the bargaining mechanism design problem of allocating a good between two
players where the players’ valuations in each period are private information, and the
valuations change over time following a first-order Markov process. The other line
of research is considering more complex environment and evaluating different mech-
anisms through experimentation. The negotiation model in Chapter 6 falls into this
category and there are a number of future research directions. First, in the current
design, an agent will make its decision (e.g., accept, confirm) immediately after it
receives a message. As future work, we will consider the role of delaying making
decisions. Second, while it is impossible to derive agents’ equilibrium strategies in
such dynamic resource allocation game, it would be interesting to investigate agents’
rational strategies in some simplified scenarios [7]. Third, fully understanding the role
of decommitment in this resource allocation game deserves further analysis and ex-
perimentation. Finally, studying and evaluating other auction models (e.g., partially
centralized auction models with different ways of determining when to run auctions)
are also necessary.
Another interesting future research direction is bargaining in trading networks.
Different from trading in markets, a buyer and a seller can negotiate for an agreement
if and only if they have a relationship, or “link”, to engage in exchange. This setting
is practical since individual buyers and sellers often trade through intermediaries,
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not all buyers and sellers have access to the same intermediaries. One good example
of this setting is the trade of agricultural goods in developing countries [25]. Given
inadequate transportation networks, and poor farmers’ limited access to capital, many
farmers have no alternative to trading with middlemen in inefficient local markets.
Bargaining in trading networks has received a lot of attention in recent years (e.g.,
[25, 103, 76, 32, 38]) and the focus is analyzing agents’ strategic behavior. Future
research should include analyzing agents’ strategies in incomplete information settings
and how network structure will agents’ strategies and bargaining outcome.
Bargaining theory so far assumes that agents are fully rational, which rarely holds
in real-world domains as is well known, such human beings may not be utility maxi-
mizers. Therefore, theoretic analysis may be not useful in practice. Future research
will include analyzing strategic behavior of agents with bounded rationality. Another
related future research direction is building systems to support human negotiation
(e.g., [88, 89]), which is difficult due to a number of reasons. First, we need to con-
sider much larger negotiation space and strategy space. For instance, human beings
often use body langues while doing negotiation. Second, we need to consider many
other factors such as emotion, trust, power, culture, belief, desire, and intention.
Future research should also include designing new business models for creating
virtual enterprises. A virtual enterprise is a temporary group of fully autonomous
agents that is formed to meet a special objective or to provide a special service.
Achieving this objective or service involves performing a series of tasks that require
repeated interactions among virtual enterprise members.
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